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THE SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

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"Full of facts and suggestions that will prove most valuable to all responsible, whether as guardians or schoolmasters, for the educational training of others. The whole work should be carefully studied by the historian of education as well as by the practical teacher; to both it will be most serviceable."—*The Athenæum.*

THE SCIENCE OF EDUCATION

Its General Principles Deduced from its Aim

AND

THE ÆSTHETIC REVELATION OF THE WORLD

BY

JOHANN FRIEDRICH HERBART

Professor of Philosophy at the University of Göttingen

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN WITH A BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION BY

HENRY M. AND EMMIE FELKIN

AUTHORS OF "AN INTRODUCTION TO HERBART'S 'SCIENCE OF EDUCATION'"

AND A PREFACE BY

OSCAR BROWNING, M.A.

Fellow of King's College, Cambridge

FOURTH



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“Das Glück des Erziehers! Wer noch ausser dem innern Heiligthume der eignen Ideenbildung ein Glück sucht, das einen reinen Vernunftgenuss geben, und nicht von Zufall stammen soll, der kann nur in einem Geschäft es sich erarbeiten, welches die Darstellung der Idee in einer existirenden Intelligenz zum Ziel hat.”

“Man soll keine menschliche Kraft lähmen; unter dem Schutze des sittlichen Gesetzes und unter seiner milden Herrschaft sollen alle gedeihen.”

“Man hat nur dann die Erziehung in seiner Gewalt wenn man einen grossen, und in seinen Theilen innigst verknüpften Gedankenkreis in die jugendliche Seele zu bringen weiss, der das Ungünstige der Umgebung zu überwiegen, das Günstige derselben in sich aufzulösen und mit sich zu vereinigen Kraft besitzt.”

J. F. HERBART.

PREFACE.

I COMPLY with the request of Mr. and Mrs. Felkin to write a preface to their translation of Herbart's *Science of Education* and *The Æsthetic Revelation of the World*, not because I think that any words of mine can add to the value of the book, but because I hope that by advocating the scientific training of teachers generally, I may do something to create a public ready to welcome this and similar enterprises. The training of teachers in schools other than elementary, stands in this country in a very peculiar position. Nearly fifteen years ago the Committee of the Head-Masters' Conference took the matter in hand and requested the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge to prepare a scheme of lectures and examinations for the purpose. Oxford declined to take any steps, but Cambridge established lectures and examinations which have continued ever since. The result has been different from what the projectors of the scheme intended. Very few public schoolmasters have submitted themselves to training. On the other hand, women have fully availed themselves of these opportunities, and there are at present five training colleges for women in direct connection with the examinations of the Teachers' Training Syndicate.

It is difficult indeed to see by what argument the absence of training for teachers can be defended. What is required for doctors and clergymen would naturally be demanded for a profession which undertakes the hygiene

both of the mind and the body. It is urged by some that a university graduate who has been at a public school needs no special training, because having had experience of many teachers he can tell for himself what should be imitated and what avoided. It would be as reasonable to assert that an invalid who had passed through the hands of many physicians would make an excellent doctor. A boy is not a fair critic of a master's methods. He is generally struck to an exaggerated degree by some peculiarity which may be a merit or a defect. Indeed, the best teaching and the highest form of education are imparted in such a way that the pupil is unconscious of the process. The greatest merit of the teacher is to secure his own effacement. His greatest honour is when the pupil thinks that he has learnt everything by his own unaided efforts. A young man leaving the University goes to teach in a school with the vague recollections of many teachers in his mind. Perhaps there are one or two whom he extravagantly admires. He will imitate even these faults. He is also determined never to show the awkwardness of this man, the simplicity of that, the temper of one, and the gullibility of another. Notwithstanding these good resolutions, he may when brought face to face with a number of boys exhibit them all in turn. The master whom I most admired at school used to be very careless about the exercises he looked over in form. He used to throw them down upon the floor in a disorderly heap. When I first became a schoolmaster, I naturally imitated the practice, until one day a colleague passed the door of my schoolroom and pointed out to me that I was not only encouraging habits of untidiness, but that I was giving ample opportunity for fraud. After this I carefully collected my exercises, and took them in a neat packet to my house. Indeed, during thirty years of teaching I

have scarcely ever heard a lecture or a lesson given by others from which I have not learnt something either to copy or to avoid. The proper use of the blackboard came to me, if indeed I possess it now, from a lecture heard in quite recent years. I am certain that a competent master of method could teach nine-tenths of our public schoolmasters devices of teaching which would be of great use to them, and could correct many obvious faults.

It may be objected that training of this kind would lead to cold and mechanical uniformity, and undoubtedly this might be the case if it were carried to excess. But it will be time to guard against this evil when the danger appears. At present the balance is all on the other side. Training colleges for elementary teachers may have turned out teachers of too rigid and uniform a type. But the material has been unpromising, and the ordinary pupil-teacher has not the versatility and the independence of mind which is found in the graduate who aspires to be a public schoolmaster. But the trained schoolmaster will always have the advantage in certain points. He will secure the attention and order of a large class without difficulty, and his lessons will be better arranged so as to teach a larger amount in a shorter space of time. The practical certificate of the Teachers' Training Syndicate is given partly on a report of a competent examiner on certain set lessons delivered in his presence. No fair-minded public schoolmaster could read the detailed criticisms of these lessons furnished by the examiner to the Syndicate without admitting that he might have profited largely by the exercise of a similar criticism.

What I have said above refers to the more mechanical parts of the practice of teaching, but the same considerations will apply with equal or greater force to instruction in the theory. The theoretical part of the Cambridge

examination consists of three sections—history, theory, and practice. Each of these has its special value in the education of the teacher. A public school teacher, who takes an interest in his profession, will be struck by the fact that intelligent discussion of methods plays so small a part in the conversation of his colleagues. No body of men are more devoted to their work, probably no class of professional men carry their work so completely into every portion of their life. The details of their profession engage their minds not only in the school time, but in the holidays; they are as urgently present to the members of their family as to themselves. Indeed, the family of a schoolmaster is often as actively engaged in producing the results at which he aims, as the family of a peasant proprietor. He does not, like a lawyer or a doctor, or a man of business, find repose from his anxieties in a family circle whose interests have nothing to do with his avocations. The boy is always with him; yet the fundamental conditions of his work are often unquestioned. The practice of a large school is made up of survivals and traditions, good, bad, and indifferent, often lasting far beyond the need which called the practice into existence. The daily routine demands with pitiless recurrence the execution of tasks which we feel to be useless. Schoolmasters have not the time and still less the desire to review their system periodically so as to bring it into harmony with the needs of the age, or to make a careful apportionment between effort and result. The answer is too often given to a reformer, “Well, well, we must grind on.” A narrow and exaggerated sense of duty is frequently the bar to a higher excellence. The study of the history of education, tends to dispose the teacher to an intelligent criticism of methods, or at least to a belief that methods are capable of intelligent criticism. He may learn from

it two important things: first, the means by which the practice of his school has been gradually built up, so that he may learn to appreciate what is essential and what is accidental; and secondly, the ideals which great schoolmasters and thinkers on education have conceived as at some time attainable under happier circumstances. The student of the *Trivium* and *Quadrivium*, of Sturm, of the Jesuits, will learn something of the *genesis* of the modern public school, the reader of Comenius, of Milton, of Locke, of Rousseau, or Spencer, will have a series of ideals at his command which he may call from time to time into practical use. Also the *ex cathedra* teaching of practice is not without its advantages. The best means of imparting the knowledge of languages, mathematics, history, and geography can be taught by lectures. The best disposition of a time-table, the most important questions of school hygiene, matters so seriously neglected in our public schools, can be imparted in the same manner. The great oculist, Liebreich, visiting Eton College some twenty years ago, discovered that only one class-room in the whole school was constructed on principles which he considered sound, and the new class-rooms, built at a great expense, were in some respects the worst in the place.

But if these pleas are to be admitted for the study of history and practice, surely that of theory is of more urgent importance. The main operations of the schoolmaster are directed towards the mind of the pupil. How is it possible that these operations can be wisely or profitably conducted unless he knows as much of the growing mind as is possible to be known? Hence the study of psychology becomes of the very first necessity. There is, of course, psychology and psychology. I do not say that the best psychologist will prove the best schoolmaster, or that the most abstract psychological training is of the greatest use

to a teacher. But the psychology which has reference to the simple operations of the mind, and that branch of it which rests upon a physical basis, cannot fail to assist the schoolmaster materially in many of the most important questions which he has to decide. Let us take the case of memory. Learning by heart, which occupied so large a place in the traditional public school curriculum, was always defended on the ground that it strengthened the memory. The assertion of Locke that it did nothing of the kind was unknown or disregarded. Surely psychologists can tell us whether and to what extent learning by heart does strengthen the memory, and what kind of learning by heart will strengthen it most. As a boy I was compelled to learn in a superficial manner large masses of prose and poetry, and my memory became so weak under the operation that I was dismissed as soon as I had said a single line correctly. A friend of mine used to invent Homer as he went on like an ancient rhapsodist, and always got off with great applause. One boy would learn his part of five lines, wait till the passage came round in its turn, and go up and say it off. Another would adopt the simpler method of pasting a leaf on the desk in front of him and reading it off. These subterfuges arose from demanding under the pressure of a false theory a task which could not be performed under the existing conditions. Some enlightened schools, I believe, now exact the accurate learning of shorter pieces; but does this strengthen the memory, or does it only store it with a golden treasury of literature? Even more fundamental are the questions of pleasure and pain as inducements to learning, the best means of commanding attention, the relation of the senses to the intellect, the comparative merits of the hard and the easy. If these difficulties, which meet a schoolmaster at the very threshold of his

work, cannot be solved by psychology, they may at least be reduced to a form in which they become easier of solution. If we cannot reconcile disagreements, we may be able to see exactly where the disagreement lies.

To those who desire to study psychology in relation to education few writings will have more value than those of Herbart. He was a psychologist of the first rank, the founder, some would call him, of modern psychology. He was also a practical teacher. Pestalozzi and Froebel were to some extent both psychologists and practical teachers, but their psychology was vague, and their teaching was confined to very young children. Pestalozzi in his hospital at Stanz revolutionized the education of our present century. But the natures with whom he identified himself, and which he analysed with such loving care, were those of little children, waifs and strays, poor homeless orphans. Herbart began the study of education and of the human mind as a private tutor of boys of gentle birth and nurture intended to receive the higher education. His experience, therefore—and in him theory and practice always went hand in hand—are of especial value to teachers of public schools. His practical counsels apply to ourselves. An Eton master is not likely to be in the position of teaching the elements of knowledge from an old piece of tapestry; he is very likely to be grateful for the advice that the *Odyssey* is the piece of literature most suitable for the training of the young.

The study of the Theory of Education which I have endeavoured to advocate, has been greatly hampered in England by the want of efficient text-books. In Germany and in other countries they are abundant and accessible enough; with us educational theories have too often to be learned from summaries or from lectures. Mr. and Mrs. Felkin deserve the thanks of all who are inter-

ested in education by making these writings of Herbart accessible to Englishmen. They have accomplished their work with the greatest care and self-denying zeal. The translation is as readable as is consistent with an exact rendering of the original. If it is carefully studied, as it ought to be, there will be no difficulty in understanding it. Their introduction is probably the best account of Herbart which has appeared in our tongue. I venture to hope that their efforts, a labour of love, will be appreciated in this country, and that the work which they now put forth may be so successful as to induce them or others to undertake a similar task, and to remove a reproach which has long rested upon us, that we have no Educational Library, and that the publishers who have attempted to give us one have suffered a serious loss.

OSCAR BROWNING

TRANSLATORS' PREFACE.

THE translation of Herbart's chief educational work which is now offered to English and American readers, and especially to educationalists of both countries, was undertaken with great doubt and diffidence. But the need of such a translation was said to be felt, and we were induced to begin it by a member of the working staff of the Maria Grey Training College for women, Miss K. M. Clarke, and to continue it by the late Mr. Quick, who much desired that Herbart should be made accessible to English teachers, and without whose encouragement we should hardly have presumed to proceed. This must be our apology for undertaking so difficult a task—one we would gladly have left in more able hands. Herbart's style, classical as it is, presents many difficulties to the translator. It is one peculiarly his own, characterised by great compression of thought, and requiring close attention on the part of the reader, in whom Herbart presumes a deep interest in the subject of education. A more flowing English rendering it would have been possible to give, but it would have been a paraphrase, not Herbart himself. Therefore since accuracy, faithful representation, is a translator's first duty and virtue, we have determined to leave the work in its present form, believing that those who wish to study it will prefer to do so in the more rugged but more correct translation.

Although *The Æsthetic Revelation of the World*, having been written first, precedes *The Science of Education* in the translation, we recommend the student to read *The Science of Education* before *The Æsthetic Revelation*, as the latter requires a greater previous knowledge of Herbart's mode of thought and technology.

Our warmest thanks are due to Mr. Oscar Browning, Fellow of King's College, Cambridge, for his valuable preface, showing the worth of Herbart's writings to English teachers; we also acknowledge the careful and scholarly revision of the translation by Mr. G. W. Steevens of Balliol College, Oxford.

We are indebted to G. A. Hennig's *Life and Study of Herbart* for much information, and to it and Ziller's *Herbartischen Reliquien* for most of the biographical material. Of these we have made free use, as well as of Carl Richter's and Dr. Otto Willmann's editions of Herbart's works, with their rich and suggestive commentaries. The material of the analysis of the *Pädagogik*, given at the close of the Introduction, is taken from Richter, and that of the *Æsthetic Revelation of the World* chiefly from Hennig.

TRANSLATORS' PREFACE

TO THE SECOND EDITION.

To this second edition of Herbart's *Science of Education* we have added a few notes, and further have connected the book by numerous references with our *Introduction to the Science of Education*, published three years after the translation of Herbart's original work. The welcome given to the *Introduction* has led us to hope this connection will prove useful to students of Herbart's *Science of Education*.

This second edition will be found to contain also a few improved renderings, the most important of which is the reading on p. 117 (line 5) of conjecture for heredity. (See note on p. 117.)

A full and complete index has also been added.

CHEMNITZ, SAXONY

Dec., 1896.

NOTE ON HERBART'S VIEW OF LOCKE.

LOCKE's employment of the terms "good breeding," "knowledge of the world," etc., here included by Herbart in the expression "How to behave in society," seems to have been misunderstood by the German educationist. "To make men of the world" was never an end with Locke, as Herbart appears to imply. It was with him a *means* to his end of education, an end identical with Herbart's own, *i.e.* the formation of a moral character. "A young man," writes Locke, "should be acquainted with men *to secure his virtue*. That which every gentleman desires for his son is contained in these four things—Virtue, Wisdom, Breeding, and Learning." The order in which these stand show the relative importance Locke assigned to them, as he afterwards explains: "I place virtue as the first and most necessary of those endowments that belong to a man or a gentleman, as absolutely requisite to make him valued and beloved by others, acceptable and tolerable to himself. Without that I think he will be happy neither in this nor the other world." By giving breeding the precedence of learning, and placing learning last in the list, Locke emphasizes his dictum—"Instruction is but the least part of education." In so doing, he indicates the real point at issue between himself and Herbart, for whom instruction in his wider use of the term is the most important factor of education, since its work is nothing less than to form that insight in whose light alone the will can be virtuous. We may question whether Herbart at the time of writing the *Science of Education* had ever read the foregoing and similar passages, in which Locke lays stress on the moral aim. Later on, however, he recognised that he had misread Locke in thus confounding a means with the end, and candidly owned it.

"We easily fail to see," he writes in 1832, twenty-six years after the publication of the *Science*, "in so unassuming a writer as Locke that originality which we may to some extent call depth, and we do him injustice without knowing it. I myself have done so in former times." And he closes his long defence of Locke against the German critic Schwarz with these words: "May what I have now said atone for my misjudgment of him in the past."

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INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATORS.

HERBART'S LIFE AND EDUCATIONAL WORK.

ONE of the greatest living art critics has said, that the real strength of an artist is tried to the utmost, and never elsewhere brought out so thoroughly, as in painting one man or woman and the soul that is in them. Whether the tool of the artist be pen or brush, the assertion is equally true; indeed, it perhaps applies with greater force if the artist be a writer and not a painter, since the simpler materials to produce any effect, require greater firmness of touch and accuracy of sight in him who uses them. In no sense can the following brief biography pretend to offer that perfected portrait of a great man in which the interaction of the internal and external forces which build up character is made visible. Anything beyond the barest outlines of his personality and the outward details of his life has been of necessity omitted; and what are these, "if," as Carlyle has asked, "its inner secret, the remorse, temptations, true, often baffled, never ended struggle of it be forgotten?" The story of Herbart's inner growth and development remains to be written. This little sketch is only a humble finger-post by the wayside of a noble life, and its purpose will be fulfilled if it points the English traveller in the world of thought to what, for him, is an almost unknown country of beauty and of good.

Childhood. Johann Friedrich Herbart was born at Oldenburg, May 4th, 1776. His father, Thomas Gerhard Herbart, a lawyer and privy councillor of that town, seems to have conscientiously discharged his professional duties, but to have had no desire to extend the narrow range of thought required in their daily routine. His mother, on the contrary, Louise Schütte, the daughter of an Oldenburg doctor, is described as "a rare and wonderful woman." Utterly unlike her husband, possess-

ing imagination, strength of will, and considerable intellectual power, she was eminently fitted for what to her was a labour of love—the direction of her only child's early education, in which she happily combined discipline with affection. The boy's delicacy when a child, the result of a fall into a tub of almost boiling water, induced his mother to provide him with home instruction. Her choice of his first private tutor, afterwards Pastor Ulzen, was a wise one. The aim of all his instruction was to cultivate clearness, definiteness, and continuity of thought, and the boy's innate aptitude for philosophy received from such teaching a powerful stimulus. The mother, that she might watch the tutor's influence and methods of instruction, as well as help her son in any difficulty, was always present at the lessons, learning Greek herself, that she might the more perfectly follow the progress of his studies. As a child he showed extraordinary power of understanding and remembering the thoughts of others. He would reproduce sermons heard in church almost word for word. His mathematical turn of mind was a marked mental characteristic, evident even in his childish play, as was also his attraction to physical science. Time was found among more serious studies for music, for which he had considerable talent. His love for it lasted through life, and we are told he would seek relief in it from the arduous labours of later years, delighting his friends by his performances. His book on harmony, and a sonata of merit, composed in 1808, and performed at his Centenary Memorial Festival, prove that music was to him a source both of work and recreation. However much we may doubt the truth of his generalization, we can understand how the following piece of autobiography was written in the remembrance of this period of childhood, its mental gifts and their favourable environment—"the whole look of a well-trained boy is directed above himself, and when eight years old, his entire line of vision is beyond all histories of children."¹

Entering the Gymnasium of his native town in his thirteenth year, he already possessed that "many-sided and balanced

¹ Introduction to *Allg. Pädagogik*, page 89.

interest" which he afterwards defined as "the first part of the educational aim."

School Life. Having begun logic at the age of eleven, and metaphysics when twelve, he two years later wrote an essay on Human Freedom, concluding with the following words, curiously indicative even at this early age of the intellectual rectitude which throughout life was one of his most prominent characteristics—"It is contrary to all philosophy to reject an argument against which we have nothing to urge."

At the Gymnasium, where a year after his entrance he was placed in the prima, his favourite studies were physics and philosophy. A farewell oration delivered in Latin in 1794, in which he compared Cicero and Kant's conception of the highest good, with the principle of moral philosophy, attracted considerable attention. As to his social experiences at school, the boy's home education had increased, as was to be expected, his natural reserve; and, though he won the regard and even the affection of his fellow pupils, he seems to have formed friendships with only two of his classmates, Bonus and Langreuter. During the long half-holiday rambles, which, in the absence of any national game like cricket, formed the one great recreation then, as now, of German boys, the three friends would enter into hot discussions on many subjects, sometimes losing their way both in subjects and forests, as when Herbart thought he had discovered the secret of perpetual motion, but never failing to find the basket of provisions which his good mother would send on before them. According to the master's report, Herbart left the Gymnasium, his only school, at the age of eighteen, "distinguished among his schoolfellows for order, good conduct, and unceasing industry in developing and improving his excellent natural abilities." With a mind at once classically cultured and thoroughly trained in the processes of logical thought, he went at once to Jena to study jurisprudence at his father's wish; a subject entirely distasteful to himself, and which he ultimately threw aside.

Life at the University. The University of Jena, where Herbart spent the next three years, devoting himself to philosophy rather than to jurisprudence, was then the focus of German

philosophic thought. Karl Rheinhold, the gifted disciple of Kant, whose system had superseded that of Wolff, with its utilitarian basis for morality, was succeeded by Fichte, who became Professor of Philosophy at the University in 1794, the year of Herbart's entrance. At first the scholar, and later on for a time the enthusiastic disciple of Fichte, Herbart formed the highest estimate of his teacher's genius, and acknowledged the extent of the intellectual debt which he owed him. But the spirit of enquiry in the young student was too strong to be limited, and his acute logic soon convinced him that Fichte's Idealism was no satisfactory theory of the universe. Later he wrote: "Fichte taught me chiefly through his errors, and was able to do so, because in all his enquiries he aimed at exact thought. With and by means of this aim every teacher of philosophy is useful to his scholars; without it, the latter are but visionaries and fools."

The year 1796 marks the point at which German philosophy bifurcates into the streams of Idealism and Realism. Herbart's criticisms of this date on Schelling, whose philosophy he considered the most logical form of Idealism, contained his points of divergence from Fichte, and the leading ideas, easily recognisable, of his own future system. "However many happy thoughts," he writes, "may be scattered about in Fichte's deductions regarding natural right and morality, I consider the fundamental points, *i.e.* his theory of the recognition of a reasoning being as such, and his doctrine of freedom, as false." It is suggestive of the future teacher, that Herbart rejected the idealistic doctrine of freedom at this early stage of his mental development, on the ground of its inconsistency with the possibility of education. In the letter before referred to, he writes: "I am very modest in my demands on human freedom. Leaving that to Schelling and to Fichte, I seek to determine a human being by the laws of his reason and nature, and to give him that which will enable him to make something of himself."

Having thus parted from his teacher, he started on his own independent line of thought, often passing weeks together in the consideration of philosophical problems, to the exclusion of all other study, and rarely attending the university lectures.

In thus thinking out his subject for himself, and then discussing it with a few chosen friends, he acquired that firm mastery over his material, which characterised from this time both his written and oral productions. To this period of his life belongs also that study of the Homeric poems, upon which was founded the opinion to which he always afterwards adhered, and the practical worth of which he himself successfully proved, when teacher, that since the poems contain "the best classical representations of an ideal boyhood," the reading of them should form the beginning of education.

Herbart's mother, attracted by the University society which her mental capacity so well fitted her to enter, and glad to leave the uncongenial husband (from whom she was afterwards divorced) for her son's society, lived in Jena during the latter's residence there, associating with its professors, especially with Fichte, Niethammer, and the historian Woltmann, and using her personal acquaintance with Schiller to bring about a friendship between her son and the poet, traces of which may be found in Herbart's writings. Once more she was to exercise a beneficial influence on her son's future, by directing his strong interest in education, latent only up to this time, into its first channel of practical activity, from whence it was to pass into, and mark out the much-loved work of his life. Acting on her suggestion and advice, he left the University early in 1797, before his course was completed, to become private tutor to the three sons of Herr von Steiger-Reggisberg, the governor of Interlaken. In later years, the happy relation hitherto existing between the mother and son became somewhat clouded. Believing that from the study of philosophy, to which he afterwards returned, he would obtain but poor provision for the practical needs of life, she ceased to enter into his projects with the old approval and sympathy. He, on his part, seems to have retained his early affection for her unbroken, and we gain a glimpse of his strong loving nature from a letter written to his friend Schmidt in 1799, when his mother's illness, combined with other circumstances, induced him to resign his post as tutor. "I think I could have surrounded my garden (his pupils) with a fairly impenetrable hedge, did not my sick

mother's wishes call me away. I have begged her not to hide them from me, and you will wish me compensation in the joy of an attempt to lighten her sufferings. My good, my perpetual benefactress! how much that was undreamed of, perhaps unavoidable, has she had to suffer for my sake! How gladly would I repay her, were it in any way possible!"

Life as a Private Tutor. "Whatsoever of morality and of intelligence; what of patience, perseverance, faithfulness, of method, insight, ingenuity, energy; in a word, whatsoever of strength the man had in him, will lie written in the Work he does." Difficult indeed would it be to find a fairer record of head and heart, than that contained in the work of Herbart. He went, as he writes, into his "new world of hopes, wishes, cares and plans, with the earnest purpose of deserving the happiness it offered" him. The condition of his pupils and his general environment are best learned from his own words in a letter to his friend Rist. "The piece of land given me to till has not been neglected by nature, though it has lain fallow terribly long, has become hard and stiff, and must be thoroughly dug over before anything can be sown in it. . . . Friendly faces and helpful hands wherever help is possible, consideration and courtesy, and above all things complete freedom in the arrangement of work, combined with the greatest interest in the result—all these I wanted and have found in the house of Landvogt Steiger. . . . The man is man, the woman, woman, and the children, children; they are all actually what they seem, and so at least satisfy the requirements of truth, if not exactly of beauty. . . . Steiger is conscientiousness and punctuality itself, and yet no pedant; he is almost without prejudices, and receptive to all for which a reason can be shown. He can be at times cheerful, merry; under his rule the household lives in quiet regularity, the wife in her unvarying gentleness, goodness and charity, the children in their joyousness. The house is no temple of genius, but the abode of healthy common sense."

Herr von Steiger, probably seeing the rare ability of their teacher, left the education of his three sons, Ludwig, Karl, and

¹ *Past and Present*, by Thos. Carlyle, book 3, ch. v.

Rudolf, aged respectively fourteen, ten, and eight years, entirely in his hands, the sole condition being that Herbart should report its plan and progress to him in a letter every two months. Five only of the twenty-four letters were preserved, but these contain the outlines of an unusual course of education carefully planned, strictly based on psychology, and therefore adapted with rare educational insight to the individualities and different ages of the three boys. Being concerned in this place with the man rather than the teacher, we only remark in passing, that these letters, written at the age of twenty-one, contain many of the fundamental ideas afterwards worked into the structure of his system. Here he first conceived the thought of an *educating instruction*, and the possibility and benefit of reading the *Odyssey* in the original with boys of eight to ten years of age. Here we find him endeavouring to arouse in his pupils a *many-sided interest*, and to intertwine the pupil's interest with the teacher's own, by mutual study of the same subject. Here, in a word, he gained that wealth of educational experience, which enabled him twelve years later, when he had made trial of its worth practically and theoretically, to write as follows: "The teacher, as tutor to two or three pupils, creates his own school. To him who hears the true artist's call to education, the small dull space in which he at first perhaps feels himself confined, soon becomes so bright and large, that he discovers the whole of education therein, with all its motives and needs, the satisfaction of which is truly a work immeasurable. Be he ever so learned, the boundary line of his knowledge must fade away in the face of all that amongst which he ought to choose, if he would find what is best suited to his pupils. If he be at once strong and flexible, nevertheless *the* strength and *the* flexibility which he needs to rule perfectly, and protect the varied dispositions of those entrusted to his care, must appear to him an ideal. The home, with all its relationships and customs, must become infinitely valuable to him, so far as it helpfully co-operates, and what is wanting he must miss, that he may learn to desire it. Thus begins the education of the true teacher."

Of the three boys, Karl, obstinate, boisterous, and dearly

liking to play the mentor to his younger brother, but full of deep feeling, loving, industrious, and eager after knowledge, became Herbart's favourite pupil, and later on his devoted friend. Perhaps the knowledge, tact, affection, conscientiousness, wide sympathies and touch of humour, which, combined with "faith in the good nature of healthy boys,"¹ made Herbart almost an ideal teacher, are nowhere more perceptible than in the letters written to this boy after he had left the Steigers: "I know you find difficulty in putting your thoughts into words; this shows you do not think clearly enough, and tends to leave your teacher in the dark as to the best subjects and means for your instruction. . . . How useful it would be to you, and pleasant to me, if we could still work a while together; this depends in a great measure on whether you can express yourself clearly to me. In the summer you will read Phædo. This book especially provides you with much to think about, and if you will tell me your thoughts and ask mine, I can continue to help you. Especially tell me which of the three authors, Xenophon, Plutarch, or Plato, gives you most pleasure, and which most food for thought; do not confuse these questions, and answer each separately." After advice as to the way in which he must collect and order his thoughts—advice so clear and valuable to all boys who are in a fluid state mentally, that the temptation to quote in full is very great, the teacher in the letter gives place to the friend. "If you have no time to re-read what you have written, then the quickest letter will please me the best. I cannot give up my letter that you may make an *exercitium* of it; please remember this if you love me—it is the most binding of all the rules I send you. Remember you must not be in the least slavishly bound by them; I mean them rather as hints. . . . In all efforts for your own culture, in all attention turned on yourself, you will not forget there are duties not connected with your culture, indeed which may even clash with it, but which you must fulfil for the sake of others. Until now you have been free from heavier obligations of this kind, and if you are

¹ Introduction to *Allg. Pädagogik*, page 90.

only careful not to be rude and disobliging to your sister Henriette, and not to give yourself cause to be dissatisfied with your treatment of Rudolf, then I hope the little courtesies due to those surrounding you will suggest themselves to you more and more. It will help you to judge yourself in these matters, if I send you an extract from your last letter, which you no doubt wrote with the best intentions in the world. 'Zwar weis (weiss) ich das es mir etwas schwer sein wird, das Interessante (Interessante) was mir den Tag über auffallen mag zu finden; aber doch weil sie (Sie) es mir rathen, und weil (,) was sie (Sie) mir rathen (,) zu meinem Nuzen (Nutzen) ist, will ich es gerne thun.' ¹

"(Do not lose your temper over the orthographical faults noticed in the brackets; I did not lose mine.) What would have been your answer had I not merely advised, but asked this, and not for your advantage and pleasure, but for mine? Ought you to have refused it? Of course you know I would not for the sake of a mere foolish fancy ask you anything which cost you much time and trouble, but its value would doubtless have been as great to me as your trouble is to you. How would it, however, have been, had my aim been merely to judge of the education I had given you by its result? Would you then have undertaken the work, or would you rather have spent the time in learning by yourself? I expect the answer in your next letter. . . . You are quite silent this time about Rudolf. His teachers are more satisfied with him; may I then conclude you are making it easier for him to be good? . . . I want to remind you of little Franz, for if there is opportunity to help him to understand things, much is won for the future. . . . I ask you above all things to meet your new teacher with courtesy. . . . Pay attention when he wishes to talk of anything with you, follow the conversation where it leads, give your opinion modestly when you have one, best interrogatively; do not judge decisively—that would break the conversation; think over it afterwards, and try to follow it up at some convenient time. Tell me if you understand him, and of what you

¹ "I know it will be rather difficult for me to find out what has interested me during the day, but since you advise it, and as what you advise me is for my good, I will willingly do it."

care most to speak with him. You see, my dear boy, my wishes are with you and my spirit would fain be with you also, and with those belonging to you."

Herbart's progress in philosophical thought went on rapidly during this period in Switzerland. Whether absorbed in the view of the illimitably beautiful and sublime, woven together by nature in an Unnameable, or actively occupied in sounding with knowledge and sympathy the depths of the human heart, he felt himself more and more powerfully attracted to that unknown mysterious Unity beyond himself, which holds together and animates all things, and imparts to them its hidden force. The problem of self-consciousness occupied his mind. Its solution formed the foundation of his metaphysics, and led the way to psychology, which, impelled by its value in education, he at once began to study.

Political events which interrupted the education of his pupils, combined with personal considerations, determined Herbart to resign his post as teacher in 1799. He always remembered the Steigers' household with affectionate gratitude, and carried on an intimate correspondence with his pupil Karl till the year 1817.

Life in Bremen. In the house of his friend Schmidt, then Senator, and afterwards Oberbürgermeister of Bremen, Herbart passed the next two years studying philosophy, his object being to complete his academic course, and thus qualify for a university chair. His Bremen friends, believing him to be the man to exercise a reforming influence on public education, wished to obtain for him a schoolmaster's place in Bremen. His views of reform he gave in his work, *Ideen zu einem pädagogischen Lehrplan für höhere Studien* (1801), and the method explained therein, which he maintained instruction in the ancient languages must adopt, forms an important supplement to his later writings on the same subject.

In 1802 appeared his essay on Pestalozzi's newly published work, *Wie Gertrud ihre Kinder lehrt*. Its object was to help mothers of the middle and upper classes to form a correct estimate of its value. Herbart recognised the importance of the work, and pointed out with his usual clearness both the

truth and limitations of its ideas. He had visited Pestalozzi in 1799 at Burgdorf, and the essay contained the young philosopher's impressions of the man of genius and his method of teaching. After describing the lesson which Pestalozzi had arranged at an unusual hour in the evening so that Herbart might be present, he criticises and justifies his method as follows: "But why does Pestalozzi give so much to be learned by heart? Why does he seem to have chosen the subjects of instruction with so little consideration for the natural inclinations of children? Why does he only allow learning, never talks himself with the children, never chats, jokes, tells stories to them? Why is everything which might mitigate the seriousness of school life here scornfully banished? How is it that he, at the first glance such a friendly, lovable man, he who greets everything human with such gentleness, whose first word to the stranger seems to say, 'here he who deserves it will find a heart,'—how is it that he, amongst the children who possess his whole heart, no longer pours forth joy, no longer combines the pleasant with the useful?"

"These questions did not trouble me so very much, although others have arisen from them. My own experiences and experiments had prepared me to estimate the mental power of children incomparably higher than is usual, and to seek the reason of their pleasure in instruction elsewhere than in superfluous sporting, and their dislike of it elsewhere than in the assumed dryness and difficulty of such subjects as require seriousness and attention. What are considered the difficult and the easy, I have often found to be the exact contrary. I have long held that the sole and genuine root of instruction is a feeling of clear comprehension. And a perfect regularity in the sequence of studies adapted to all requirements, was to me the ideal, which I looked upon as the omnipresent means of securing to all instruction its true efficacy. It was the discovery of this sequence, of the arrangement and co-ordination of what was to be learned contemporaneously and what consecutively, which formed, as I understood it, Pestalozzi's chief aim. Granted he had found it, or at least was on the road to it, every unnecessary addition, every assistance by indirect

means, would be harmful and objectionable, as diverting the mind from the main point. If that sequence still remained for him to find, or any way to improve and extend, his method is at least so far correct, that it rejected harmful superfluities. Its laconic brevity is its most essential merit. No useless word was heard in the school; thus the train of understanding was never interrupted. The teacher spoke steadily to the children, the wrong letters were immediately rubbed off the slate, so the child could never linger over his mistakes. There was no deviation from the true course; therefore every moment was one of progress."

More important is Herbart's treatise on *Pestalozzi's Idee eines A B C der Anschauung*, written on his conviction that the principle was one of the greatest value, not only in the elementary schools for which it was intended by Pestalozzi, but *as applied in a developed form to the whole of education*. The book, published in 1802, consists of an introduction, in which the value of Observation¹ (*Anschauung*) as an educational factor is proved, and of three parts treating respectively of its nature, form, and employment. The cardinal fault of uncultivated sight-perception, Herbart argues, is its concentration on *colour*; observation (*Anschauung*) should correct it by exhibiting and fixing the attention on *form*. Of all the formative processes of education, cultivated observation is the most important, both for the child and boy, for it lays the solid foundation of future knowledge and judgment. The child is made up of desires, perceptions, and imaginations. From perceptions follows knowledge of nature and of objects, and they must preponderate, unless the child is to be ruled by caprice, the outcome of desires, or by delusion, the growth of imaginations. Imagination needs guidance, the desires a

¹ The word Observation is used here and afterwards as an approximate, but by no means exact equivalent for that difficult word, *Anschauung*. In *Anschauung*—a condition of reflective yet alert contemplation—there is an objective and subjective element, not included in the term Observation; there is first, perception by the child of the object or idea presented to him (objective), and secondly, his contemplation and reflection thereon (subjective).

counterpoise; both lend themselves to a keen observation of objects as they are, which means, in the case of children, as they are exhibited to them. Since the senses only discover easily what the mind knows how to see, the eye is worth nothing unless the mind is disciplined. To this end, the mind must observe, to the utmost degree of accuracy, differences of form. Forms must be studied systematically *as form*; their concepts must enter into and become an integral part of the mind's contents. Mathematics contain the material gathered by the greatest minds of all ages for the study of form, and therefore the best material for the cultivation of Observation (*Anschauung*). Hence mathematics are indispensable for the beginning, middle, and end of an educating instruction. Instruction will overcome distraction—a child's natural condition—when it has shown him the weakness, and at the same time the potential strength and capacity for cultivation of his intellect, and for this mathematics is the best instrument. "In mathematics, and nowhere else, is to be sought the thread for a child's early instruction, which can be so conditioned, that it shall provide an authority for its own use as well as for all other studies, at whose command distraction shall disappear and attention arise and endure." This is the *A B C of Anschauung*.

Since single points possess no form, and the connection of two points give only a line, *i.e.* distance without form, the connection of three points, *i.e.* the triangle, is the most simple form, the element of all others, and, as such, the elementary form for *Anschauung* (*Allg. Pädagogik*, Book II., Chap. v. 1).

It would be beyond the scope of the present sketch to follow Herbart's demonstration of the value of the *A B C of Anschauung*, and its use for other subjects of study, especially geography and natural science, in the middle and later stages of an "educating instruction." But his estimate of its value for the beginning of instruction just noticed, raises a question which will probably occur to all disciples of the new education, *i.e.* how far was Herbart indebted to Pestalozzi for his ideas and method?

Doubtless Herbart received the idea of "*Anschauung*" in its

elementary form from Pestalozzi; it is equally beyond question, that the true conception of its application throughout the whole sphere of education was Herbart's *alone*. The latter's own words confirm this. After considering "the grand idea (*Anschauung*) of the genial, the noble Pestalozzi," he says: "The discoverer has worked out the same for only a narrow sphere, that of elementary education; it belongs, however, to the whole of education, but it needs for that an extended development."¹ The total absence of any scientific training, and ignorance of even the little psychology known to his predecessors, rendered Pestalozzi incapable of generalising from his experience the laws of mind, and consequently of demonstrating the validity of any law for all education. That he clearly felt the need thereof is certain; he expressed it by saying: "Ich will den menschlichen Unterricht psychologisieren" (I wish to psychologise instruction). The first attempt to put the enlarged conception into practical shape was also Herbart's—the *A B C of Anschauung*. The deductive method he there employs is obviously one which Pestalozzi, in his ignorance of the laws of logic, could neither have used nor suggested. All points to the inference, that Pestalozzi's was the inspired idea, but its systematic expansion was Herbart's. Nor is there any evidence to show that Herbart was in any sense a disciple of Pestalozzi, or that his educational activity and theories were started by him. Pestalozzi did not begin his work at Burgdorf, where Herbart visited him, till 1799 (and with the exception of a chance meeting at Zurich there is no record of any previous one), when Herbart was actively engaged as a teacher, and had in the Steiger letters, as has been before noticed, already formulated his theory of education. The points of contact between the two teachers are many and striking. Herbart's fundamental principle of psychology—presentations are the elements of which the mind is composed—and the deduction from it on which hangs his whole theory of education—*viz.* the giving of the presentations, or the formation of the circle of thought, is the work of the teacher—are, as he himself pointed

¹ Introduction to *A B C of Anschauung*.

out, the former the basis, the latter the counterpart of Pestalozzi's practice. "The essence and the advantage of Pestalozzi's method of instruction is . . . that it perceives its work is to build the child's mind, to construct therein a definite and clearly perceived experience; not to proceed as if the boy had already an experience, but to take care that he gains it."¹ The order of instruction again was a question that both Herbart and Pestalozzi perceived to be of vital importance. Both alike also shared the conviction which ushered in a new epoch of education, that this order ought to be absolutely and solely determined by the advancing stages and corresponding needs of the child's development. "A perfect regularity in the sequence of studies adapted to all requirements was to me the ideal which I looked upon as the ever present means of insuring to all instruction its real efficacy. It was the discovery of this sequence, of the arrangement and co-ordination of what was to be learned synchronously and what consecutively, which formed, as I understood it, Pestalozzi's chief aim."² We need not multiply examples of these harmonies of ideas; they are to be considered not as composed of theories derived by Herbart from Pestalozzi, but rather as instances of the many points of contact which a great and inspired effort like Pestalozzi's offers to a different system of thought.

Life in Göttingen. In May, 1802, Herbart left Bremen for Göttingen, where he obtained his Doctor's degree in open disputation, and began his academic work with lectures on philosophy and pedagogy. These lectures, carefully thought out, and always delivered extempore, soon attracted to his auditorium the whole philosophical life of Göttingen. Among his hearers was his former pupil and present friend, Carl von Steiger; and, with him and a few other young men, who eagerly shared his educational plans and work, Herbart began an intimate and stimulating intercourse. Conscious he was in his right place, he refused a post in Heidelberg, where he would have received an income four times as large as that at

¹ *Standpunkt der Beurtheilung der Pestalozzi'schen Unterrichtsmethode.*

² *Ueber Pestalozzi's neueste Schrift, Wie Gertrud ihre Kinder lehrt.*

Göttingen. The humiliating position in which Germany then stood to France affected every unit of the defeated nation. Out of his stipend of £45 a year and the small income he derived from other sources, Herbart was compelled to contribute his quota of 1,500 francs to war expenses; and what was to him far worse, the unhappy state of the country and its uncertain future, predisposed its sons to enter business rather than study philosophy. But the troubles of the time, which shattered the faith of the many, might ruffle the surface, but could not disturb the depths of his serene and hopeful nature. "I never lost my belief in noble hearts or in knowledge," he writes at this time; and the list of his works published during the Göttingen period of seven years, affords abundant evidence that his intellectual force flowed on, not only untroubled, but with ever-increasing strength. In 1802 appeared the *A B C of Anschauung*, to which was added to the second edition of 1804, *Die aesthetische Darstellung der Welt als das Hauptgeschäft der Erziehung*. In 1804 was published *Standpunkt der Beurtheilung der Pestalozzi'schen Unterrichtsmethode*; in 1806, *Allgemeine Pädagogik* (his principal work on education), *Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik*, and *Hauptpunkte der Logik*. The latter, commenced one mid-day, was sent to the printers the next noon, a proof of the perfection which any subject of thought reached in Herbart's mind before he put pen to paper. In 1808 he finished his *Allgemeine praktische Philosophie*, and lastly in 1809 he prefaced and added some important comments on three papers written by his scholars, Dissen, Thiersch, and Kohlrausch. The prospects of the University ultimately became "so dark and uncertain," that Herbart accepted a call to Königsberg in 1809. "How happy I was," he writes, "to receive the offer of this, the most renowned chair of philosophy, the place which when a boy I longed for in reverential dreams, as I studied the works of the sage of Königsberg."¹

Life in Königsberg. During the twenty-four years spent in Königsberg, Herbart reached the height of his literary and academic activity. He began by carrying out a long-

¹ Kant.

cherished idea, that, "in education, theory and practice should always go together." Not satisfied with teaching theoretic pedagogy, he desired to found a sort of pedagogic seminary, where his hearers could apply practically the principles which they had learned from him in the class-room. "Amongst my duties," he writes, "I had the lectures on education very much at heart. But education cannot merely be taught; it must be demonstrated and practised. Besides, I wish to extend my ten years' experiences in it. So I long ago conceived the idea of teaching a small number of selected boys myself for an hour daily, in the presence of some young men acquainted with my pedagogy, who will afterwards attempt in my place and under my eye, to carry on what I have begun. Gradually in this way teachers may be trained, whose methods must be perfected by mutual observation and exchange of experience. Since a plan of instruction is worthless without teachers, and moreover such teachers as are inspired by the spirit of the plan, and skilled in the use of the method, perhaps a small experimental school such as I propose will be the best preparation for future and more extended movements. Kant's saying is: 'First experimental, then normal, schools.'" The idea that Herbart would reform education on Pestalozzi's lines aroused the liveliest sympathy in Prussia; and from the Prussian government, through William von Humboldt, the Minister of Education, whom he found to be "a learned, humane man, by no means ignorant of philosophy," he received full liberty to carry out his plan, and permission to choose an assistant at a yearly salary of 200 thalers (£30).

*Demonstrated
Lessons.*

But that plan did not stop with the training of the teachers. He had always believed and taught with Pestalozzi, that family life was "the ground on which education ought to grow,"¹ and he sought now to provide the pupils with the best substitute for it in his own home. This

¹ In this belief he was in opposition to the prevailing opinion generated by the war excitement, and to Fichte, its exponent in particular. The latter advocated education under State control, and considered its primary object was "to awake the civic and military spirit and the duty of love to God, King, and Fatherland."

*Philosophy of
Hegel.
which led to
Great War.*

became practicable after his marriage in 1811 with a young English lady, Mary Drake, the daughter of one of the first merchants in Memel. Having been ruined by the war, her father returned to England, leaving her, a girl of eighteen, at Königsberg. There, in the boarding-house to which he went on his arrival, he met her for the first time, and after an acquaintance of six weeks he determined to win her for his wife. Both in character and education she was entirely worthy of his choice. True to the highest ideal of wifehood, "wise, not that she might set herself above her husband, but that she might never fail from his side," their union seems to have been one of hearts *and* minds, and as such to have brought them a fulness of happiness during their twenty-nine years of marriage impossible under any other conditions. From this home life as a centre, with its society of kindred spirits, Herbart's activity went forth in various directions, quickened by the recognition and esteem which now came forth spontaneously to meet him on many sides. The government expressed its feeling practically, by appointing him Director of the Royal Examination Commission, and by giving him an addition to his stipend. He was repeatedly invited to Court, though "this society," he said, "interests me but little," and hardly a half-year passed in which he was not elected to sit on the governing body of some college. More precious to him than all this, as a sign of the growing appreciation of his teaching, and of that regard which honoured him as the most renowned professor of the University, was the crowd which filled his auditorium to overflowing, where his hearers could no longer find room to sit and write the heads of his lectures. For their use, and his own, during the last troubled months of 1812, when Moscow was burned, and Königsberg burdened with foreign troops, he drew a clear and concise outline of his philosophical lectures, *Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in Philosophie*, his best known and most widely read book. It treats of the nature of concepts, of the great problems in their simplest form from which philosophy is evolved. It avoided as far as possible, the ready-made dogmas of philosophical systems, leading the scholar to conjecture with thought unbiassed, through a strictly ordered

course of enquiry, the place in the distance where truth was to be found. The criticisms which the book called forth, Herbart answered in his work *Ueber meinen Streit mit der Modephilosophie*.

Psychology was the subject on which, during the Königsberg period, Herbart concentrated his greatest strength. In 1811 appeared the *Psychologischen Bemerkungen zur Tonlehre*, the *Psychologische Untersuchung über die Stärke einer gegebenen Vorstellung als Funktion ihrer Dauer betrachtet*, and in 1812 the treatise *Ueber die dunkle Seite der Pädagogik*. He completed his System of Psychology in 1814, but the conditions of the time being unfavourable to the publication of a detailed work, he deferred it for ten years. Meanwhile he compiled as a text-book, for his current lectures the *Lehrbuch zur Psychologie*. Its clear, concise language, and emphasis of what is important and essential, its direction of the reader's attention to all the chief classes of mental phenomena, the attractive manner in which the central thought is used, less as a speculative dogma than as a hypothesis justified by its fruitfulness, and finally the suggestions so stimulating to thought for the further use of that hypothesis—all combine to make this *Lehrbuch* of great value to the scholar. His chief psychological work, *Psychologie als Wissenschaft neu gegründet auf Erfahrung, Metaphysik, und Mathematik*, appeared in two parts, 1824-25. The system of metaphysics on which the fundamental principle of his psychology, i.e. that presentations are the ultimate forms of all psychical life, rested, was not published till 1828-29, and the difficulty of comprehending the book was consequently much increased.

Herbart saw that Metaphysics was the science, which suffers most from the errors of all other branches of knowledge. With the view of keeping it as free as possible from these errors, he therefore first completed his Ethics, which were independent of all metaphysical speculation, then his Psychology on its metaphysical foundation, and finally his Metaphysics. The *Allgemeine Metaphysik nebst den Anfängen der philosophischen Naturlehre*, published in two parts (1828-29) bears witness to its author's intellectual energy and many-sidedness. It con-

tains the foundation of Herbart's philosophy, and as such the final material necessary for forming a judgment on it. With this—the book which had cost him more labour than any other—his system of philosophy was completed, and the danger that posterity would receive a distorted picture of that philosophy was at an end.

Of the great number of smaller essays, lectures, etc., which Herbart produced at Königsberg, we can here mention but a few. In *Erziehung unter öffentlicher Mitwirkung* (1810), intended to arouse interest in his educational projects, he started the novel idea that trained pedagogues should live in every town, and, like doctors, be called in by parents to give their advice for each child, as to the proper ordering of studies, and on all questions of education. The *Verhältniss der Schule zum Leben* (1818) was an attempt to show the State would best forward its interest by leaving the schools under self-control. Two important fragments are the *Briefe über Anwendung der Psychologie auf die Pädagogik* and the treatise on *das Verhältniss des Idealismus zur Pädagogik* (1831). In the same year he published the *Encyclopädie der Philosophie*.

The Teacher's Institute before mentioned, being dependent in its internal arrangements on the constantly changing pupils, was never permanently organised in its original form. It was extended into a training college, and the course of instruction adapted to the four middle classes of the Gymnasium, the boys being instructed sixteen hours a week by four students. Herbart himself gave the mathematical lessons with extraordinary success, but took no other active part in the work of the institution beyond supplying the students with continual hints, and meeting them at a weekly conference on instruction and discipline. The strong opposition which met his attempt to begin the course of instruction with the study of Homer soon ceased, for his youthful experiences with his Swiss pupils were repeated in the pleasure and profit with which the Königsberg boys read the *Odyssey* under the guidance of teachers trained by him. But the general ignorance and prejudices of the parents were a fruitful source both of annoyance and amusement. The parents, for instance, of a promising eight-year-old

boy, whose ideal of education was the learning of Bible texts and fluent newspaper reading, were astounded when instead of the mental delicacies ordered, their son related the unheard-of things he was taught—about substantives and adjectives, what a river was, and how its course was determined by the mountains and valleys of the country. What was the use, they asked, of pointing out to him the doings and sufferings of his fellow creatures, and their simplest relations, when he would see them for himself soon enough? When he talked of circles, and began to measure the door and window angles, they declared that they had got on in the world well enough, thank God, without such knowledge, which only made folks worldly. But their indignation and alarm reached its climax, when some neighbours enlightened them as to the truly heathenish religious instruction their son in common with the other pupils was receiving, *i.e.* that he must look on all men without distinction as brothers, since God is the common Father of all. How these obstacles were overcome, and by what means the boy in question became a promising pupil, is amusingly and instructively told in the half-yearly report of the seminary, from which this description is taken. It was written for Herbart at his request by his student-teacher Gregor. Another report, of the year 1823, gives the following account of the course of instruction, which was given strictly on Herbart's principles:—

“Greek was begun with boys from eight to ten years old by translating in their order Homer (the *Odyssey*), Herodotus, and Xenophon, the teacher preparing the pupil (in the historical and geographical details of the book), then translating it with him, and *afterwards* gradually giving from it the elements of grammar. After Xenophon, Latin was begun with Virgil's *Æneid*, which was prepared for by a short study of Eutropius. Historical lessons from ancient history on the model of an ancient writer (for instance Livy), and plane and sphere observation-exercises (*Anschaunungs-übungen*) necessitating the teacher's knowledge of trigonometry, were given *pari passu*. Backward boys were stimulated by analytical conversations on familiar objects. Generally in the thirteenth year, or as soon as Cæsar could be read fluently, Latin syntax was begun, which, with

examples, was learned accurately by heart in from six to nine months, but no exercises were set, lest the pupil should acquire the habit of writing errors. Such written exercises, for which the pupil was prepared by learning whole chapters from Cicero and Cæsar, were begun when the syntax was finished, and at the same time as the *comparative* Greek and Latin syntax. Then followed the translation of Homer's Iliad, and afterwards Plato and Cicero, that the pupil might be introduced to a system of ethics. Mathematical instruction grew out of the observation-exercises before referred to; the pupil was taken quickly through geometry, trigonometry, and algebra, up to logarithms, with the help of the integral and differential calculus. Then followed, with more expenditure of time, conic sections, and the elements of astronomy, and finally some problems in statics and higher mechanics."

The Königsberg seminary was closed in 1833, when Herbart left for Göttingen, but the master's spirit and principles were, and are, living and active in his scholars. In 1836 Brzoska, for some time Herbart's head teacher at Königsberg, published a work entitled *Die Nothwendigkeit pädagogischer Seminare auf der Universität*. In 1843 Stoy founded the Pedagogic Society in Jena, out of which grew later a seminary and school, lately re-organised by Prof. Rein. In 1862 Ziller, one of Herbart's most able exponents, founded a pedagogic seminary and practising school at Leipsic. The seminarium and præceptorium in Hallé, resuscitated by the late Dr. O. Frick, is now conducted on Herbart's principles, and the teaching in the seminary for higher teachers in Giessen, directed by Prof. Schiller, is largely influenced by Herbart's ideas.

The attitude of the reactionary party in the government towards the universities, which were suspected, especially after the murder of Kotzebue by the student Sand, of "harbouring and fostering democratic intrigues," exercised so repressive an effect on their freedom of enquiry that Herbart determined to find work elsewhere, if possible outside Prussia. At Schultze's death, he accepted the offer of his vacant chair at the Göttingen University, and left Königsberg in 1833, followed by the universally expressed regret and esteem of his colleagues and pupils.

Second period He devoted the greater part of his later years to at Göttingen. the preparation and delivery of his university lectures, consequently his literary productions at this period were few. Among them, however, was an educational work second only in importance to the *Allg. Pädagogik*, and written as its supplement—*Umriss pädagogischer Vorlesungen* (1835). To the second edition of 1841, Herbart appended his *Umriss der allgemeinen Pädagogik*, in which the fundamental thought of that book in its relation to psychology is more fully exhibited. It called forth a most favourable criticism in the *Pædagogic Review*, where it was termed “a veritable teacher’s breviary.” The essay *Über die Subsumption unter die ontologischen Begriffe*, the letters, *Zur Lehre von der Freiheit des menschlichen Willens*, and the *Analytische Beleuchtung des Naturrechts und der Moral* appeared in 1835–36, and a second edition of the *Encyclopädie der Philosophie* in 1841. With the exception of a short interlude, during which his attitude to the government was misconstrued into one of weak submission, his lectures were as largely attended as at Königsberg, and even more enthusiastically received. His conduct he explained and fully justified in the *Erinnerung an die Göttingische Katastrophe*, 1837, which, however, at his own wish, was not published till after his death.

Death.

That death was fast approaching. With apparently unimpaired intellectual and bodily strength, he gave his usual lecture on the 9th of August, 1841. The following evening, his last on earth, he spent with his family, who specially noted in him that kindness and cheerfulness which had increased with years. On the 11th came the fatal stroke of apoplexy which ended his life almost instantaneously, and in the early dawn of the August morning he passed away to a brighter day. The students, who not a week before had listened to their beloved teacher for the last time, carried his body to its final resting-place. The marble cross which marks the spot bears the following inscription:—

“To penetrate the sacred depths of Truth,
To strive in joyful hope for human weal,
Was his life’s aim ;
Now his free spirit hath the perfect light,
Here rests his mortal frame,”

HERBART'S PHILOSOPHY AND PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION.

The significance of Herbart's life and work for the teacher arises from the fact, that education with him was the starting point and end of all his investigations. He was, as Prof. Strumpell remarks, the only modern thinker who has not treated education casually in his works, or looked at it, as Fichte did, mainly from a political standpoint, but has allowed the whole weight of his philosophy and ethics to operate on it, and construct it into a scientific system. He not only sought, found, and explained its psychological basis, but he did this in the light of his larger philosophy. "I for my part," he writes, "have for twenty years called to my aid metaphysics and mathematics, besides self-observation, experience, and experiments, in order only to find the foundation of true psychologic knowledge."

To understand Herbart's philosophy, upon which are based the *Aesthetische Darstellung der Welt* and *Allgemeine Pädagogik*, a few words as to its points of agreement with, and divergence from, Kant's philosophy, are necessary.

Kant rejected the false ethical principle that, if the desires are satisfied, the moral worth of that which satisfies them is proved thereby. A system of morality whose judgments are passed not on the will itself, but on its capacity to attain a preconceived end, was to him false. He held that the good will alone has absolute value,¹ its goodness again being entirely independent of any effect its actions may, or may not, have on its own or others' good or ill. To him all material principles, and, since experience only yields what is material, all empirical principles were worthless; all determinations of worth must follow from formal principles, and therefore praise or blame be

¹ See note, *Aesthetische Darstellung*, p. 58, and *Introduction to Herbart's Science and Art of Education*, by H. M. and E. Felkin, p. 55.

given to the will in consideration of its form alone.¹ From this followed a conclusion essential to the scientific foundation of ethics, *i.e.* that practical philosophy² must be treated independently of theoretical. In these fundamental principles the philosophies of Herbart and Kant were in entire agreement. But Kant further attempted to make this notion of duty the scientific basis of morality. To him the binding nature of duty was a universal law, and as such,³ harmony or disharmony with it constituted the moral or immoral will. Its worth he sought to find in its unconditioned origin in pure reason, the categorical imperative, "thou shalt" being the command of reason to the will. But that he might prove its validity *a priori*, he was compelled in his doctrine of transcendental freedom to introduce theoretical speculation once more into ethics.⁴

Herbart rejected on the one hand Kant's theory of transcendental freedom, on the other, that of fatalism. The former made education, as he conceived it, an illusion; for to try to influence the moral condition of a being whose will could effect its own freedom independently of all influence, was obviously a useless and therefore foolish attempt.⁵ Fatalism too, made education impossible; for if the latter were not to be an empty name, and the cultivation of morality a chimera, a certain possibility of cultivation must be presupposed. In Herbart's system of ethics, the notion of duty occupies only a secondary place. "If the notion of duty," he writes, "is to be the *first* principle of ethics, a direct certainty of the validity of an original command must exist—but it does not. For to command is to will, and if a command as such be possessed of

¹ The first principles different philosophies set up respectively, as that from which the manifold ethical relationships they contain are severally deduced, are either *material* or *formal*. The first principle of a philosophy is called material, when it makes the criterion of morality a definite object of the will, for instance happiness, or conformity to nature, etc.; it is formal when it makes the goodness or badness of the will to consist not in a definite object of the will, but in a definite manner of willing.

² The doctrine of that which ought to be, as distinguished from metaphysics, the doctrine of that which is.

³ *Aesthetische Darstellung*, p. 62.

⁴ *Allg. Päd.*, bk. 1, ch. ii. 5. See also note, p. 117.

⁵ *Aesthetische Darstellung*, p. 60.

original certainty, then one act of volition as such must take the precedence of others, which are subservient to it. But each will, as will, is equal to any other will. Consequently, since no will, as will, is superior to any other, no command, as such, has an original right to command. Hence that which is commanded, cannot as such carry with it the obligation of duty. Therefore the notion of duty is deduced, and hence can form no part of the basis of practical philosophy" (*Sämmt. Werke*, x. p. 20). Herbart thus proved that the universality of the law, notwithstanding its necessity and utility, did not supply the primary basis for estimating moral worth. That which gives to command its authority, to obedience its value, to virtue its glory, to duty its obligation, and removes the reproach of despotism and servitude, must be determined antecedently to any command or obligation.¹ In this conviction he writes, "It was a mistake to begin the science of ethics with the categorical imperative."² He pointed out further, that in taking the autonomy of the will for granted, a dual will in the same subject must also be conceived; *i.e.* an obeying and a commanding will, whereby everything else can be more easily explained, than the singular precedence of one will over another in the same subject. Repeatedly did Herbart reject the doctrine of transcendental freedom,³ and especially in relation to education expose its dangerous conclusions. We have now briefly to consider what he offered in its place.

For Kant's categorical imperative, by which reason commands the will to act conformably to the moral law, Herbart substituted his five practical ideas, placing the "imperative," as we have seen, in a secondary position in virtue of its derived nature. Kant's "thou shalt," itself the expression of a will, implied a knowledge of that which has the sole unconditional right to assume the authority of law; that is to say, a judgment independent of the will, which could estimate its value. Since the value of the will is, as we have seen, to be determined

¹ *Asthetische Darstellung*, p. 63. ² *Allgemeine Pädagogik*, bk. 3, ch. ii. 1.

³ *Asthetische Darstellung*, p. 60.

by its form, such a judgment could only refer to relationships of will, and therefore these relationships supplied, according to Herbart, the formal first principles of ethics. Contemplated by the mind, each relationship calls forth an independent judgment of approval or disapproval. This judgment must be involuntary and absolute, springing alone from the pure contemplation of the relationship, utterly without proof since none is possible, and thus it is identical in nature with the judgment which we pass at once without any logical evidence on musical harmonies or discords when hearing them.¹ On the strength of this analogy, based on their involuntary origin and certainty without proof, between the judgments of will and those of art, Herbart extended the term æsthetic judgment to the former as well as the latter, and it is thus used in the *Darstellung*. Every sphere of art has thus its own relationships, and, answering thereto, its own code of taste embodied in these involuntary judgments. A well-conceived work of art, combining with its own relationships many from other branches of art, may call into activity a corresponding variety of tastes. But we can only conceive a combined totality of these ideal appeals to taste, including the moral which is in the background of every work of art—in an æsthetic comprehension and revelation of the world which unites in itself “the fitting, the beautiful, the moral, the just; in one word, that which in its perfect state *pleases* after perfect contemplation.”² Such a revelation Herbart conceived to be the chief work of education,³ and the sum total of original, involuntary judgments which it would arouse in the pupil supplied the material which he would ultimately form into the law of his life.⁴

Herbart sought out “the simplest conceivable relations of will which can follow from its activity directed on the Ego or on other volitions or objects.”⁵ In thinking out these relationships, and in the effort to press them as it were into compendious concepts, he arrived at his five practical (*i.e.* moral)

¹ *Ästhetische Darstellung*, p. 64.

² *Allg. Päd.*, bk. 2, ch. vi. 1.

³ *Ästhetische Darstellung*, p. 69.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

ideas,¹ which are an exhaustive series of types of volitional perfection. They are the following:—

I. The Idea of Inner Freedom, which arises from the harmonious relationship between volition on the one side, and moral insight and conviction on the other side of an individual. The will is then free from external influence, and is controlled alone by the inner judgment. Herbart, in his *Kurze Darstellung eines Planes zu philosophischen Vorlesungen*, defines this idea of inner freedom as “harmony with oneself, not the empty, vague identity of the modern idea, but the Platonic *δικαιοσύνη*, the harmonious triad of *σοφία*, *σωφροσύνη*, and *ἀνδρεία*.” Of these *σοφία* is practical insight, taste, *ἀνδρεία* the active willing, *σωφροσύνη* the control of the will, which is at the same time reservation from every opposing will.

II. The Idea of Perfection or Efficiency (*Vollkommenheit*), “as a correct measure of the strength at which the judgment, or the law-giving will, should arrive,”² arises from a comparison of the various degrees of the will’s efforts, and is defined by Herbart in terms of magnitude. The terms of this relation may or may not exist in the same person. These terms are (1) Intensity, i.e. strength of degree; (2) Extension, i.e. variety of objects compassed by the will; (3) Concentration of the will going out in many directions on a main effort. Here, as in the whole realm of the æsthetic, both the greater and smaller efforts of the will command the approval of the judgment. No absolute standard of approval or disapproval exists. The efforts which in the process of comparison prove to be greater, serve the smaller efforts as standards to which they must relatively attain, if they are not to arouse disapproval. In so far as this actually takes place, the conception arising therefrom constitutes the idea of perfection (*Vollkommenheit*, that is, “*Des Kommens zu seiner Fülle*”).

In his work *Ueber meinen Streit mit der Modephilosophie*, Herbart shows that of the five Practical Ideas, that of Perfection has at first the most direct bearing on the pupil; as a being full of effort and force going forth in all directions, he first falls under

¹ See *Introd. to Science of Educ.*, p. 63, for an analysis of the practical ideas.

² *Herbartian System of Pedagogics*, Dr. C. de Garmo.

the judgment which that idea calls forth. Taking its contents, which expressed in terms of magnitude are, as we have seen, of a threefold nature, Intension, Extension, and Concentration of power, he argues that since intensity of power in the pupil is for the most part a natural gift, and concentration on a main object is neither possible nor desirable in early life, only the third magnitude, extension remains for the activity of teacher and pupil—that is, expansion of power over an unlimited number of objects, the greater the number the better; in other words, the formation of a many-sided and balanced interest, which he names as the first part of the educational aim.¹

In his *Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie*, Herbart, while pointing out the direct dependence of education on all the practical ideas, especially lays stress on the idea of perfection, “not on account of its greater importance, but because that part of the educational aim determined by it (the vitality of a many-sided interest) requires the greatest expenditure of manifold efforts, and because by it at the same time the basis of the remaining moral culture is won.”

Although the judgment occasioned by the relationship in inner freedom and in perfection is absolute, it is nevertheless incomplete, since in both relationships the will in itself may be entirely praiseworthy, while in other aspects it may be blamable. Thus the will may act according to its moral insight, but that insight may be at fault. And while the *quantity* of a powerful will may command the approving judgment, its *quality* may be open to censure.

In the remaining three relationships of will, the volitions of two or more individuals must necessarily play their part.

III. The Idea of Benevolence (goodwill) arises out of the relationship of two wills to each other, the one will existent in an individual, and the efforts of the other upon which it is directed being present in the mind of that individual. When the acting will, either in accordance with, or in opposition to that other will, makes the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the latter its object, a judgment of approval in the one, of

¹ *Allg. Päd.*, book 1, ch. II. 2.

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disapproval in the other case, is aroused, and the resultant idea is that of benevolence or malevolence. If the acting will considers the will it represents to itself, not as independent of itself, but as only a means to its own ends (self-seeking), the judgment of absolute approval disappears. To make the actual results of its acts the measure of the worth of benevolence is to misconceive and corrupt the idea.

Herbart identifies the idea of benevolence with "the absolute good, which our religion calls love,"¹ As such it forms the main thought of Christianity, at once its aim and end.

The idea of benevolence arises, as just shown, out of the relation of an acting to an imagined and independent will. Two actual wills may come in contact with each other, but they only become actual to each other through expression, through action, and action is the necessary condition of the remaining relations of will.

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IV. The Idea of Right rests upon the agreement of several wills as a fixed principle, by means of which that which arouses absolute disapproval in a conflict—that is, the mutual thwarting of two wills existent in separate individuals—is removed or prevented. Volition here is no longer, as in the relation of benevolence, existent in the mind alone, and through the aim for which it strives it trenches upon the will of another.

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V. The Idea of Equity or Retribution is founded on the balancing of a previous relationship which has been disturbed by a premeditated and compassed external act of good or ill; that is, its object is satisfaction, equitable reparation. Since this act affects the second will, it arouses approval or disapproval. Moral judgment requires that an equal amount of good or ill should return back again upon the doer of the deed. Thus arises the idea of retribution or equity.

With this the series of the original practical ideas closes. Taken in their totality they supply the notion of moral good, and hence their due and relative proportion to each other must be strictly observed. The sacrifice of one or more to the rest disturbs the balance of a well-ordered life.

¹ *Kurze Darstellung eines Planes zu philosophischen Vorlesungen.*

Applied to society the original ideas yielded for Herbart the following five derivative ideas. From the Idea of Perfection came that of a System of Culture; from the Idea of Benevolence that of an Administrative System; from the Idea of Right that of a law-abiding Society (*Rechtsgesellschaft*); from the Idea of Equity or Retribution that of a System of Rewards or Wages; and from the Idea of Inner Freedom that of an Ideal Society.

In deducing the five sociological from the original ideas, Herbart rose above the then current conception of practical philosophy, and uniting its hitherto divided parts—moral and natural right—presented them as the indivisible basis of a regenerated society. In the practical philosophy of that time the morality of individuals, or of society, did not enter into the calculations of formal justice—that is, of law and political economy; and the State was nothing more than a power enforcing order under all circumstances among its citizens, and providing for their safety, but in no way concerned with their inclinations as such. The mind of Herbart, dissatisfied with these arbitrary and superficial divisions, pierced to the underlying unity, and saw that the practical ideas which supplied the ideal to the individual will, must also regulate every form of social life—the family and the community, the State and the Church. In this manner he arrived at the derivative ideas. His theory of education and the State sprang from a common origin, the former from the application of ethics and psychology to the individual, the latter from their application to man as a member of society. The whole aim of education, according to Herbart, is contained in the one word, morality.¹ Its whole work is to form a character which in the battle of life shall stand unmoved, not through the strength of its external action, but on the firm and enduring foundation of its moral insight and enlightened will.² Not only are all measures

¹ *Aesthetische Darstellung der Welt*, p. 57.

² "Since morality has its place singly and only in individual volition founded on right insight, it follows of itself first and foremost that the work of moral education is not by any means to develop a certain external mode of action, but rather insight together with proportionate volition in the mind of the pupil."—*Allg. Päd.*, bk. 1 ch. ii. 2.

of education (government and discipline) to contribute to this work, but all instruction, "the whole treasure of accumulated research in a concentrated form," which must be given to the pupil in the light thrown by psychology on the mind's gradual development, is to advance it, and its worth is to be measured by its power of doing so. In like manner, the aim of the State, as "a society guarded by force," must be to become a community inspired and penetrated by moral ideas. To Herbart the State was no mere political body, whose power was to be limited to the administration and defence of law, and the just distribution of reward and punishment, but a corporation which, by its benevolent administration, its furtherance of moral culture, its protection of individual freedom consistent with social order, and its elevation of the general tone of the community, should make itself felt as a moral force.

In order fully to estimate the service which Herbart rendered to education, an exhaustive study of his philosophical writings is necessary, especially his conception of the relation in which education ought to stand to its foundation sciences, metaphysics, ethics, and psychology. Here it is only possible to indicate the extent of that service in the direction of psychology.

Philosophers before Herbart (Wolff, Kant, and his disciples) adhered to Aristotle's principle, but slightly modified, that the soul is the dwelling-place of higher and lower capacities, entirely separate from each other. According to this theory, mental processes lying open to the observation of experience, were classified into smaller and larger divisions according to their similitude. All phenomena of one kind were regarded as effects of a single capacity, originally inherent in the soul. Three chief capacities were assumed—knowledge, feeling, and will, each of which was again separated into its sub-capacities, the result being a system which was nothing more than a classification of so-called capacities. Given these as the material for their work, the old school of teachers set before itself a corresponding diversity of aims, each of which was to be reached by a separate road, and imagined an all-round perfection of the single capacity would follow from its concentration on one

object. Herbart proved¹ not only the falsity of this theory, but also that, were it true, education in its noblest conception would be but an empty word.

Educational problems first directed him to the study of psychology, and, convinced of its supreme importance not only for them but for natural philosophy, and the philosophy of history, ethics, and politics, he pursued it with never-failing energy for the rest of his life. Relegating in its light the "capacities" to the region of myth, he may be said to have created, as the result of his long and deep research, a natural history of the human mind. He proved how vain was the attempt to deduce from the capacities, the conformity of mental activity to law, or to reconcile with their multiplicity the simple nature of the soul and the unity of consciousness, how irrational to consider as original those endowments of the soul, which are the result of a long process of development. The arguments by which Herbart disposed of the theory are too long to give here; they are contained in his *Lehrbuch zur Psychologie* and *Psychologie als Wissenschaft*. But we must briefly consider the theory he substituted, for it provides the field for, and the single aim of, education as he conceived it.

The proposition, then, which forms the basis of his psychology is,—that presentations² (*Vorstellungen*) are the elements of mental life, and their combinations, permutations, and interactions cause all the rest of the manifold forms of consciousness. They are to psychology what the elements are to chemistry, and cells to physiology. By a presentation, Herbart means not only the complex idea presented to the mind through sense, to which the term is usually applied (for instance the idea of a chain), but the numerous elementary ideas to the furthest extremity of thought of which it is composed. Inborn presentations there are none. The soul is a *tabula rasa*, whose only original power is that of entering through the medium of the nervous system into reciprocal relations with the external world. These relations supply the mind with its primordial presentations—the sensuous ones of sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch, pleasure, pain.

¹ *Pädagogik als Wissenschaft*.

² See *Introd. to Science of Educ.*, p. 22.

They are to the mind what the postulates and axioms are to Euclid; from them its whole after-contents are derived.

The primordial presentations constitute, however, but a small part of the mind's contents; their interaction produces the derived presentations, which in their varied developments form the greater part. Presentations once created, the recurrence of the sensuous impression, which necessarily entered into the process, is unnecessary; they are an abiding portion of the mind's contents, playing their part, now one of *re-presentation* in consciousness, without further aid from the special sense organs. Those among them which are the distinct and absolute reflection of the thing or idea that caused them, are capable of development by the processes of comparison, abstraction, generalisation, into concepts (indirect, sensuous presentations), which form the material for the higher and highest processes of thought. For the union of two concepts in a proposition involves an act of judgment, and the inference or conclusion, the induction or deduction we draw from such judgments involves an act of reasoning.

The masses of presentations which the teacher finds already existent in the child's mind have two main sources, experience and intercourse.¹ It is the teacher's work to create from the former *knowledge*, from the latter *sympathy*, by means of an educating instruction.

If the mind of the child be thus built up, as Herbart affirms, "entirely of presentations," the question arises, is there in his scheme of psychology space left for the existence of individuality? Or further, assuming that existence, is there any chance in the *educated* child of its development? As to its existence, we have seen that he held the mind *has* one original power—that of entering into relations with the external world. Granting this, he provided for the existence of individuality by implication. For that one power, varying in degree in different beings, is the sum of the mind's *potential* energy. The special forms of dynamic force into which it will be converted, and which, active among the presentations, will, if permitted, select

from among them those best suited to their nature, is *Individuality*, i.e. the aptitudes of genius, inclinations, dispositions possessed by each human being, partly inherited, partly arising from that tendency to variation which is a law of the psychical, as well as of the physical world. Accepting then its existence, we may further ask, if the teacher's work as Herbart understood it (i.e. the giving of presentations and the construction of the mind therefrom) and individuality are not mutually excluding factors, which can never be multiplied into each other? They are only mutually excluding, he answers, if the teacher fails to perform his work aright. How he reconciles the two concepts, education and individuality, theoretically, is to be found in outline in the *Allgemeine Pädagogik*, and in detail in his psychological works. How he did so in practice, we learn from the Steiger letters. "The teacher," says Herbart, "ought to make it a point of honour to leave the individuality as untouched as possible"; he ought "to leave to it the only glory of which it is capable, namely, to be sharply defined and recognisable even to conspicuousness, that the example of the race may not appear insignificant by the side of the race itself, and vanish as indifferent."¹ Even from a lower standpoint the individuality will be respected by the teacher if he be wise, as a force which he must reckon with, and can use, since it will sometimes oppose, sometimes forward, his work. It plays an important part in deciding his point of departure. "It is the individuality and the horizon of the individual determined by opportunity, which decides, if not the central, at least the starting point of advancing culture."²

So far as regards the teacher's attitude towards individuality. How does *it* in its turn (and this is a question to Herbart of far-reaching importance) determine the nature and extent of the teacher's work? "The mind of an adult, consisting of knowledge and imaginings, of resolves and doubts, of good, bad, strong, weak, conscious and unconscious opinions and inclinations, is put together differently in the cultured and uncultured

¹ *Allg. Päd.*, bk. 1, ch. ii. 3.

² *Ibid.*, bk. 2, ch. i. 1.

man, in Germans, Frenchmen, and Englishmen; *how* it is put together, the *individuality* of the man determines.”¹ Is the germ of this mind which the child unquestionably carries within him, the *counterpart* of the seed of the future plant? Must it develop to a predetermined form, as the seed of corn to wheat? Or does the development go on all through life with infinite possibilities of variation, and would the vegetable world supply a truer image of the growth of mind, and the work of the gardener be a truer picture of the work of the educator, were it possible for the former “to develop a lichen in the course of its growth into a grass, the grass again into a plant, and the plant into a fruit tree?”² Unquestionably, Herbart answers, it would. For the child’s psychical part is *not* like the forms of the animal and vegetable world, his own body included. “If that mind be left to the play of chance, the latter sometimes builds, sometimes destroys; and the individual is at war with himself and his fellow creatures.”³ Were the mind moving to an end predetermined in the germ, this could not be; circumstances might favour or retard its growth, but not produce contradictions such as there are in men and society.⁴ Therefore this narrower conception, by which the teacher would be but a human gardener, and his work merely to surround the mind with conditions suitable to its predestined development, is to Herbart false. To the true educator, he maintains, is given a vaster and a nobler work, *viz.* to penetrate the innermost core of the mind-germ entrusted to his keeping; and *leaving the better part of its individuality intact*, to inoculate it with thoughts, feelings, desires, it could never otherwise have obtained. These, when absorbed into itself, will continuously help to guide and determine its aftergrowth.⁵ That Herbart should have formed this lofty conception of the work of education, and should have shown the way to its realisation in his life and writings, constitutes one of his chief claims to gratitude and recognition.

¹ *Standpunkt der Beurtheilung der Pestalozzischen Unterrichtsmethode.*

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Über einige Beziehungen zwischen Psychologie und Staatswissenschaft.*

If, then, the mind be built up of presentations, and consequently is inherently neither good nor bad, but develops one way or the other, under external influences and the guidance of the teacher, it follows necessarily that *what* it receives in the form of presentations and their mode of combination, that is to say the work of education, is of infinite importance. It is, in Herbart's own words, "the formation of the circle of thought" (*Gedankenkreis*), upon which depends the *good*, that is the *enlightened will*—the source of the one and only aim of education—*morality*. His insistence on the circle of thought as the seat of the good will, and its result, the formation of a moral character, as the whole and sole end of the teacher's work, and the strictly logical method by which *on the basis of his psychology* he showed the absolute dependence of the aim to be attained, upon the enlightenment of the will, is the *greatest service* which Herbart rendered to education. Morality depends on the *good will*, this again on the enlightenment of the whole man. Cultivate in the pupil this enlightenment, *i.e.* a "large and, in all its parts, interconnected circle of thought, which possesses the power of overcoming what is unfavourable in the environment, as well as of dissolving and absorbing from it what is good," for "he only wields the full force of education who does so"¹ The fundamental thought and aim of the *Pädagogik* is thus to aid the pupil to form his moral character by *his own power*—by "a making" he himself discovers when choosing the good and rejecting the bad."² "To place the power already existent and in its nature trustworthy under such conditions that it must surely and infallibly accomplish this rise," is the work of the teacher, and the means to its accomplishment as elaborated in Herbart's system of education are government, an educating instruction, and discipline.

The function of government (*Regierung*) is to restrain the wild impetuosity of childhood, which cannot be called will,³ until such time as the true will which renders the human being

¹ Introduction to *Allg. Pädag.*

² *Ästhetische Darstellung*, p. 61.

³ *Allg. Pädag.*, bk. 1, ch. i. 1.

capable of self-determination can grow up in its place. To form this will, in other words to form the character, is the work of instruction (Unterricht) and discipline (Zucht) combined. Herbart's doctrine of the foundation of the will has been excellently summarised by Professor Charles de Garmo as follows: "Character-building is will-building. Will arises out of desire when coupled with a conviction of the possibility of its attainment. *The representation in its strength and completion is will.* But along with every action of the will there is present in consciousness a mass of representations concerning motives, duties, considerations, etc., all of which together form a 'picture' of the will-action. When the will a second time has occasion to make a similar decision, this 'picture' of the former action at once rises into consciousness. If the second decision coincides with the first, the total representation is much strengthened and vivified. Later repetitions continue to deepen the impression. If now, upon a later occasion, a desire arises which contradicts and opposes the decisions already made, there at once begins a mental strife or struggle between the opposing representations, the old and established group which has been made strong and vivid by repeated actions of the will on the one side, and the new and opposing desire on the other. If the latter representation falls in with the former, the hindrance is removed, union takes place, and mental peace and comfort follow. If, on the contrary, the decision is opposed to previous right ones, the opposition remains, and a mental discomfort ensues, the highest degree of which is called remorse. Out of single acts of will, then, grows the more general will. Every new similar action strengthens the tendency already at hand. The memory of the will¹ or reproduction of the will-*'pictures'* becomes important in this consideration. If the reproduction is to be rapid and clear, the representations of which these pictures are composed must be intimately and strongly united. This would be the case, for example, when a will-action arises from energetic and thorough-going reflection. The latest series of representations, then, are examined by the

¹ *Allg. Pädag.*, bk. 3, ch. i. 2.

apperception or synthesizing power of the mind, to see if they can be harmonized and united to the former. The result is a judgment on the matter out of which rises a command or prohibition. When such a judgment is extended so as to include not merely a single case, but a whole class of similar cases, we call it a practical principle of conduct, or maxim. It is the business of training (*Zucht*) to see that all classes of will-action are brought under the dominion of moral maxims, in order that a 'symmetrical passion for good' may be created. 'Character is, in general, uniformity and fixedness of the whole of will.'

"Children have at first no real moral character. It arises gradually, and begins when here and there single moral volitions arise from the union of similar acts of will. These more general determinations of will-action, which through the apperception begin to accept or reject the new will-actions, form the beginning of the *subjective side*, or subjective foundations of character. Over against this stands the *objective part*, or the single will-act which results from a manifold of desire. The subjective part of character is *that which determines*; the objective part is *that which is determined*."¹

The immeasurable service Herbart rendered to education by the new light he threw on the laws of mind, indicates his distinct advance in one direction on his predecessors. Comenius and Pestalozzi, insisting that education should follow the course of the child's natural development and be based on the psychological laws of human nature, had advanced far in the same direction. But the knowledge of those laws in their day was too vague to allow of any but the most general expression of the vital truth they saw and proclaimed. Herbart himself made no pretension to possess a complete science of mind; no one was more penetrated than he by the conviction that this science was in its earliest beginning, leaving an immeasurable field for future investigators.² But his wide knowledge, his

¹ *Herbartian System of Pedagogics*, Prof. Chas. de Garmo, *Educational Review*, May, 1891.

² *Introduct. to Allg. Pädag.*, p. 83.

power of analytic and abstract thought, and incorruptible love of truth enabled him to gain a more accurate insight into the origin and progress of mental activity, and with it the possibility of marking out a systematic course of education, which in the employment of definite means would attain sure results and compass its appointed end.

Such a course of education, together with its means and their employment, is developed in the *Allgemeine Pädagogik*. The system of education it contains is, as the title of the book sets forth, deduced from its aim—morality, which in the *Aesthetische Darstellung* Herbart presents as the highest aim of humanity, and consequently of education. The two works therefore are translated, the *Allgemeine Pädagogik* following the *Darstellung* in fitting sequence as its logical outcome. Indeed, Herbart himself urges on the reader a comparison of the two works;¹ it is one of great value not only intrinsically, but because it affords a striking instance of the integrity and the constant striving towards perfection of his thought.

The reader can hardly fail to notice, that while the aim of education in the *Darstellung* and the *Allg. Pädag.* is one and the same, the *means* by which it is to be attained have received a new setting in the latter work. In the former, the aim of education is defined as Morality:—that is, a will steadfast in obedience to the commands of a taste founded on the relationships of will.² Hence arises the teacher's twofold task; on the one hand, to cultivate that taste and make it a power in the soul, which is accomplished by the æsthetic revelation of the world given through instruction; and, on the other hand, to enable the will to change its direction, in accordance with its standard of taste,³ which is effected by the awakening of manifold desires (*Verlangen*) held in check and turned into right directions by discipline.⁴ The form of the *Darstellung* is strictly deductive, passing from the aim to its postulates, and thence

¹ *Allg. Pädag.*, bk. 1, chap. ii. 1.

² *Aesthetische Darstellung*, p. 64.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

to the means of their attainment. But Herbart could not conceal from himself, that in this conception of the work of education, instruction was limited to the cultivation of taste, although to taste in the widest sense of the term; and not all the parts of instruction were exhibited in their true light. There are indications¹ that he felt that the independent value of a general culture to be secured by instruction had not been sufficiently estimated, and the problem of cultivation as such occupied his thoughts then and afterwards. The influence of his psychological studies now asserted itself more distinctly in the *Allg. Pädag.* His Psychology, as we have seen, abolished all separation between understanding and will, reason and impulse, and constructed the mind entirely out of presentations.² The sum of the presentations constitutes the "sphere of thought" in which feeling and willing also have their abode. In conformity with this, the task of education is now in the *Allg. Pädag.* conceived to be the determination of the circle of thought, and this in such a way that from it a will conformable to insight may arise. This conception receives its true force if we add, that the determination of the circle of thought is not to be effected (as in the *Darstellung*) by the awakening of a manifold desire or a manifold love, but by the animation of a many-sided and balanced interest. This, in the *Allg. Pädag.* is the task of instruction, by whose side discipline now only stands as supporter, giving

¹ *Allg. Pädag.*, bk. 2, chap. ii. 1.

² The man is driven by no other mechanism than that created out of the presentations which he receives and understands. These presentations themselves are powers which now restrain, now aid, each other; they are powers which rise and rush, throng and liberate themselves, and through this warfare fall into all the manifold conditions which we by a far too general and vague term call Will. What is not contained in this expression will? inclination, desire, fear, courage, choice, caprice, resolution, reflection, good will that knows not what is good, bad will which imagines it is good, insight without resolution, resolution without strength, horror at the crime which is in the same moment deliberately perpetrated—and all the rest of the phenomena which in their wonderful mixture and separation, their continuous, incessant changing and new formations put to the blush and destroy at every moment all divisions made by philosophers between understanding and willing, reason and arbitrariness, impulse and freedom.—*Über den Standpunkt der Beurtheilung der Pestalozzischen Unterrichtsmethode.*

strength to the character whose adjustment has been provided for by instruction. Herbart was the first clearly to conceive the idea of an *educating instruction*, i.e. one having a moral aim, and hence, to place instruction as a whole in connection with the final aim of all education, deducing a plan embracing it in its totality from that aim. The later conception is in no wise inconsistent with the meaning of the earlier. To set up morality and to cultivate a moral character have an interchangeable meaning. The "idea of God" of the *Darstellung* is commensurate with the "end of nature" of the *Pädagogik*; the "empirical interest" of the *Pädagogik* is directed to "teleological inquiry"; the "speculative" led to the idea of Providence. Religion must be so cultivated that "it may find the discord unbearable arising from a world without moral order," while sympathy with humanity must lead to "the recognition of its dependence." But in the *Pädagogik* instruction takes a more proportionate place, and is referred, with greater emphasis, to a psychological basis, while in the *Darstellung* ethical considerations preponderate.

The ideal tendency which education receives from ethics is brought out into stronger relief in the *Darstellung* than in any of Herbart's after works, though its main thought—that the harmonious working together of all elements in the mind can alone insure the enduring strength of morality—underlies, as we have seen, the whole of the *Pädagogik*. The germs of the ideas afterwards to be fully developed in the *Darstellung* may be found in Herbart's letters before-mentioned to Herr von Steiger. In the fourth letter of the series he is busied in the case of his pupil Ludwig, with the problem of how "to give an equipoise to a nature predisposed to egotism without injuring its activity, by placing a picture drawn in true and sharp outlines of what humanity can and ought to be, that the effort to live in conformity to his insight may be aroused in the boy." In the "circumspect morality, exerting insight and imagination" of the third letter, the aim of the *Darstellung* is expressed. And the formation of character which is to be the joint work of teacher and pupil in the fourth letter is the same in its essential point—the relative activity of teacher and

pupil—as that which in the *Darstellung* is to be “the chief work of education.” In the former the teacher is to exhibit the “course of the moral development of humanity” in such a way that the boy may be led to “correctly form and pronounce on its varied phases his own approving and disapproving judgment, and thus learn to shape his own principles.” In the latter it is the teacher’s task “to place the trustworthy power existent in the mind of the pupil in the midst of such conditions that it must inevitably effect the rise to self-conscious personality,” while it is the pupil’s part to form his character through “‘a making’ he himself discovers in choosing the good and rejecting the bad.” The main thought of the *Darstellung* is but another expression of the principle Herbart arrived at when, as a young man of twenty-one, he was in the midst of his first year of active work as teacher—the principle “that no human faculty ought to be crippled, but should advance to good under the protection and gentle rule of the moral law.” This harmony in all he wrote, and, as his life bears witness, in all he did, is intensely characteristic of the man. Not only do we find it in the Letters and the *Darstellung*, which are separated from each other by a period of seven years—a most important period in Herbart’s mental growth, during which his practical philosophy, whose main features were first given in the *Darstellung*, shaped itself; it is quite as noticeable in the *Allg. Pädag.*, and in his last important work, *Umriss pädagogischer Vorlesungen*, a supplement to the *Allg. Pädag.* written seven years before his death. It was an intense belief in, and love for, the human nature to be educated, and an enthusiasm for the teacher’s work growing out of his own lofty conception of it, which gave this fundamental unity to his life and thought.

There seems to be a general consensus of opinion among German scholars as to the beauty of Herbart’s style. Bartolomai, one of his most accurate and sympathetic expositors, writes: “No philosopher has surpassed Herbart in the lucidity of his classic style, or paid more devoted homage to the genius of the German language.” Jean Paul Richter, in the preface to *Levana*, while agreeing in the main with Bartolomai, pointed out the peculiar difficulty of the *Allg. Pädag.*

"The exquisite and alluring language," he writes, "cannot suppress the wish that Herbart had not made use of the title-privilege 'general' so generally, since the reader is necessarily left to fill up the too wide formulas for himself. When, however, Herbart desires to strengthen the muscles, and stretch the bowstring of the character, he becomes circumstantial enough, and with good reason, for his language and his thoughts reveal a character peculiarly his own." The following analyses of the *Darstellung* and the *Allgemeine Pädagogik* may be found useful as a preliminary to the translation, but the reader will soon discover for himself, that nothing but a concentrated effort of thought, patient study of the teacher's fundamental principles, and complete mastery of his technology, will enable him to appreciate the power or value of either work.

THE ÆSTHETIC REVELATION OF THE WORLD AS THE CHIEF WORK OF EDUCATION, published in 1804, when Herbart was twenty-eight years old, although complete in itself, was added to the second edition of his work entitled *Pestalozzi's Idee eines A B C der Anschauung*, as an extension of the latter. Proceeding from morality as the highest aim of humanity, and consequently of education, the essence of formation of character is defined as "a making' which the pupil himself discovers when choosing the good and rejecting the bad." This rise to self-conscious personality must take place in the mind of the pupil himself, and be perfected by his own exertion. To place the power already existent, and in its nature trustworthy, in the midst of such conditions that it must *infallibly* effect this rise, is what the teacher must conceive as possible—while he must consider the great work for all his efforts is to reach, understand, and guide that power.

The first predicate of right willing is obedience. But not every obedience to the first chance command is moral. The individual obeying must have examined and chosen the command, he himself must have placed it in its position of command. The moral is its own authority. Not that it comes forth as originating a decisive judgment, for the moral being is essen-

tially humble, but as finding an antecedent necessity. This necessity can be neither logical nor moral, since every "must" is excluded, and the question here is only of *original* necessity, which does not become moral necessity till it governs obedience in opposition to inclination.

Therefore only æsthetic necessity remains, the characteristic of which is that it speaks in purely absolute judgments entirely without proof, moreover without using compulsion to enforce its claim. It takes no account of inclination, neither gratifying nor restraining it; and arises on the complete presentation of its object. With a multitude of objects, there is a corresponding number of original judgments which are not linked together so as to be logically deducible from each other. At the most, after exclusion of all that is incidental in various objects, analogous relations will be found, and these will generate analogous judgments. As far as we know the simple æsthetic relations, we have simple judgments of them. It is important that these judgments should never require the actuality of their object. Only when that object becomes existent and permanent, is the judgment which announces what it should be, steadfast also. And through this steadfastness, it becomes to the human being who cannot escape it the most inexorable necessity; it is its slow constraining force which we call conscience.

If we consider will in the simplest conceivable relationships, arising from its action on itself, on other wills or on material objects, an original, absolute, independent, æsthetic judgment of a particular nature, and with direct evidence, will be formed on each of these relationships. From the judgments so received, a plan of life must be afterwards formed. This is effected by discipline, which is necessarily a preparation for the æsthetic revelation of the world. Through it freedom is given and obtained to alter the direction of will, of desire; that is, the power of adhering to one inclination until another is ready to assert itself. At this point all turns on the question whether egotism or practical¹ reason will take possession of this free-

¹ Practical, *i.e.* used in the sense of what "ought to be."

dom; if Egotism, it will become Worldly Wisdom; if Practical Reason, it will become Morality.

Which it shall become ought to be no open question, if the teacher has done his part. If he begins his work aright, he can, by the æsthetic revelation of the world, determine the boy's perception so early and so powerfully, that the free bearing of the mind will receive its law, not from worldly wisdom, but from pure practical reflection. "Such a revelation of the world—the whole known world, and all known times, obliterating if necessary the bad effect of undesirable surroundings—this may with justice be called the chief work of education."¹

The first necessity for such a revelation is a perfect family life; upon which, in all its dignity and purity, the child in its midst can look with his ingenuous eyes. From thence education moves forth in a twofold course—outwards and upwards. Upwards, since in the perfect family life we find the most perfect earthly expression of the Divine, there is but one step possible, the step to the supersensuous world—to God. In a passage of great beauty, remarkable for its forcible language and sublime thought, the idea of God is exhibited in its absolute unconditioned perfection, and in the life of man bounded by the limits of consciousness alone. But if this idea is to maintain in the future its rightful place in the mind of the man, it must not be forced too early, or too persistently, upon the immature mind of the child. There it must be gradually and indirectly fostered by means of a double contrast; first between the Homeric characters and the child's relations whom he honours and loves, and secondly between the polytheism of Homer and the Providence whose image the child will fashion for himself in the likeness of his parents. This contrast naturally leads to the second,—the outward course of education, that is, the course of the progressive revelation of the world. This is given along the two lines of instruction, knowledge and sympathy; which, guided by instruction, continue to run on side by side, till they find their meeting-place at last in God.

¹ *Ästhetische Darstellung*, p. 69.

THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SCIENCE OF EDUCATION appeared in 1806, while Herbart was at Göttingen. His philosophical studies and work as teacher, not only in Switzerland, but in Bremen and Göttingen, to which he owed his "little collection" as he called it, of carefully arranged observations and experiments collected on a variety of occasions,¹ provided him with ample material, both theoretical and practical. He tells us "the plan of the *Pädagogik* was, after practical use, thought over carefully in all its details many years before pen was put to paper towards the end of the year 1805." The book is dedicated to his old and true friend Senator Schmidt, and the letter accompanying the presentation copy runs as follows: "My dear Schmidt, you will find yourself godfather here to a late-born child, which you saw six years ago as an embryo, and which would not now have seen the light, had I not been impelled to finish it by the wish, that my two able pupils, Counts Sievers and Platers, should take home this conclusion of their work. The hurry of its completion compels me to request that you will overlook omissions in the final correction, and be content with a tolerable statement of the main concepts." Herbart himself wrote the first notice of the work for the Göttingen paper, containing hints to readers and an explanation of its plan. From its title *Pedagogy Deduced from its Aim*, a strictly deductive method of treatment, like that of the *Darstellung*, might have been and was expected. But while many-sidedness of interest as the work of instruction, and moral strength of character as the work of discipline are rightly placed side by side, a section devoted to *formation of character*, of virtue as a whole—which ought to have preceded any explanation of those concepts that signify the *two* parts of education—is not given till near the end. By exhibiting the work of instruction and discipline as following, not from the fundamental thought of the book, *i.e.* formation of a moral character, but from consideration of "possible and necessary aims"² that fundamental thought is still

¹ *Allg. Pädag.*, bk. 3, ch. vi.

² *Ibid.*, bk. 1, ch. ii.

further thrust into the background; and instruction and discipline are not brought back to it—the concept from which they are actually deduced—till near the end, the fourth chapter of the third book. Not till that point does Richter's praise, given in *Levana*, become applicable. Herbart, in the notice of the *Allgemeine Pädagogik* before referred to, wrote, "the pedagogy in question has by no means the proud wish to pass for a speculative work of art. It asks those who read it through from beginning to end, to re-read it once more from *end to beginning*, when the innermost connection of the work of education differentiated in the concepts will appear more conspicuously than the headings would lead the reader to suppose possible." By the hint thus given, Herbart tried to guard his readers from confusing the collateral aims with the chief one—formation of character—which occupies its true position of precedence in the re-reading he recommends. He seems to have taken this departure from the strictly deductive method out of consideration for the teacher, who, confronted by a multitude of means, mainly requires to have, as it were, a bird's-eye view of them all; he hoped "the disadvantage that the concepts which served as headings to the chapters had to do double duty as principles, would not be felt by the attentive reader." A synthetical and analytical method of division, like that he used in the *Psychologie als Wissenschaft*, would have removed all difficulties, but he does not seem to have adopted it, partly out of regard for symmetry of form.

We have seen that Herbart founded his pedagogy on ethics and psychology, the former supplying the aim of education, the latter the means thereto. On its ethical side, pedagogy is purely speculative; but on its psychological side it must take counsel with experience. Viewed, then, in relation to ethics, it is a science (that which is known); in its relation to psychology—to experience, it is an art (that which is done). Education as an art is classified as government, instruction, and discipline.

The highest and the necessary aim of education is morality. But the boy when grown to manhood will set other aims

beside this before himself; therefore the teacher must consider not only the necessary, but these other possible aims of his pupil also—aims which will answer to his talents, dispositions, and inclinations. Since the teacher cannot know what these aims will be, he must qualify the pupil to attain them by preparing inward power, and this can only be done by giving a general stimulus to the mind.

The starting point of education is individuality—what the pupil is and has. The idiosyncrasies of the individual are to be respected, for in them lies the strength of individuality, which is to be maintained as unimpaired as possible, that the child may not become a mere type of the race.

The sole object of government, the first division of education, is to create order and keep the child within bounds; it therefore deals with the present alone. Authority and love support its measures, which are occupation, supervision, threatening and punishment. These must gradually be made dispensable and then withdrawn.

Instruction, the second division of education, is the most important. Education must determine the will towards virtue (that is, it must insure its conformity to insight derived from the ethical ideas). But both will and wisdom have their roots in the circle of thought, that is to say, in the combination and co-operative activity of the presentations acquired, and the true cultivation of that circle instruction alone can give. The more immediate aim of instruction on its way to its ultimate aim is a balanced, *many-sided interest*; that is, an intellectual activity prompted by instruction, and directed towards many objects, in which no single effort preponderates, but all are as far as possible of equal strength. Interest as such depends immediately upon its object, and is thereby differentiated from *desire*, which strives towards something in the future. When the mind becomes concentrated on the future more than the present, interest passes into desire. Attention and expectation are conditions of interest, demand and action of desire.

Alternate acts of concentration and reflection¹ are necessary to

¹ See note, pp. 123 and 126, *Allg. Pädag.*

the production of many-sidedness. The former, *i.e.* the temporary concentrated absorption in an object, must be followed by the latter, *i.e.* the collecting and combining of the presentations brought clearly and distinctly into consciousness by concentration. For many-sidedness, numerous concentrations on varied subjects are necessary, with which, however, reflection must alternate, that one-sidedness, absence of mind, doubt, etc., may be avoided. Quiescent concentration, which purifies the presentations from confusing elements, creates clearness; the progress from one concentration to another produces association of the presentations; quiescent reflection, which is directed to the various parts of association, creates order and system; and finally, the progress of reflection, which applies what is systematised and pursues it further, is method. These are the four formal steps of instruction.

Interest, whose object is to create a many-sided activity, is directed first to the natural already existent presentations, *i.e.* those which have been given by experience and intercourse. Since experience leads to knowledge of nature, and intercourse to the disposition towards human beings (sympathy), instruction must be brought to bear on both in order that it may correct and complete them.

Knowledge and *Sympathy*, as the two primary divisions of interest, can be directed to various objects: knowledge, to the multiplicity of phenomena in nature, or to their conformity to law, or to their æsthetic relationships; sympathy, to individuals, to society, or to the relation of all to the highest Being. Thus the six following classes of interest are formed:—

<i>In Knowledge.</i>	<i>In Sympathy.</i>
Empirical interest.	Sympathetic interest.
Speculative „	Social „
Æsthetic „	Religious „

To place all in balanced action is to create the perfect many-sided culture of the mind.

The sciences contain the materials for instruction. If they are to be used, it is not enough merely to know their terminology;

what is homogeneous in the different branches must be emphasized, and this can be done under the terms Symbols, Forms, Things. Symbols, for instance languages, arouse interest only as the means of revealing what they express. For that reason they are in themselves felt to be wearisome, and, in the beginning of instruction, their use ought to be limited to their necessity for the next interesting work. Forms also, the single properties of things obtained by abstraction and considered separately, do not arouse direct interest, and therefore must be treated only in connection with the actual. Finally, things—works of nature and of art—excite direct interest. But things are nothing more than the combination of properties which we take out by the process of abstraction, therefore we can either proceed from the single properties to the things in which they are combined, or begin with the things and analyse them into their properties.

The course of instruction is determined accordingly. It will be analytical in so far as it separates and dissects, moreover corrects and completes; in it the chief work will fall on the pupil. Or it will be synthetical in so far as the elements are given and combined; in this the teacher will determine the order of connection. Both analytical and synthetical instruction are classified in conformity with the six classes of interest, and the two must mutually support each other. Instruction must universally point out, connect, teach, philosophise; the first is productive of Clearness, the second of Association, the third leads to System, the last to Method. In matters appertaining to sympathy, instruction is observing, continuous, elevating, active in the sphere of reality. And these conditions are again in like manner productive in order of clearness, association, system, and method.

Discipline, the third division of education, consists in direct action on the child, with intent to form him. This cannot be accomplished, however, by merely exciting the feelings. Through the influence of discipline, the circle of thought itself must receive additions, and the desires be transformed into action. Therefore its work is indirect, so far as it prepares the way for instruction to determine the circle of thought, and direct as

far as it transforms the contents of that circle into action, and thus lays the foundation of character. The aim of discipline is *moral strength of character*, that is steadfastness in progress to virtue. Character consists in uniformity and firmness of will, and these as exhibited both in what the man will, and what he will not.

There is an essential distinction between the objective and subjective sides of character. The former is the seat of the will, existent in the individual before self-observation began, directed to what he bears willingly or unwillingly, what he longs to have or to do; the latter is the seat of the new will growing up as a result of self-observation, which crystallises itself by degrees into general concepts, partly from antecedent homogeneous acts of willing, partly from the requirements it makes on itself in regard to the kind of willing. Through memory of the will, that is, through uniformity of willing, the objective part of the character comes into harmony with itself. Then in the want of accord between what he would endure, have, and pursue, the pupil is confronted with the choice between them, which helps to determine the character. Resolutions, maxims, principles are formed in riper years, when the subjective character develops, and since that process involves subsumptions, conclusions, and motives, it cannot, if the motives are to be worth anything, take place without struggle. Strength of character depends on the agreement between the two sides of the character. The good resolves belonging to the subjective side which require æsthetic judgment, enthusiasm for the good, and, to make them into moral resolutions, logical culture as well as systematic combination and continuous employment, must meet what is praiseworthy in the objective part of the character, that what is bad may be excluded.

The attitude which the teacher assumes towards the pupil is the most important aid to discipline—his expressed satisfaction or dissatisfaction, freedom granted or restraint imposed, etc.—throughout which, the pupil's susceptibility is to be observed, made use of carefully, and not over-stimulated.

The book on discipline closes with suggestions as to its method of procedure. It is the formation of character by the

light of psychology. Special stress is laid on the importance of keeping the mind as a whole tranquil and clear, so that the æsthetic judgments may form, and the character become moral. In proportion as the pupil has gained trust in his opinions and principles, discipline must retreat and allow room for self-education.

The reader will perceive from the foregoing that Herbart includes in the circle of thought, the *whole* of human experience, subjective and objective—whether from within or without. His principle, that morality is based on the circle of thought, and that in widening that circle and awakening interest all true education lies, receives a striking illustration in the life and teaching of Jesus. The main thought of Jesus' life, the one he said he came into the world to teach, *i.e.* the Fatherhood of God, was the greatest widening of the circle of thought and interest the world has experienced, and the one most productive of successive, ever widening circles. Being a new concept introduced into the mental horizon of humanity, and affecting as it did the relationships between men themselves and their God, it altered the whole aspect of life. As the circle of thought and interest has been expanded, one evil after another has passed away. In the history of the world it has been ever thus. Men must first have light, to see good and evil, before they can cleave to the one and eschew the other. Light ultimately is choice. When men saw that burning witches at the stake was wrong, they ceased to do it.

The basis of Herbart's system of ethics is neither transcendental nor supernatural. Its ultimate ground is what he calls the æsthetic judgments, which, as applied to ethics, and not to the sphere of taste where he also recognises and traces their action, are the perceptions present in every human soul that to it individually right and wrong are inconvertible terms. The standard—that which education offers—varies with the changing conditions of humanity. The theft, which, if he had sufficient skill to conceal from his victim, was honoured as a virtue in the Spartan boy, was forbidden by the barbaric code of Jewish morality, and condemned by the golden rule of Confucius and

Jesus, but under both the act and the abstinence from it was the same consciousness of the mind pronouncing to itself the distinction *for it* between right and wrong. On this consciousness, as on a rock which could withstand all storms because it is an integral part of human nature, and therefore as indestructible as that nature itself, not on any revelation, religion, or law external to the individual, Herbart based his morality, and in so doing opened out illimitable possibilities to education. To him, in the words of a great living theologian, this consciousness, the moral faculty, was "not any apprehension of invisible qualities in external actions, not any partition of them into the absolutely good or the absolutely evil, not any intellectual testing of them by rules of congruity or balances of utility, but a recognition at their very source of a scale of relative values lying within ourselves, and introducing a preferential character throughout the countless combinations of our possible activity."¹ In building up the character through the circle of thought on this foundation, Herbart endeavours to ensure that morality shall penetrate all parts of the mind and heart—that under a rightly directed, all-embracing education, the whole of the character, not merely one side of it, shall be permeated and impelled by moral force. The very prevalent belief, that instruction ought to be confined to the intellectual side of human nature, and that the foundation of virtue is transcendental, its basis an external objective law, a law written on tables of stone instead of a law written on the heart, has hindered the accomplishment of this aim. The first error made men piecemeal moral, the second fostered growth from without inwards, instead of from within outwards. Both are at variance with Herbart's idea of moral development. With him the process is a slow and natural one, begun in earliest childhood; in his language it is the gradual triumph of the subjective over what is bad in the objective will, and "conversion" begins with the cradle and ends at the grave. Thus Herbart's two main aims, a perfect education and a morality based on an indestructible foundation, necessarily complete each other; for he places that

¹ *The Seat of Authority in Religion*, Dr. Martineau.

morality in the very texture of the mind itself, which must be destroyed before the moral can cease to exist, and contends that education, rightly carried out on psychological principles, will enable each pupil to determine his own character in this moral direction. Either without the other is incomplete, for virtue is the true end of all education, and education is necessary to the perfection of virtue in the individual.

An attentive study of Herbart reveals how these two aims successively developed in his mind, and how underlying both, although unseen, is the foundation stone of certitude. Not that Herbart claimed finality or perfection for his method of education, though he did so by implication for his principle of morality. But the necessity of certitude in both is implied as part of any perfected system of education and ethics.

Herbart was no pessimist; he had faith in human nature, and believed in its cumulative power of self-regeneration through self-culture. "Humanity," he reiterates, "educates itself continuously by the circle of thought which it begets." He saw, and was probably the first to do so, clearly *three* things and their intimate connection: first, that there can be but one right method of education, and its foundation is psychology; secondly, that this method is infallible, can and must claim for itself certitude; and thirdly, that virtue, the end and aim of all education and life, has an impregnable basis in the human mind, and can claim for itself certitude also. An optimistic view of life demands this. The right education alone is infallible, it *must* compass its aim; failure to do this only proves it is not the right education, and is not founded on psychology. Its aim, the only true morality, is infallible also, for it is founded on the mind's intuitive judgments. Either the world is capable of rising, by means of self-culture, to virtue, or it is not. Herbart claims it can do so, and virtually that it *must*—that there is a right method of education by which men not only can, but *must* attain virtue, so that in process of time the human race thus trained must of necessity advance in perfection. In this way alone can we have surety that evil will diminish. In a word, men rightly educated *must* certainly attain virtue, a virtue whose germ is an integral part of, and therefore as

indestructible as, the mind itself. This is Herbart's optimistic view of the future of humanity to be reached by education. Of him, in truth, it may be said,—

“God has conceded two sights to a man—
One of men's whole work, time's completed plan;
The other of the minute's work, man's first
Step to the plan's completion.”—*Sordello*.—R. BROWNING.

And as such he speaks to teachers, to those who, in the faith in human progress which inspired his life, are fashioning the minds of the coming generation, and are ready to welcome any new light. He speaks to thinkers, to those who meditate on the problem of existence, and seek to penetrate through that which is ever *becoming* but never *is*, to the underlying unity. And finally he speaks to the religious, to those who, seeing religious systems of the past and present rise and fall as growths of time and place, having no final claim on the minds of men, can abide by the words of the greatest of all teachers: “the kingdom of heaven is *within* you,” and found their faith as Herbart did, on the eternal nature of love and duty, God's ever present witnesses in the soul of man. To the thoughtful study of such, we commend him in his own words, spoken in memory of his great predecessor Kant, in the University where both laboured and taught:

“Centuries pass away, taking with them the great men they have brought to us. All traces of them vanish, if not held fast in sacred remembrance. What the mind of the individual can effect depends on the receptivity of the many, who do or do not come forth to meet him. How long that influence will endure depends on its recollection, development and use in the circle of the living. Whether the picture of the dead shall be received true and clear, or falsified and distorted by ages to come, depends upon the witness which his contemporaries give or transmit of him. For the grave by itself is cold and dumb; it only finds a voice when speech is lent to it by loving hearts.”

CHEMNITZ, SAXONY,
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ON THE ÆSTHETIC REVELATION OF THE WORLD AS THE CHIEF WORK OF EDUCATION.

BY JOHANN FRIEDRICH HERBART.

THE one and the whole work of education may be summed up in the concept—Morality.

We might assume as many problems for education as there are permissible aims for men. But then, this would involve as many educational inquiries as problems, which would have to be carried on irrespective of their mutual relationships, and it could not be seen how the teacher's separate measures are to be limited, or in what way they might be carried out. We should find ourselves much too poor in means, if we tried to attain every individual aim directly, and that which we intended only to effect singly, might have tenfold results from secondary and accidental causes, so that all parts of the work would be thrown out of their right proportions. This point of view is thus unsuitable for approaching the consideration of educational questions as a connected whole. If it is to be possible to think out thoroughly and accurately, and to carry out systematically the *business* of education as a single whole, it must be previously possible to comprehend the work of education also as but one.

Morality is universally acknowledged as the *highest* aim of humanity, and consequently of education. Whoever denies this can certainly have no true knowledge of what morality is; at least, he has no right to speak in this place. But to set up morality as the *whole* aim of humanity and education, an *expansion of the concept* (*i.e.* of morality) is required, as is also a proof of its necessary presumptions as conditions of its real possibility.

The *good will*—the steady resolution of a man to consider himself as an individual under the law which is universally binding—is the ordinary, and rightly the first thought which the

word morality suggests.¹ If we think of the power, and the resistance as well, with which a human being maintains this good will erect in himself against those movements of the emotions and desires working in opposition to it, then morality, which was merely an *attribute*, a *determination* of the will, becomes to us the virtue, power, action, and efficacy of the will so determined. Distinct from both is what belongs to legality, *i.e.* the right comprehension of the moral law, and different again from the knowledge of the general law, and even of the knowledge of ordinary and recognized rules of duty in common life, is the proper judgment by the individual of that which in special cases, in particular moments, in his immediate contact with human beings and destiny, is to be done, chosen, or avoided, as the best, as the true and only good. All this philosophy finds *immediately in the concept*, and expects, nay even requires it just as immediately from man as an expression of freedom.

Can the teacher make a beginning with this mode of looking at the concept as it stands?

Granted that we are speaking of moral culture only in the narrowest sense of the word, stripping from it everything scientific, all training, all strengthening of mental and physical energy as far as we think possible, and reserving that for consideration elsewhere, we have to ask, is that which presents itself to the philosopher's mind when putting before himself only the bare concept of morality, given to the teacher also? Does he too find the good will present, so that he needs only to direct it against the inclinations, needs only to indicate the right objects by exposition of the moral? Does the "intelligible source"² possibly flow for him also? May he also draw in comfort from heaven the stream whose origin he does not

¹ Note by Herbart.—"This is so since Kant. There is nothing conceivable in all the world, or indeed outside of it, which can be accepted as good without limitation, except alone a *good will*. The good will is good, not through that which it effectuates or does, or through its fitness to attain a prescribed aim, but solely in virtue of the willing, *i.e.* it is good in itself."—(From the preface to the *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*).

² See note, p. 17.

know? In a disciple of our new systems indeed, nothing is more logical than calmly to expect that the radical good—or perhaps also, the radical bad—will express itself quite spontaneously in his pupil, nothing more logical than to quietly respect the freedom which he must presuppose in his pupil as a human being, his only care being not to interfere with it by any misdirected effort on his own part (out of which arises the question, can freedom, as a matter of fact, be interfered with?). Thus he will give up entirely the most important part of his business, and finally limit his whole care to the presenting of pieces of information. Something similar has been actually affirmed in all seriousness by a disciple of those systems.¹

But we must not be so exacting in the application of these theories. They would break down in the very beginning under the weight of such a logic. We may hope that the first transcendental philosopher who is interested in education will be able to show an appropriate basis for it. The postulate² that education *must* be possible will first be endowed with a valid title; then there will be room enough in the sensuous world; and, for all those who have anything to do therein the realistic view stands good. In the same way as freedom can reveal itself through its verdict, “the moral law” as equivalent to *cause* in the realm of phenomena, it will be also conceded that the sensuous world as systematised by the teacher will appear as influencing the pupil’s freedom, and this suffices. Now we have found our field, though certainly not yet our rules of procedure; but while the teacher will discover them to begin with, the transcendental philosopher will know how to deduce them afterwards from his system.

To the teacher morality is a “*taking place*,” a *natural event*,

¹ Schopenhauer afterwards, in the *Fundamental Problems of Ethics* (1841), carried the doctrine of Kant to this point.

² Postulates are, according to Kant, theoretical, but as such, not demonstrable propositions so far as they inseparably depend on an *a priori* practical law of unlimited authority. The moral fundamental principle is a law on which rest the postulates of freedom, of the immortality of the human soul, and of the existence of God.

Herbart’s ironical remark about the art of derivation is directed not so much against Kant, as against his short-sighted disciples.

which we may assume has already been seen incidentally in isolated moments in a small part of his pupil's soul, but which should act and continue to act in the entire circuit of the character, and absorb and change into parts of itself all the remaining events, thoughts, imaginations, inclinations and desires. In such a perfect form as this, that natural event ought to take place, with the entire sum of the pupil's mental power; in the imperfect form in which it actually takes place, the good will has each time—or rather every act of good willing is—a defined sum of activity, a defined part of the whole, and indeed exists thus defined and in such a degree for the particular moment only. With time, however, the sum grows, diminishes, disappears, becomes negative (as in the case of a crooked line), grows again, and all this we can observe in so far as the pupil expresses himself openly.

In the entire determination with which this takes place, it does so of necessity as an inevitable effect of certain mental causes, just as necessarily as every effect in the material world, only not in any way according to material laws (*e.g.* of weight, impact, etc.), which latter have not the remotest similarity with those of mental operations. The teacher, like the astronomer, takes courage to attempt to investigate the conformity to law of the phenomena before him, by a right interrogation of nature and exact inferences sufficiently multiplied, and thus to discover likewise how they may be modified conformably to aim and plan. These realistic views do not tolerate the smallest mixture of the idealistic. Not the gentlest breath of transcendental freedom¹ must be allowed to blow through ever so small a chink into the teacher's domain. If so, how is he to begin to deal with the lawless marvels of a being superior to natural laws, on whose assistance he cannot reckon, whose interruptions

¹ Kant calls freedom transcendental, because its bearer, the intelligible character of the human being, is transcendental, that is to say, lies beyond every possible experience. An intelligible character, however, belongs to the active subject, in so far as it is thing in itself. Opposed to this stands the empirical, which belongs to the active subject, in so far as it is phenomenal, an object of the sensuous world. The empirical character is conditioned by temperament, life, intercourse, etc. The intelligible (the absolute capacity) is not determinable, only determining, independent of time and its causality.

he can neither foresee nor prevent? Perhaps to provide opportunities—to remove hindrances? Was the absolute capacity then hindered after all? Are there then opportunities for it external to its own pure original beginning? Is then the intelligible again imprisoned within the mechanism of natural things? The philosophers, it is to be hoped, will remember their own concept better. *Transcendental* freedom neither can nor ought to allow itself to be met with in consciousness as an inner phenomenon. On the contrary, *that* freedom of choice which we all find in ourselves, which we honour as the most beautiful phenomenon in ourselves, and would fain exalt among the other phenomena of ourselves—this it is which the tutor strives to influence and firmly grasp.

“*A making*” which the pupil himself discovers when choosing the good and rejecting the bad—this or nothing is formation of character! This rise to self-conscious personality ought without doubt to take place in the mind of the pupil himself, and be completed through his own activity; it would be nonsense if the teacher desired to create the real essence of the power to do it, and to pour it into the soul of his pupil. But to place the power already existent and *in its nature trustworthy* under such conditions that it must infallibly and surely accomplish this rise—this it is which the teacher must look upon as possible, which to attain, to affect, to investigate, to forward, and to guide, he must regard as the great object of all his efforts.

It will now be necessary to submit the concept morality, which we must here assume to be known and granted, to a critical philosophical examination, the commencement of which is mere analysis, while the continuation necessarily becomes synthetical as it establishes the *presumptions* to which the concept mainly relates, without our being able to reckon them in its contents. The form of this examination is very generally used, but cannot here exhibit its full strength and accuracy.¹

Obedience is the primary predicate of the good will. Confronting it must stand a command, or at least something which

¹ The method of seeking out necessary supplementary concepts when they are hidden, Herbart calls the method of relationships (*Beziehungen*).

can appear as command. The command has something *commanded* as object. But not every obedience to the first chance command is moral. The individual obeying must have examined, chosen, valued the command; that is, he himself must have raised it for himself to the level of a command. *The moral man commands himself*. What does he command himself? Here there is universal confusion. Kant, who felt this confusion most of all, finally, after much temporizing, hastily substituted the form of the command, the universality (whereby he distinguished it from momentary caprice) in the place of the contents. Others substitute their theoretical concepts—approach to the Divinity, to the pure Ego, to the Absolute—nay more, some even put the customs and laws of the country, or even the utilitarian, the agreeable, into the vacant place. The impartial thinker recognises the empty place *to be* empty. He argues,—we all know the concept of morality; if it contained but *one definite* object of command, we should know this together *with* the concept. Therefore it does not contain *one* definite object. But the concept (of morality) refers nevertheless to a command presupposed, *i.e.* to a presupposed act of willing, for command is itself will. This willing¹ must be primary and original; obedience follows after. If then this original willing is not conditioned, but yet real, then it is obviously an unconditioned *manifold*. Herein lies the reason why we are not led to it (the original willing) from the starting point of obedience, for opposite to this (obedience) stands as command only the general concept, *viz.* that there exists in general such a willing which comes forth as command, in opposition to all inclinations and individual chance desires.

Before we now seek out that which is characteristic of those acts of the mind which here, in contrast to the obeying will, appear as commanding will, two remarks are necessary. First, these acts cannot in themselves be moral, properly speaking, since they exist antecedently, are there independently *before* they enter into the relationship of command which they hold

¹ We use "willing" as a rendering of *Wollen*, rather than "volition," because Herbart refers here rather to individual acts of willing than to their sum, volition.

to the inclinations; only in *so far* as they become a link in this relationship, do they belong to morality. The primordial element of the commanding will is to be sought for in an entirely different sphere. Secondly, so far as these undetermined manifold acts are motives to obedience, they must be of such a nature, that they can be comprehended within the general concept to which the universal and single vow of faithfulness is due, together with the single and constant watchfulness, self-criticism and humility, which constitute the crown of morality.

The composition of these acts must be so conditioned that thereby everything foreign shall be rejected; it must show the rigour of the contrast between the worthy and good on the one side, the common and bad on the other; through it the clear penetrating and commanding voice of the moral imperative must arise. For *antecedently* to the relation of reason to inclination all this is inconceivable. Such a composition cannot be merely logical. It cannot be learned from a well-classified doctrine of morality; such a doctrine cools the will, and does not impel it. It requires much rather a partly poetical, partly pragmatic composition. But it is now time to seek for the elements which are to enter into the composition of these acts.

In vain should we impose obedience on the desires, if we would subsequently transform reason again into desire. Kant's axiom remains eternally true—no practical (moral) principle must require the actuality of any object whatever. But what follows from this? Nothing else than that originally reason is not everywhere will, for will which wills nothing is a contradiction. Reason hears, and it forms a judgment after it has heard perfectly. It looks, and passes sentence, then turns its gaze and looks further. This will be confirmed if we again take up the former threads. The obeying subject respects the command, that is, he creates it, at least *as* command. How must he in so doing appear to himself? As giving the decisive sentence? Or as finding an existent necessity? Must he desire to make himself felt as lord and master, as *owner* as it were of his inner store of feeling and life? Or would it perhaps, even

if not truer, be at least safer for the correctness of his judgment, if he only tried to fathom the alien will of a perfected reason? He dare not appear to himself as giving the decisive sentence. For the first essential of morality—obedience—is destroyed, and it is only one arbitrariness put in place of another, so soon as in any sense will becomes the ground of command. The moral man is intrinsically humble; this acquaintance with the concept of morality was assumed here!

He appears then to himself as finding a necessity. Or perhaps he does not appear to himself at all, for he might discover the necessity without turning his glance on himself. A spontaneous, more accurate answer to this question will be forthcoming a little later on. The first question is, what necessity is found? No theoretical necessity; we know the difference between *ought* and *must*, and to honour a command does not mean bowing to the inevitable. And again, no logical necessity; for this is in itself nothing but a “must”; it points beyond to a higher principle, and thus only staves off the question how and why it is necessary. Thus it is nothing inferred, nothing learned, nothing given in experience or discovered in the teachings of nature. To this extent Kant, who makes the empirical strictly opposed to pure reason, was right. We must hope no one will answer at this point—it is a *moral* necessity (which is discovered). For we have but just proved that we are here entirely outside the realm of the moral. We are speaking of the originally necessary, which then first *becomes the morally necessary* when it rules obedience in opposition to the inclinations.

Amongst known necessities the only one remaining is the aesthetic.

The characteristic of this necessity is, that it speaks in purely absolute judgments¹ entirely without proof, without, in a word, enforcing its claims. It takes absolutely no consideration of the inclinations, neither favouring nor opposing them. It arises on the clear presentation of its object. There are precisely as many primary judgments as there are varied objects, which judgments are not related to each other in any way so as to be logically deducible from one another. At the most it is

¹ *Introd. to Science of Education*, p. 59.

found that after rejecting everything accidental, similar relationships are found among various objects, and that these naturally create similar judgments. As far as we know the simple æsthetic relations, we have simple *judgments* about them. These stand at the head of the arts with quite independent authority. Amongst the arts, music in this respect affords a striking example. It can definitely and collectively enumerate its relations of harmony, and just as definitely show their correct use. If however the teacher of thorough bass were asked for proofs, he would only laugh, or pity the deaf ear which had not already *perceived* them.¹ It is specially important that æsthetic judgments never require the actuality of their objects.² Only *when* that object does exist, and when it is permanent, does the judgment, which declares what it *ought* to be, also stand. And through this persistency, it becomes in the end to the human being who cannot escape it, the sternest necessity. Want of taste is a crime in the artist, of course only in so far as he sets up to be an artist. There is nothing to debar him from destroying his picture which is a failure, or closing the instrument of which he is not master, and finally from giving up art entirely.

But *from himself* a man cannot separate himself. Were he himself at any time the object of such judgments, these latter would, through their gentle but always audible voice, exercise *in time* a compulsion over him, exactly as they do over the votary who has once set his mind on being an artist. We must add here that when a judgment of taste breaks forth from the depth of the mind, it will, thanks to the nature of its origin, be often felt as a power which does not properly lie in what it utters. Happy is it, when such an uprushing is victorious at

¹ *Note by Herbart.*—May we say that the musical doctrines which bear the strange names of thorough bass are the only correct model of a genuine æsthetic which has yet existed? (We must here emphasize that thorough bass only forms a very small part of a complete theory of music.) This thorough bass asks and wins for its simple intervals, harmonies, and progressions, absolute judgments, without explaining or proving anything. In the same way we can transfer to the relationships of will an approval or disapproval like those existing for the relationships of notes.

² See Introduction, note 1, p. 25.

the very beginning, for it disappears with time; but the judgment remains, and it is its slow pressure which men call *conscience*.

Finding then original practical, that is æsthetic necessity, the moral individual controls his desire in order to obey this necessity. The desire then was a link in an æsthetic relationship. And as far as the same desire is in him, which exists in the relationships judged, so far does the individual in his contemplation turn his glance inwards upon himself. For the rest, the æsthetic demand would doubtless remain precisely the same, if another, standing in just the same relationship, were the one possessed by the desire. Thus we judge of others, only more easily than of ourselves, and the demand is authoritative, at least ought to be so for another, and we expect him to find it so himself.

If we would learn the æsthetic judgments which depend on volition, that is, if we would construct a practical (moral) philosophy, we must entirely give up once and for all the idea of one supreme moral law, as the sole voice of pure reason, of which all other moral laws would be only developments. On the contrary, in considering the will by degrees in the simplest conceivable relationships¹ which follow from its direction upon itself, upon other wills and upon objects, there springs up as a result for each of these relationships also, an original, absolutely independent æsthetic judgment, self-evident, and of peculiar nature. We should subsequently have to arrange the judgments so obtained to form therefrom a plan of life. This could easily be done, if we had acquired those judgments at the very beginning in their peculiar clearness, in their simplest and most exact expressions, and undisfigured by the attempts of false philosophy to reduce one to the other. The contrary explains without trouble why it is so difficult to build up from these judgments, of which daily life is the fortuitous and varying cause, a trustworthy system of practical (moral) opinions, through which the character can receive solidarity and unity. If, however, science has provided in this construction for a

¹ See Translators' Introd., p. 28, and *Introd. to Science*, p. 61.

correct outline, then the fulness of life, partly transfigured by poetry, partly penetrating as the truth of history, will help to reveal that sketch, at one time as a whole, at another partly painted in with varying colours, lighted up by this or that contrast.

But this pedagogic thought comes prematurely, though only by a very little. For the application of our general considerations is at hand; only one retrospective glance at moral obedience is necessary. In what relation does obedience stand to this system of *practical* (moral) reason? The obeying element should be and remain *will*, but its direction it ought in part to alter. Now originally all willing, desiring, longing, are directed towards objects.

And it must not be thought that these objects permit of being moved about as it were in their places under the will at pleasure. To him who wills little, everything is spoiled as soon as this little is denied him. Therefore only in the abstract can we separate the will from its direction.

But he who knows and thinks much, requires much, and in him whose presentations are well associated, the desires are also associated. To alter the direction of the desires means really restraining *one* desire, but in such a way that near it another immediately lies ready to spring up. This is possible only to a very mobile and active mind. Just for this reason it is easier to men than children. But to well-brought-up children there *is given and won, by means of discipline, freedom* to restrain each desire for the moment without much trouble, a freedom it must be added which in itself alone has absolutely nothing in common with morality. Still we see immediately, that all depends whether egoism or practical (moral) reason becomes master of this freedom; if the former, it becomes worldly wisdom, if the latter, morality.

Here then there lies immediately before us the first work of discipline. We ought to arouse many desires, but in no wise permit any one of them to rush unrestrained on its object. It ought to seem as if an immeasurable store of will power lay locked in a mental reservoir, which can be opened by reason only, when, where, and how it wills. And it *will* seem so, if from

the beginning the contact with objects is as varied as possible, and if, moreover, the always perceptible restraint is effectual enough, under the circumstances, to stamp indelibly on the mind the conviction, that the attainment of no object is to be reckoned upon unconditionally. For the rest, it is acknowledged that discipline acts best as an impersonal necessity, and that it must be tempered by much love and much spontaneous kindness; we assume further, above all, the suppression of everything capricious in children without lessening their joyousness.

As crude desire, however, should be curbed that it may not prove its power in action and thereby become decided will, we must on the other hand, when right ideas reveal themselves, place them *in action*, and *support* them till they reach their end. Thus reason learns its power and takes courage to rule.

When we see a boy, it matters not whether he has to thank art, or nature and fortune for it, who essays much, but easily rejects what he finds to be foolish, and carries out firmly and persistently what he has matured, a boy who can be easily roused in all manner of ways, easily excited by unsuitable treatment, easily taught, turned, put to shame by the right word; then we rejoice at the sight and prophesy good things of him. We call him *free* because we presume he will with his open eye discover and hear what is reasonable, and we know there lies no rebelliousness in him which can silence and overpower his judgments.

But we must not forget that something still depends on what sort of a world the boy finds before him in which he will exercise his judgments and his actions.

This world being a rich open circle filled with manifold life, he will examine it in all its parts. What he can reach, he will touch and move to investigate its whole power of motion, the rest he will look at and transfer to his mind. He will take the measure of individuals, and their conduct, compare modes of living and classes of society according to their splendour, advantages and freedom. He will, at least in thought, imitate, taste, choose. If any *material* charm seizes him strongly, he will *calculate*, and then he is lost to pure morality.¹

¹ Therefore immediate, not mediate, interest must be cultivated. See *Introd. to Science*. pp. 94, 95.

Or perhaps nothing chains him. The years of boyhood pass with him amidst the continual pursuit of pleasures of the moment. If only he is sure of his bodily power, his health, his freedom from need, and of his *inner control*, and has collected by observation, as opportunity offered, a store of keenly observed phenomena, that he may not feel strange among the things of the world, he will then perceive the kind of behaviour which is demanded from youths on their first entrance into society. With the fear of being found wanting, with the wish to learn, but otherwise composed and without anything to seek or to fear, he steps in and looks around. Then his concentrated reflection will grasp all relations; the contrast of the ridiculous and the seemingly will determine his judgment as easily as his behaviour. And in contact with the seemingly, he will find the honourable and the shameful, honesty and truth, falsity and treachery. And if only he has a truly imitative disposition he will at first be full of sympathy, of feeling, and enter into the sufferings and hopes of others. He will be disposed accordingly to that reflection which recognises and values beauty of soul-goodness. Out of these perceptions he will prepare for himself a law, and an obligation to follow the law, for he cannot do otherwise; he would despise himself did he not follow it. Therefore he *will* obey it, and he *can* do so; we call him once again *free* with increased emphasis, and rightly so in the noblest sense of the word, even if you know ever so exactly how he would and must become so.

Whether he becomes free or not, and to what extent, depends on the psychological accident whether he is absorbed *first* in the calculations of egoism, or in the æsthetic comprehension of the world surrounding him. This accident *ought* not to remain one. The teacher *ought* to have the courage to assume, that he can, if he begins rightly, determine that comprehension so easily and strongly through the *æsthetic revelation of the world*, that the free attitude of the mind will receive its law, not from worldly wisdom, but from pure practical (moral) consideration. Such a revelation of the world—the *whole* known world, and every known age—obliterating if necessary the bad impressions of undesirable environment, may with justice be called the

chief work of education, for which that discipline, which awakens and controls desire, is nothing but the necessary preparation.

The concept of an æsthetic comprehension of the world is wider than that of the analogous comprehension of human desire, consequently wider than that which morality immediately requires. And it ought to be so. For although external objects are adventitious to us, and although it is very important to reckon *as* adventitious as much as possible, it is nevertheless impossible to us altogether to go out of the sphere of the external. And at this point, so many demands of taste arise whose mode of demand is at the bottom none other than that of the æsthetic judgment of the will. Their necessity will also be more strongly felt in proportion as the external is more closely attached to us. Hence the power with which external honour, respectability, the social tone, in short, everything that tends to suppress barbarism, makes its claim authoritative on men whose culture has begun. It has been said there is but one virtue. Almost as accurately could we say, there is but one taste. Whoever at any time injures it in cold reflection is on the road, if not to forsake the moral, at least to base it more on extraneous principles springing from efforts after personal greatness and well-being, or from civic, priestly, or worldly wisdom.

Regarding the question, how a *general* æsthetic revelation of the world must be planned, we have here but one remark to add, and that truly is but a repetition of what has gone before,—we must be on our guard against reducing the judgments of taste to one another. And again it follows therefrom—we must also be on our guard against denying the possibility of collisions amongst those judgments. If, however, early and wide reading of chosen classical poets be required of the pupils, and with this the exercise of their perceptive power in the comprehension of works of art of all kinds, then the interconnection even of the most abstruse causes will be easily divined. But more on this subject afterwards.

It only remains to mention some chief characteristics of the revelation of the world, as far as it immediately touches morality.

It may be taken for granted that, on account of their simplicity and absolute priority, the child cannot help forming the simple fundamental judgments of the will¹—certainly not as formulæ, but as judgments in individual cases—provided opportunity is offered to him by his environment. It is often said, and it is hoped generally recognized, that the mother's tender care, the father's kind seriousness, the relationship of the family, the order of the house, must exist in all purity and worthiness before the child's ingenuous eyes, because he judges only what he observes, because what he sees is to him the only thing possible, and the pattern for his imitation.

Assuming these first conditions to be fulfilled (or tolerably compensated for later, by the beneficent humanity of a good teacher), what further steps does education take at this point? It *must* leave the narrow circle, it would be guilty of the most blameable weakness, were it from fear of what is beyond, to try and limit the child yet longer to what is near him, when he has finished learning therein, and looks and strives onwards. Upwards and outwards that education must take its way. Upwards there is but one step, *only* one, and nothing higher beyond; outwards there is illimitable breadth and depth. On the upward step, the *supersensuous kingdom* must open itself, for, in the whole visible world, the family circle is the most beautiful and most worthy. But opposite to this supersensuous kingdom lies the *actual*, and on the one hand shows with importunate clearness its own deficiencies and its needs, while on the other it is the duty of education to disclose completely what the pupil does not, and yet must see, that he may be able to live as a human being.

But as these contrasts respectively balance each other, and the more so the further distant they are from the mean, we should easily arrive at the rule to move simultaneously and regularly on both lines, in order that by the side of ever-

¹ *Note by Herbart.*—One has good reason at the present time to protect oneself from the suspicion of wishing to invent a new morality, and thereby scoffing at the strict requirements of the old and true morality. For this reason the known names *Rectitude*, *Goodness*, *Self-control*, may stand here. Their more precise definition is reserved, and will seek to be of service, not in saying anything new, but in making the old plainer.

deepening shadows (of the actual) we might cause an ever stronger light (of the supersensuous) to shine out all the more brilliantly, if only the way were equally open on both sides and continued so.

God, the true centre of all practical (moral) ideas and of their illimitable workings, the Father of men and Lord of the world—He must fill the background of memory as the oldest and the first to whom all reflections of the mind, turning from the confused tangle of life, must always revert, that it may repose as in its true self in the rest of belief. But just because this highest Being ought to occupy an immovable place amongst the *earliest* thoughts on which the personality of the growing man fastens, and because He as the Highest, can never be yet further exalted, there is danger that a human being, by continually fixing his mind on the single simple point, would only deform it, and it would be degraded to the commonplace, yes, even to the wearisome. And wearisome, the thought that ceaselessly shames and reproves human weakness certainly ought not to become, or it succumbs to the first daring attempt of speculation to make its own world. Rather should we keep the idea less active, that when the man needs it for his safety in the storms of life, it is then unspoiled. But there is a means of nourishing, strengthening, cultivating this idea slowly, and insuring to it an ever-increasing veneration, a means which to him who knows it theoretically is at the same time valid as the only one, namely, that of establishing the idea continuously by means of contrast.

And it is indeed just this to which that other direction—the outward—the progressive revelation of the world leads, entirely of itself.

For reasons, the proof of which would be too detailed here, it is clear that instruction has to guide two separated, but always simultaneously advancing courses from below upwards to that highest immovable point, that it may unite both at last in it. We may distinguish these courses by the names Knowledge and Sympathy. Training in acuteness and the first preparation for contemplative observation (*Anschauung*) and the work immediately following it, in short, the A B C of the

senses, are the beginnings of the course of knowledge. It would be somewhat more difficult to state the starting-point of progressive sympathy and to justify the statement. Closer consideration soon shows that this point cannot lie in the actual present. The child's sphere is too narrow, and traversed too soon, the adult's sphere is among cultivated people too high and too much determined by relationships, which we would not willingly explain to the little boy if we could. But the time-successions of history end in the present, and in the beginnings of our culture amongst the Greeks, an illuminated spot for the whole of posterity is formed by the classical representations of an ideal boyhood in the *Homeric poems*. If we are not afraid to allow the noblest among languages to take precedence, in our instruction, of the accepted learned language, we shall, on the one hand, escape numberless perversions and distortions in everything touching the right understanding of the literature and history of mankind, of opinions, and of arts ;¹ and we shall, on the other, be more sure of presenting to the child's interest, events and characters which he can perfectly grasp, and from which he can go on to endlessly varied self-reflections on human beings and society, and the dependence of both on a higher power.

The earliest cultivation of the child's feelings will have been a failure, if, after taking his fill of pleasure in the characters, the moral impression left from those old stories is at all doubtful. The relation of fable to truth, and of barbarism to culture, must be apparent to the boy, when he compares that picture with the circle in which he lives. And the double contrast, partly between the poet's people and those of his own world whom he loves and honours, partly between those gods and the Providence whom he pictures after the image of his parents, and whom he worships after their example—the contrast, I say produces on a pure and youthful mind an influence contrary to

¹ *Note by Herbart.*—This subject is so important and full of matter, that it would require a book to itself. The author does not write without convincing experience that it can be carried out. For many reasons the *Odyssey* should have preference over the *Iliad*. But after completion of the tenth year, this commencement would come too late.

that which it does on those who seek refuge from the tedium of lengthy sermons in their imagination, with which they daringly play, and find compensation in imaginative feats in which they wonder at their own dexterity. The boy plays in real life, and it is by play that he realises for himself his imaginings. If any boy were so unhappy as to grudge the Deity His supersensuous kingdom, and wanted empty space therein for his fictions, he evidently has but little external life; we must improve his diet and increase his gymnastic exercises.

But the world, as he looks at it in hours of seriousness, widens more and more; always lying between the two like extremes, it extends outwards as it were into far distances, making room for the crowd of characters which come forth on the thread of history, each one illumined if possible by its best classical delineator, or at least by the glow which spreads itself from the purest sources of historic light over the more obscure parts. Periods which no master has described, whose spirit no poet breathes, are of little value to education. But if the languages are taught for the sake of the literature, it is strange that teachers should destroy the pupil's interest in the writings by giving him preliminary stories made up of insipid extracts, and written moreover in an absurd tone which children might imitate. The continuous study of modern times belongs to mature youth; the boy would wander at leisure in an earlier world, especially in the old, if he, only just grown out of the needs of childhood, began his Homer as he ought at that time.

"To every man his due." This proverb will be justified in every exhibition, observation, and illustration of the various characters. The pure, the stainless, which every true poetry shows when it exhibits and groups individualities—this, if not to imitate, at least to receive thankfully from that poetry, and use it thoughtfully, is the teacher's first duty. But *the* picture he ought to show has no frame; it is open and wide as the world. In it, therefore, all the characteristics whereby the various kinds of poetry differentiate themselves, fall away, and naked and bare stand all the faults and weaknesses, which are otherwise excused under the design of the work of art. Con-

science accompanies us to the play, however much the poet may protest. The teacher, supported by Plato's authority, banishes the poet from his sphere, unless the truth and the distinctness of the bad, will and can serve for purification of the better, and for elevation of the good.

While then through the reading of poets and historians, through growing knowledge of men, through moral and religious discourses which help to digest the previously collected material, the moral distinctions become sharper, observation of shades of character and the estimation of their distances by a moral measurement become rectified, and the elements of the practical (moral) idea of God gain increasingly in clearness and dignity thereby;—during all this there develops on the side of knowledge the concept of nature in increasing sharpness of outline, as the system of forces and motions, which, rigorously persistent in a course once begun, forms for us a type of law, and order, and sharply defined proportion. How defective would be the revelation of the world, how little would the actual and the given find a place therein, how shadowy would they float in the airy realms of thought if we shut out nature! And how badly would that revelation harmonize with the spirit of a life formed on reason! Do you think you can teach how to act solely through the moral ideas? Man stands in the midst of nature; himself a part of her, her power streaming through his innermost self, he answering external force with *his* own according to *his* method, *his* nature, first thinking, then willing, then working. Through his will goes the chain of nature. But there is one definite place for each definite will. This destiny, sprung solely out of the individuality of environment, which inevitably becomes special for each separate example of the race, in contradistinction to his (*i.e.* the separate example's) origin from the supreme plan of nature which was designed in the first instance for the race by an all-ordering Providence—this destiny is the necessity which impels men; it is this necessity which a man must needs see and consider in order rightly to determine his steps and their measure at each moment. For the moral idea doubtless appeals to the race, but it is dumb to the individual so far as he *is* individual; it

knows nothing of his immediate limits; it condemns and puts him to shame, but it cannot aid. It wishes that he should reach the goal; he is on the road, but it knows nothing of that road, much less can it guide him. Himself and his powers and the powers around which can aid him, the man must know, and acknowledge their limitations, if their power is to be serviceable to him according to their measure.

This destiny, however, is not the ancient *μοῖρα*, that destroyer of life, that pure contradiction of mind.

This destiny cannot possibly distress the moral man. For he does not expect that humanity and reason should reach perfection in his individuality. He goes forth to meet Providence, he seeks himself to join in her care for the race, he hears the summons to continue that which is begun, he realizes that theodicy¹ is left to the actions of men.

But where does education stop? How does the pupil attain insight into these results of his individuality? These questions are a sign that the end is approaching. For the man soon comes to look on himself as nature, when he once knows nature in general. But no one can be expected to think himself into the strict uniformity of nature, who has had no training in the rigorous discipline of mathematics and its deductions.

And further, previous to investigation of laws, a keen comprehension of data is necessary. It needs in general, attention, a giving up of the individual to what lies before him, an early discipline of the roving thoughts, an early habit of perseverance in, and completion of, work begun. These thoughts have already found their place in the introduction² to this essay.

It still remains for the favourably disposed and thoughtful reader to connect and fill in these outlines. What is offered here is not intended to appear as a whole. But it ought to be clear that we have the courage to ignore, at least when speaking of education, certain systems by which it can never profit. What is here said may be left open for the present to the objec-

¹ Note.—Theodicy is the realisation of the idea of God.

² The introduction here referred to is the *Nachschrift zur zweiten Auflage von Pestalozzi's Idee eines A B C der Anschauung*, of which the *Aesthetische Darstellung* forms a part.

tions raised by those systems. It is, I hope, neither old nor new enough to afford any one the pleasure of making it square with alien theories, and of thinking he understands it better than the author himself. Otherwise the latter would be compelled to say, he considers it a bad example, not of acuteness, but of weak-mindedness, should any one show an inclination to amalgamate the distinctive statements of different thinkers. Above all, the author believes he will never be understood by those to whom the coexistence of determinism and morality is still a riddle.

Some there may be who perhaps do not willingly find such abstract investigations in the vicinity of an *A B C of Anschauung*. I implore such to consider, that for once it may be useful if an educational essay affords an opportunity for estimating the breadth and the sphere of education, and the vastness of the problems lying before it, by the distance which must be traversed in order to mount from the lowest to the highest—a distance into which we must look, because the highest must be prepared for by the lowest.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SCIENCE OF EDUCATION PSYCHOLOGICALLY DEDUCED FROM ITS AIM.

BY JOHANN FRIEDRICH HERBART.

Introduction.

THE aim of all those who educate and demand education is determined by the range of thought they bring to the subject.

The majority of those who teach have entirely neglected in the first instance to construct for themselves their own range of thought in view of this work; it opens out gradually as the work progresses, and is formed partly by their own characteristics, partly by the individuality and environment of the pupil. If the teachers possess originality, they will utilize all that comes to hand to provide stimulus and occupation for the objects of their care; if they have foresight, they exclude all which may be harmful to health, disposition, or manners. Thus a boy grows to manhood, who is tested in everything that is not dangerous, practised in the consideration and treatment of the common things of daily life, and with all the sensibilities which the narrow circle wherein he lives can arouse in him. If he has really grown up thus, he may be congratulated on the result. But educators complain unceasingly of the harmful influence of surrounding circumstances—of servants, relatives, playmates, the natural instincts and the university. And it is no wonder, when the mental diet is determined more by chance than by human skill, that a robust health, which can bid defiance to unfavourable influences, cannot always flourish on fare that is often so meagre.

Rousseau desired at any rate to *harden* his pupil. He defined for himself his own view of the subject, and remained true to it. He follows nature. All the processes of animal development in man are, by means of education, to be assured of a free

happy growth from the mother's arms to the marriage bed. To live is the rôle which he teaches. Yet he evidently sympathizes with our poet's dictum, "Life is not the highest good," for he sacrifices in theory the whole individual life of the teacher, whom he gives up to be the boy's constant companion. This education costs too dear. The companion's life is in any case worth more than the boy's, even if we go no further than mortality tables; for the probability of being able to live is greater for the man than the boy. But is mere existence then, so difficult to man? We thought human *plants* were like the rose; that just as the queen of flowers gives the gardener least trouble of all, so human beings thrive in every climate, are nourished by every species of food, learn most easily to accommodate themselves to all circumstances, and to turn everything to advantage. Still it is true that to educate a "nature man" among cultivated men must entail as much trouble on the educator, as it afterwards will on the pupil to live in the middle of so heterogeneous a society.

Locke's pupil, of all others, will know best how to behave in society. The principal thing there is conventionality. For fathers who destine their sons for the world, no book of education according to Locke need be written; anything superadded would degenerate into artificiality. Buy at any price a trustworthy man of refined habits, who "himself knows the rules of courtesy and good society with all the varieties arising from difference of persons, times, and places, and who will then assiduously direct his pupil as suits his age to the observation of these things."¹ One can say nothing to this. It would be vain to wish to dissuade real men of the world from making their sons men of the world too. The desire that they should be so is formed by the whole force of all the impressions of actual life, and is confirmed and increased by the new impressions of every moment. Preachers, poets, philosophers, may be all

¹ Locke, *Some Thoughts concerning Education*, par. 93. "To form a young gentleman as he should be, 'tis fit his governor should himself be well-bred, understand the ways of carriage, and measures of civility in all the variety of persons, times, and places, and help his pupil, as much as his age requires, constantly to the observation of them."

unction, all gaiety, all gravity in prose or verse, but one glance at the world around destroys all the effect, and they seem mere actors or visionaries. For the rest, a worldly education may succeed, for the world is in league with the worldly.

But I could tell of men who know the world without loving it; who while they will not withdraw their sons from the world, will allow them still less to be lost therein, and who assume that a clear head will find in its own self-consciousness, its own sympathy, and its own tastes, the best teachers, to guide it at the right time so far into the conventionalities of society as it is willing to go. Such men allow their sons to gain a knowledge of mankind among such comrades as may happen to be their playmates or rivals. They know that Nature is best learned from Nature, if only the power of observation has been sharpened, exercised, and trained at home, and they desire that their children shall grow up in the midst of the generation with whom in the future they will live. Is this compatible with good education? Perfectly, so long as during the hours of instruction (these are to me once for all *the* hours, since in them the teacher is occupied seriously and systematically with the pupil) such mental activity is pursued as will arouse *all* his interest; compared with this all boys' play will become trifling, and of little account even to the boy himself.

Such mental activity will never be met with, however much men may oscillate between the sensuous facts of their immediate environment and between books. On the other hand, it will be found in the union of both. A young man who is susceptible to the charm of ideas, who has the conception of education in all its beauty and all its greatness before his eyes, and who is not afraid to resign himself for a time to numberless alternations of hope and doubt, despair and joy—such a man can undertake the task of training up a boy in the environment of actuality to a nobler life, provided always that he possesses mental force and science to apprehend and represent this actuality as, from the point of view of humanity, only a fragment of the great whole.¹

¹ Herbart perceived that the teacher's happiness consists in the pursuit of the Ideal, and in the revelation of ideas, and thus describes it in the *Aphorismen zur Pädagogik*. "The happiness of the teacher!" He who seeks a

He will then say of his own accord, that not he, but the whole power of what humanity has felt, experienced and thought, is the true and right educator, to which the boy is entitled, and that the teacher is given to him merely that he may help him by intelligent interpretation and elevating companionship. Thus to present the whole treasure of accumulated research in a concentrated form to the youthful generation, is the highest service which mankind at any period of its existence can render to its successors, be it as teaching or as warning.

Potted
Experience

Conventional education seeks to prolong existing evils; to form "Nature-men" (*Naturmenschen bilden*) means to repeat if possible from the beginning, the succession of evils already overcome. To narrow the sphere of teaching and warning to the immediate environment, is the natural result of a man's own limitation, which neither knows what is beyond, nor understands its application. Children's difficulties and the failures of pedants supply a convenient excuse for this, but the latter can be retrieved, and the former do not really exist.

How far, however, this may, or may not be true, each man decides from his own experience—I from mine, others from theirs. Only let us all consider the proposition—each but experiences, what he attempts. A nonagenarian village schoolmaster has the experience of his ninety years' routine course; he has the consciousness of his long toils, but has he also the criticism of his work and his methods? Much that is new has prospered with our modern educators; they have found their reward in the gratitude of men, and they can inwardly rejoice over it. But whether they can determine from *their* experience all that can be attained by means of education, and all that can be done with children, is a question.

It is much to be desired that those who wish to base education on experience *alone*, would for once attentively consider other

happiness outside the inner sanctuary of the cultivation of his own ideas, which gives pure enjoyment of reason, and does not spring from chance, can only gain it by working in some profession, whose object is the revelation of ideas within an existing Intelligence, which work more than any other in the world leaves room for order and inward contemplation. Doubtless even here we are dependent on circumstances, but yet every happiness we seek outside ourselves, is given up for this work.

experimental sciences ; that they would condescend to inquire, in the case of physics or chemistry, how much is really involved in the demonstration of one single proposition in the sphere of empiricism, with all the exactness that empiricism admits of. They would then *experience*, that nothing is learned from *one* experience, and just as little from scattered observations ; but that one must repeat the experiment twenty times with twenty variations before a result is obtained, which even then opposing theories can explain each in its own way. They would experience then, that no one has a right to speak of experience until the experiment is completed, until, above all things, the *residuum* has been accurately weighed and tested. In the case of educational experiments, this residuum is represented by the faults of the pupil when he has attained to manhood. Thus the time required for one such experiment is at least half a human life. When then does any one become an experienced teacher ? And of how many experiences, with how many variations is the experience of each to consist ? How infinitely greater than this is the experience of the empirical doctor, and for how many centuries have the experiences of great men been recorded for him ! Nevertheless the science of medicine is so weak, that it is just a swampy ground on which new sophistries so rankly grow.¹

Is this to be the fate of education also ? Is it to become the shuttlecock of factions, which, themselves a sport of the time, have long ago carried everything of importance with them, and only left the apparently lowly realm of childhood untouched. The best younger teachers who have studied philosophy now see that thinking ought not to be divorced from education. It has already become natural to them to test in education the adaptability and pliancy of truly a very versatile wisdom. They do so in the attempt to form, synthetically improve, and mystically teach on *à priori* principles those entrusted to their care, rejecting them when patience fails as incapable of preparation for initiation.

¹ The reference here is to the Pantheism of Schelling, which powerfully influenced medical study. Schelling himself wrote a *Philosophy of Medicine*.

The rejected ones will pass no longer with the same fresh natures into other, and what other hands?

It would be better if the science of education remained as true as possible to its intrinsic conceptions, and cultivated more an independent mode of thought, by which it would become the centre of a sphere of exploration, and be no longer exposed to the danger of government by a stranger as a remote tributary province. Only when each science seeks to teach in its own way, and also with the same force as its neighbours, can a beneficial intercourse take place between them. Surely philosophy must rejoice when other sciences approach her thoughtfully, and at any rate the philosophic public of the day, though not philosophy itself, sadly needs the chance of more numerous, more varied points of view, from which it can survey all sides.

I have required science and mental force from the teacher. To others, science may be a pair of spectacles, to me it is an eye, and the best of eyes too, which human beings possess for the contemplation of their environment. It is true that some of the sciences are not free from error in their teaching, but this is the very reason why they disagree one with another; the error betrays itself, or at least one learns to be careful about doubtful points. On the other hand, he who considers himself clever without scientific knowledge, fosters errors in his opinions, as great and even greater, without the consciousness, or perhaps even the possibility of consciousness of them, for his points of contact with the world are blunted. The errors of science are originally the errors of men, but only of the best minds.

The first, though by no means the complete science of the educator, would be a psychology in which the total possibilities of human activity were sketched out *a priori*. I think I recognise the difficulty as well as the possibility of such a science. Long will it be before we have it, longer still before we can expect it from teachers. Never, however, can it be a substitute for observation of the pupil; the individual can only be discovered, not deduced. The construction of the pupil on *a priori* principles is therefore a misleading expression in itself, and is also at present an empty idea which the science of education cannot handle for a long time.

All the more necessary, therefore, is it to know that from which I started, namely the aim of those who begin to educate. One sees what one looks for; every clear head has psychological insight, in so far as it cares to look into the minds and hearts of men. *What the educator should care for* must lie open before him like a map, or if possible, like the plan of a well-built city, in which sets of lines having similar directions always intersect at exactly the same angle, and in which the eye finds itself at home without preparation. Such a map I offer here for the inexperienced, who wish to know what sort of experiences they must search for, and have ready for use. *With what aim* the teacher should grasp his work—this *practical* consideration, detailed at present down to the measures we have to choose according to our present views, is for me the first half of the science of education. Corresponding to this should stand a second half, in which the *possibilities* of education are theoretically laid down, and portrayed as limited by changing circumstances. Such a second half, however, is at present nothing more than a pious wish, as is also the psychology upon which it must rest. The first half is generally accepted for the whole, and I must be satisfied to fall in with this mode of speech.¹

No use for
utilitarianism

Pedagogy is the science which the teacher needs for himself, but he must also be master of the science of imparting his knowledge. And I here at once confess, that I have no conception of education without instruction, just as conversely, in this book at least, I do not acknowledge any instruction which does not educate. Whatever arts and acquirements a young man may learn from a teacher for the mere sake of profit, are as indifferent to the educator as the colour he chooses for his coat. But how his circle of thought is being formed is everything to the teacher, for out of thoughts come feelings, and from them principles and modes of action. To think out in relation to this chain of development each and every thing that can be offered to the pupil and find a place in his mind, to enquire how each is connected with the whole, how one part must follow

¹ The second half Herbart worked out in his *Beitrag über die Anwendung der Psychologie auf die Pädagogik*. Page 333.

another and again becomes a link to that which succeeds—this applied to the treatment of individual objects affords an infinite number of problems to the teacher, and also unlimited material, by the help of which, he can ceaselessly think over and criticize all the knowledge and works accessible, as well as all the principal occupations and exercises he must carry on. We need in this respect a number of educational monographs (introductions to the use of any of the individual means of culture) which must, however, be written strictly on one system. I tried to give an example of such a monograph in my *A B C of Observation* (*Anechaung*), a book, which certainly has up to the present this fault, that it exists alone, and can neither rest on anything, nor support anything new. Of more important subjects for similar writings there is no lack; the study of botany, of Tacitus, of Shakespeare and many others could be treated as means of education. But I dare not invite any one to such a task, perhaps because I must presuppose a plan accepted and inwardly grasped, in which every subject finds its due place.

In order, however, to bring out more clearly the idea of education *through* instruction, let us pause awhile at its opposite—education *without* instruction, examples of which are plentiful. Taken generally, teachers are not those who possess the most knowledge. But there are many (especially among governesses) who know nothing, or, if they have knowledge, understand nothing of its scientific use, and who nevertheless pursue their work with great zeal. How do they act? They dominate the feelings of the pupil, and holding him by this bond, unceasingly disturb the youthful character to such an extent, that it can never know itself.¹ How then can character be formed? Character is inner stability, but how can a human being take root in himself, when he is not allowed to depend on anything, when you do not permit him to trust a single decision to his own will? In most cases it happens, that the youthful soul has in its depths a sacred corner, into which you never penetrate, and in which, notwithstanding your rough treatment, it lives for itself, dreams, hopes, and evolves plans

¹ See note to page 94b. For the difference Herbert here makes between sensations (*Empfindung*) and feeling (*Gefühl*), see *Introd. to Science*, p. 43.

which will be tried at the first opportunity, and if successful will base a character, just on the very spot you did not know. This is the reason why the aim and the result of education are wont to have so little connection. Though certainly they often do agree in so far that the pupil in after life takes the seat of his teacher, and makes his subjects suffer as he has suffered before them. The sphere of thought is here the same which daily experience gave in youth, only the uncomfortable place is changed for the comfortable. It is by obeying that one learns to rule, and even little children treat their dolls as they themselves are treated.

Education *through* instruction regards everything as instruction which is given to the pupil as a subject of consideration. The discipline (Zucht)¹ itself under which he is placed, belongs to this, and it works far more through *the example of an energy that maintains order*, than it can through the direct checking of single naughty acts, which latter is usually described by the far too pretentious title—correction of faults. The mere checking may leave the desire quite untouched, the imagination may even continue to embellish the object, and that is almost as bad as a continued committal of the fault, which assuredly will not be wanting in future years of freedom. But if the pupil reads in the mind of the teacher who punishes, moral disgust, the disapproval of his taste (Geschmack),² opposition to all disorder, then he passes over to his point of view, he cannot help seeing things in the same way, and this thought becomes a strong inward power, controlling the desire, and only requires to be sufficiently strengthened to conquer. And it is easily seen that the same thought can be produced in many other ways—

¹ In bk. 3, ch. v. 2, Herbart remarked that what is here called Discipline (Zucht) ought much rather to be termed Government (Regierung), but he did not wish to make use of his terminology in the introduction.

² Herbart uses this word here and afterwards with reference not only to matters of art, but also to questions of morality. Ruskin uses it thus also: "Taste is not only a part and an index of morality; it is the *only* morality. The first and last and closest trial question to any living creature is, 'What do you like? Tell me what you like, and I will tell you what you are.'"

that a fault on the part of the pupil is not at all a necessary occasion for this instruction.

I have demanded for education through instruction, science and mental force—*such* a science, *such* a mental force as can view and represent the near actuality as a fragment of the great whole. “Why of the whole, why of the remote?” it will be asked. “Is not the near sufficiently important and visible? Is it not full of relationships, which when not recognized and judged rightly in the small and the simplest cases, would be just as incorrectly comprehended, indeed much more so from the widest knowledge in the great? And we may prophesy, that this requirement will encumber education with a mass of learning and study of language, to the detriment of physical training, of dexterity in the fine arts, and of social happiness.”¹ Let us not be seduced by the just fear of these disadvantages to banish such studies. They only need other arrangement, so that without discursiveness and crowding out all other subjects, they shall yet never be simply means, shall never be dissociated from the main object, but bring from the beginning a constant and rich reward. Were such an arrangement impossible, were the heavy and destructive burden of customary Latin studies inevitable from the nature of the case, then we should be obliged to try constantly to banish school learning into odd corners, just as apothecaries bottle up poison that may on rare occasions have medicinal value. But supposing, that without requiring too extensive and involved preparation, a course of instruction can be really started which would cut straight and quickly through the fields of learning, without lingering in them too long—would the above-mentioned objection be then valid, *i.e.* that thereby children are uselessly removed from what is nearest to them, are uselessly and prematurely taken on journeys through strange lands? Is it possible, after deeper

¹ These remarks refer to the opinions of the Philanthropinists, who insisted that the earliest instruction should make use of what is present and near as teaching material for children, and not estrange them by transporting them into the distant and the past. On this ground they opposed preliminary instruction in Latin, and the usual method of studying it, which they considered injurious to children's health.

and unbiassed thought, to maintain that the near is clear to children and full of relationships, judgment upon which can become the basis of further correct methods of thought? Let us leave corporeal things on one side. It is true that, notwithstanding sensuous proximity, these are not of themselves perceptible and intelligible to eye and understanding, but I avoid repeating what I said before about trigonometry and mathematics. The question now, however, is of men and human conditions. What does the near mean in their connection? Is not the *far* that which we see in the interval between the child and the man? But this is as great as the space of time, whose long successions have carried us to our present point of culture and corruption. But this far distance *is* seen; we therefore write special books for children, in which everything incomprehensible, every bad example is avoided, and to this end teachers are exhorted to come down even to the level of children, and, cost what it may, to enter their narrow sphere. And here the manifold new incongruities to which this gives rise are overlooked. It is overlooked that when the mature teacher is asked to come down from his own level to make a child-world for children, something is demanded, which ought not to be and which nature inevitably punishes. It is overlooked how warped in the end they who long pursue such a course are wont to be, and how unwillingly intellectual men enter upon it. Nor is this all. The undertaking is not successful, for it cannot be. Men cannot imitate the female style, how much less that of children. The intent to teach spoils children's books at once; it is forgotten that every one, the child included, selects what suits him from what he reads, and judges the writing as well as the writer after his own fashion. Show the bad to children plainly, but not as an object of desire, and they will recognize that it *is* bad. Interrupt a narrative with moral precepts, and they will find you a wearisome narrator. Relate only what is good, and they will feel it monotonous, and the mere charm of variety will make the bad welcome. Remember your own feelings on seeing a purely moral play. But give to them an interesting story, rich in incidents, relationships, characters, strictly in accordance with psychological truth, and not

beyond the feelings and ideas of children; make no effort to depict the worst or the best, only let a faint half-unconscious moral tact secure that the interest of the action tends away from the bad towards the good, the just, the right; then you will see how the child's attention is fixed upon it, how it seeks to discover the truth and think over all sides of the matter, how the many-sided material calls forth a many-sided judgment, how the charm of change ends in preference for the best, so that the boy who perhaps feels himself a step or two higher in moral judgment than the hero or the author, will cling to his view with inner self-approbation, and so guard himself from a coarseness he already feels beneath him. The story must have one more characteristic, if its effect is to be lasting and emphatic; it must carry on its face the strongest and clearest stamp of human greatness. For a boy distinguishes the common and ordinary from the praiseworthy as well as we; he even has this distinction more at heart than we have, for he does not like to feel himself small, he wishes to be a man. The whole look of a well-trained boy is directed above himself, and when eight years old his entire line of vision extends beyond all histories of children. Present to the boy therefore such men as he himself would like to be. Such you will certainly not find near at hand, for the boy's ideal of the man corresponds to nothing which has grown up under the influence of our present culture. Again you will certainly not find this ideal in your own imagination, for that is full of pedagogic ideas, full of your experiences, knowledge and personal affairs. Even were you a greater poet than ever was before (for every poet reflects his own age) you must still, if you wish to attain the reward of effort, increase that effort a hundredfold. For it follows from the preceding as a matter of course that the whole is trivial and unfruitful if it stands isolated; it must be in the midst, or at the head of a long series of other means of education, so that through the general connection, the gains of each single process are seized and preserved. How then could that grow out of the entire literature of the *future*, which would be suitable for a boy who is not even on our level? I know of only one place where such a written story may be

found—the classical age of childhood among the Greeks, and I consider the *Odyssey* ranks in the first place.

I am indebted to the *Odyssey* for one of the happiest experiences of my life, and in a great degree for my love of education. This experience did not teach me the motive; *that* I saw before, clearly enough to begin my work as a teacher by allowing two boys, one nine, the other not yet eight years old, to lay their *Eutropius* aside, and requiring from them Greek instead, even Homer at once, without any so-called preparation by the hotch-potch of text-books. I erred in keeping far too closely to the routine of schools, exacting accurate grammatical analysis, when for this beginning only the principal signs of inflection ought to have been taught and explained with untiring repetition, rather than demanded again and again from the boy by pressing questions. I lacked all preparation in history and mythology, so necessary to make exposition easier, and so easily furnished by a student who possesses true educational tact. Many an injurious breeze from afar disturbed me much in my surroundings, which I can now but silently thank, was favourable to me. But nothing can destroy my hope that the good natures of healthy boys are not to be considered such rarities, but will stand the greater number of educators in good stead as they stood me. And while I can easily imagine a much greater art in carrying out the task than my first attempt can boast, I believe I learned from my experience (for which the reading of the *Odyssey* required a year and a half) that this commencement in private tuition is as practicable as it is wholesome, and that it must ordinarily succeed in this sphere, if teachers, who approach the subject not only in the philological but also in the educational spirit, will lay down some rules by way of help and foresight, more minutely than time and space at present permit me to do.¹ I cannot determine what is possible in schools, but were I in the position to do so,

¹ Herbart has been referring here to his early experiences as private tutor to Herr von Steiger's sons. With their father's approval he allowed the two younger boys, Karl and Rudolph, to give up *Eutropius* and read the *Odyssey*, of course in the original and without further preparation, with the results he describes.

I would make the attempt with courage, and with the firm conviction, that even if the result were failure, the evil could not be greater than arises from the customary study of Latin grammar and Roman authors, of which not one exists even passably suitable for guiding a boy at any period of his childhood into the ages of antiquity. They may conveniently follow, if Homer and a few other Greeks have gone before. But a considerable amount of learned confusion is shown in the manner in which they have hitherto been used, and in tolerating for the sake of an instruction so wholly wanting in all educational value, so much labour for so many years, so much sacrifice of good humour and of all free movement of the mind. I appeal to many educational reviews more easily forgotten than confuted, which at any rate exposed this great evil, even if they did not at once know a suitable remedy.

The preceding is sufficient to afford a preliminary acquaintance with this proposal; it is *not* sufficient to exhibit it in its infinitely numerous relations. It would be but a beginning, were any one inclined to grasp the whole of the present volume in one thought, and carry that thought about with him for many years. I at least have not given expression hurriedly to my experience. My attempt began more than eight years ago, and since then I have had time to consider it.

Let us rise to a general consideration of the subject. Let us look on the Odyssey as the point of touch in a fellowship between pupil and teacher, which, while it elevates the one in his own sphere, no longer depresses the other, and while it guides the one farther and farther through a classical world, yields the other a most interesting picture in the imitative progress of the boy, of the great development of humanity, and lastly prepares a store of recollections, which, associated with this eternal work of genius, must be re-awakened at each return to it. In like manner, a familiar star recalls the hours to friends, when they were wont to observe it together.

Is it, however, a small matter that the enthusiasm of the teacher should be enhanced by the choice of the matter taught? It is asked that the teacher shall be relieved of external pressure; but more than half of this is left undone, if the pedantry

which repels active minds and clings to sluggish ones be not swept away.

This spirit of pedantry which mingles so easily with education is highly destructive to it. It is of two kinds. The commoner clings to unimportant matters; it trumpets forth methods, when it has only invented new games. The other kind is more subtle and corrupting; it sees the important, but does not distinguish between the temporary and enduring. To it a single act of naughtiness is a fault of character, and to beneficially correct the pupils once or twice is the art of moral education! How can we think such proceedings other than harmful, when we remember, that even the most violent emotions of the deepest souls (which the educator truly has in his power, and which must often be made use of with robust natures) so quickly subside. He who considers only the quality of the impressions, and not their quantity, will waste his most careful reflections and his most skilful arrangements. It is true, nothing in the human mind is lost, but very little is present in consciousness at the same time; that which is essentially strong, which has many relationships, alone rises up frequently or easily before the soul, and only that which is most prominent impels to action. And the impulses, which individually affect the mind powerfully, are so many and of such diverse kinds in the long years of youth, that the strongest will be overpowered, if time does not renew them, and do so in many fresh ways. Only that is dangerous individually, which cools the heart of the pupil towards the person of the teacher, just because personality multiplies itself with every word, with every look. But even this union can in due time be again effected, though not without great and tender care. Other impressions, however skilfully occasioned, only move the character quite uselessly from its wonted position; it bounds back again, feeling as when one laughs over an empty fear.

And this all leads us back to the proposition—those only wield the full power of education, who know how to cultivate in the youthful soul a large circle of thought closely connected in all its parts, possessing the power of overcoming what is unfavourable in the environment, and of dissolving and absorbing

into itself all that is favourable.¹ It is true that only private tuition under favourable conditions can ensure opportunity to the skill of the teacher; may those opportunities that really occur be utilised. From the examples here given, more may be learned. Above all, however people may struggle against it, the world depends on but a few—a few rightly cultured ones can guide it aright!

Where this art of education is wanting, the chief thing is to discover, and if possible to guide, the existing sources of the chief impressions. Those who can recognise how the general appears in the individual, will be able to gather from the general plan what is practicable, by referring man to humanity, the part to the whole, and by then contracting the great into the less and still less according to the laws of their proportions.

Humanity educates itself continuously by the circle of thought which it begets.² If the manifold be loosely combined in this circle of thought, its working as a whole will be weak, and individual singularities, incongruous as they are, will excite restlessness and violence. If the manifold be contradictory, then useless argument results, which insensibly abandons to undisciplined desire the power for which it strives. Only when thinkers are at one, can reason—only when the good are at one also, can good—be victorious.

¹ This thought forms the basis of the *Allg. Pädagogik*, and must never be lost sight of by the reader. Still more forcibly is it given by Herbart in his work, *Mein Streit mit den Modephilosophen*, "Instruction will form the circle of thought, and education the character. The last is nothing without the first; herein is contained the whole sum of my Pedagogy." (Herbart's *Pädagogische Schriften*, edited by Professor Willman.)

² Herbart expresses this thought again as follows: "In the old and the uniform, in what always repeats itself during immeasurable centuries with some progress, lies the nature of Man, and therein must we seek for the gifts of God. According to the divine order, man comes helpless into the world, but capable of cultivation by language, family, reciprocal needs, accumulated experience, discovered arts, existing science, the works of genius from all preceding ages, which the longer their duration must the more uniformly influence ages to come. Humanity becomes ever more matured, living on always under the same sun, on the same earth. The salutary powers by means of which it ripens, are, although the least observed, ever the same, and ever active." (*Rede über Fichte's Ansicht der Weltgeschichte.*)

FIRST BOOK.

THE AIM OF EDUCATION GENERALLY.

CHAPTER I.

THE GOVERNMENT OF CHILDREN.

It may be doubted whether this chapter belongs on the whole to the science of education, and should not rather be subjoined to those divisions of practical philosophy which treat of government in general. Care for intellectual culture is, in fact, essentially different from care for the maintenance of order. If the former bears the name of education, if it requires special artists, *i.e.* educators, if finally all artistic work must be separated from all heterogeneous work, that it may be brought to perfection by the concentrated power of genius, then we must desire no less for the good cause itself than for clearness of conception, that they upon whom devolves the task of training with their insight and energy the inmost minds of children, should be relieved from the government of them. But to keep children in order is a burden which parents willingly cast off, and which perhaps appears to many who are condemned to live with children as the most agreeable part of their duty, since it gives them an opportunity to compensate themselves in some degree by a little tyranny over others for the oppression which they suffer from without. An author, therefore, who omits this from his theory of education at once exposes himself to the charge that he does not know how to educate. And, in truth, he must perforce blame himself; for though these diverse functions are but badly performed when associated together, yet in actual practice it is impossible to separate them entirely. Government which is satisfied without educating, oppresses the mind, and education which takes no heed of the disorderly conduct of children, would not be recognized as such by the children themselves. Besides, no lesson can be

given in which the holding of the reins of government by a firm yet gentle hand can be dispensed with.

Finally, if the educator proper and the parents are each to take their due share in the children's bringing up, they must take care duly to determine the mutual assistance which each must give the other on either side of the partition line.

I.

Aim of the Government of Children.

The child enters the world without a will of its own, and is therefore incapable of any moral relation. Consequently the parents (partly spontaneously, partly agreeably to the demand of society) can make themselves master of it as of a chattel. It is true they know well that in the being whom they now, without asking, treat as they like, a Will in the course of time will put itself forth, which they must win over to themselves if the incongruity of a conflict unseemly to both is to be avoided. But it is long before this takes place. At first, instead of a true will, which renders the child capable of determination, there is only a wild impetuosity, impelling it hither and thither, a principle of disorder, disturbing the plans of the adults, and placing the future personality of the child itself in manifold dangers. This impetuosity must be *subdued*, or the disorderly character will be put down as the fault of the child's guardians. Subjection is brought about by force, and the force must be sufficiently strong, and often enough repeated, to compass this subjection before any trace of a true will is manifested in the child. The principles of practical philosophy require this.

But the germs of this blind impulsiveness, these crude desires, remain in the child, and even increase and grow stronger with time. To the end, therefore, that they may not give to the will growing up in their midst an anti-social direction, it is necessary to keep them constantly under an ever-perceptible restraint.¹

¹ By means of this restraint what Herbart calls "formal morality" is first of all engendered in the child, which morality he thus defines in the

An adult trained to reason undertakes, as time goes on, to govern himself. There are human beings, however, who never reach this point, and society keeps such under perpetual guardianship, calling some idiots, some prodigals. Some there are who actually cultivate in themselves an anti-social will; with such society is inevitably at war, and generally they are justly worsted in the end. But the conflict is a moral evil for society itself, to prevent which child-government is one among numerous necessary precautions.

It is obvious that the object of child-government is manifold: partly avoidance of harm both for others and for the child himself in the present and the future, partly avoidance of strife as an evil in itself, finally avoidance of collision, in which society finds itself forced into a contest for which it is not perfectly authorized.

It all amounts to this, that such government has properly no aim to attain in the child's soul (*Gemüth*), but only has to create a spirit of order. Nevertheless, it will soon be clear that the cultivation of the child-soul cannot be altogether a matter of indifference to government.

II.

Means of Child-government.²

The first measure that all government has to take is the threat of punishment, and in its use all government runs the danger of striking on one of two rocks: on the one side there

Aphorismen zur Pädagogik: "Formal morality is properly only respect for the relationships we find outside our own individuality, and by which the objects of will are given through the desires. With this morality the individual only looks upon himself as one obeying, and submits himself to a higher criticism. He does not find the general will in his own consciousness, therefore does not immediately accept its affairs so absolutely as his own. His individual will is sufficient for his activity, and would only be restrained by the moral. But morality as a mere law of censure is not the principle of a steady and complete activity, and such a principle pedagogy still needs. Formal morality arises inevitably when earlier moral culture has been absent. The moral is afterwards added as a doctrine, and acknowledged, but it never becomes a part of the nature."

¹ "So far as it presents or conceives, the soul is called intellect (*Geist*); so far as it feels and desires, it is called disposition or heart (*Gemüth*)."—*Introd. to Science*, p. 13.

² *Introd. to Science*, pp. 156 and 157.

are strong natures who despise all threats, and dare everything to gain their will; on the other there are natures—a far greater number—who are too weak to be impressed by threats, and in whom fear itself is subservient to desire. This twofold uncertainty of the result cannot be avoided.

The rare instances in which the government of children strikes on the first rock are not really to be regretted, provided that it is not too late to make use of such splendid opportunities for education proper. But the weakness and forgetfulness of childish frivolity make mere threats so extremely untrustworthy, that supervision has long ago been considered as the most indispensable part of child-government.¹

I hardly dare express my opinion openly about supervision. I will at least not state it strongly in detail, otherwise parents and teachers might seriously credit this book with a considerable power of doing harm. Perhaps it has been my misfortune to witness too many examples of the effect of strict supervision in public institutions, and perhaps, having due regard to safety of life and strength of limb, I am too much possessed with the idea that boys and youths must be allowed to run risks, if they are to become men. Suffice it briefly to remember that punctilious and constant supervision is burdensome alike to the supervisor and those he watches over, and is apt therefore to be associated on both sides with deceit, and thrown off at every opportunity—and also that the need for it grows with the degree in which it is used, and that at last every moment of its intermittance is fraught with danger. Further, it prevents children from knowing and testing themselves, and learning a thousand things

¹ Herbart further expresses himself on this point in the *Aphor. zur Pädagogik*: "Supervision, prohibition, restraint, checking by threats, are only the negative measures of education. The old pedagogy betrayed its weakness in nothing so much as in its dependence on compulsion, the modern in nothing so much as in the emphatic value it places on supervision. Great perplexity can alone be the motive for exclusively recommending a measure at once so prejudicial, insufficient, and costly. Hindrance of offences is only good when a new activity continually takes the place of that which is restrained. The individual ought not to be too simple, too incapable, too indolent to commit faults, otherwise virtue would be at an end also." Herbart is here again opposed to the philanthropinists, who considered strict supervision to be of the highest importance. (See *Introd. to Science*, p. 157.)

which are not included in any pedagogic system, but can only be found by self-search. Finally, for all these reasons, the character which is formed outside the will of its possessor, either remains weak or distorted, according as the outlets which the individual finds be many or few.¹ Such is the result of long-continued supervision. That result seldom occurs during the earliest years, or during short periods of special danger, when, of course, supervision becomes a strict duty. In such cases, which are to be considered exceptional, the most conscientious and untiring observers must be chosen; not real teachers, who would here be out of place, the more so that we cannot assume that such cases would give any opportunity for the exercise of their powers. From those who grow up under the oppression of constant observation, no versatility, no inventive power, no spirit of daring, no confident demeanour can be expected. We can only expect human beings of simple, unvaried temperament, to whom the flat monotonous round of prescribed business is pleasant and right, who would shrink from all that is elevated and peculiar, and give themselves up to all that is commonplace and comfortable. Those who so far agree with me in this must be careful not to think for a moment that they can claim to form great characters, because they leave their children to run wild without supervision and without culture. Education is a vast whole of ceaseless labour, which exacts true proportion from beginning to end; merely to avoid a few errors is of no avail.

Perhaps I shall come more into harmony with other teachers when I pass to the means of help which must be prepared in the children's minds themselves by government—I mean authority and love.

The mind bends to authority; its peculiar movements are constrained by it, and it may thus be of considerable service in

¹ The teacher's requirements must not become the pupil's constant thought. For not these, but the true relationship of things ought to be the motive of his actions and the principle of his idea. This applies to early youth. Even little children learn to mingle the by-thoughts they have of the people about them in all they do, to such an extent that they are no longer capable of an unmixed feeling."—*Aphor. zur Pädagogik.*

suppressing a growing will which tends to perverseness. It can be least dispensed with in the case of the most energetic natures, for these make trial of the bad as well as the good, and pursue the good if they are not lost in the bad. But authority is only obtained through superiority of mind, and this, as is well known, cannot be reduced to rules. It must act independently, without reference to education. A logical and far-reaching course of action once prescribed, must openly and freely take its own straight course, regardless of circumstances, but undisturbed, untroubled by the likes or dislikes of a weaker will. If the careless boy breaks rudely into the prescribed circle, he must be made to feel what he might spoil. If the wanton desire to spoil arises in him, the intention, so far as it becomes or could become act, must be richly punished; but the teacher must scorn to take any notice of the bad will together with the insult implied therein. To wound the desire to do evil, which the government of children is as powerless as the State to *punish*, with the deep disapproval it deserves, is the business of education, which only begins after government has done its work. For the way to utilise authority once attained, we must look beyond government to education proper. For though mental culture gains nothing directly from passive obedience to authority, the marking out or enlargement of the circle of thought which depends upon it, and in which the pupil moves freely and builds up himself independently, is of the highest importance.

Love depends on the harmony of the feelings and on habit. The difficulty a stranger finds in winning it at once becomes apparent. He who secludes himself, who speaks much in hard tones, and becomes excited about trifles, will assuredly never gain it; nor, on the other hand, will he who makes himself familiar—who, when he should be kind and yet at the same time maintain his ascendancy, seeks his own pleasure by taking part in the enjoyment of the children. The harmony of feelings love demands, may arise in two ways. Either the teacher enters into the feelings of the pupil, and without permitting it to be noticed, joins in them with tact, or he takes care that the feelings of the pupil can approach his own in some particular way;

this is more difficult, but must nevertheless be combined with the other, because only when it is possible for the pupil to unite his activity in some way or other with the teacher's can he contribute force of his own to the relationship between them.

But a boy's love is transitory and fitful unless sufficient strength of habit be added. Time, tender care, intercourse alone with the individual strengthens the relationship. We need not say how much this love, once won, lightens the task of government; but it is so important to education proper (since it imparts to the pupil the teacher's bent of mind), that those deserve the severest blame who so readily and so fatally make use of it to gratify themselves by the exhibition of their power over their children.

Authority belongs most naturally to the father. In him whom all follow, to whom all turn for direction, by whom the domestic arrangements are determined and altered, or rather to whom they are made subservient by the mother—in him there most visibly arises that rightful ascendancy of mind, which has the power to depress or gladden with a few words of disapproval or of approbation.

Love belongs most naturally to the mother, to her who with endless sacrifices discovers and comes to understand the child's needs as none other can, between whom and the child a language grows up and is developed, which far sooner than any other can find ways of communication with the little one, who, favoured by the tenderness of her sex, knows so well how to strike the accordant tone in the feelings of her child, and whose gentle power, if never misused, can never fail of its effect.

If then authority and love are the best means of maintaining the effect of the child's earliest subjection, so far as its further government requires, it then of necessity follows, firstly, that this government will be best left in the hands of those to whom nature has entrusted it; but, on the other hand, that education proper, especially the culture of the circle of thought, can only be given by those who have special practice in traversing in all directions the realms of human thought, and can distinguish with the truest sense of proportion what is nobler, what is more profound, what is easier and what more difficult therein.

As, however, authority and love have so much indirect power over education, the fashioner of the mind, in whom at best only an ever limited trust is placed, should not in his pride desire to carry on his profession by himself alone, to the exclusion of the parents; he would thereby lose the power of their influence, for the loss of which he cannot easily find a compensation.

If, however, the government of children must devolve on persons other than the parents, it is important to carry it on with as little friction as possible. This depends on the proportion which the children's activity bears to the amount of free play they get. In towns, contact with many men may be very harmful to children; they must be kept within due limits, and this so much the more because activity is increased and excited by the example so many children together set each other. Nowhere, therefore, is government more difficult than in institutions in towns, which are, indeed, called educational establishments, but with really hardly any claim to the title, for where even government is so difficult, what can be done for education? In the country, on the contrary, establishments can utilise the advantage given by the freer scope for the children's activity, if only the responsibility for so many children did not lead their directors to enact so many, often over-solicitous regulations, which, with the object of shielding from possible evil, result in the surest and most universal harm. With good reason, however, teachers have long turned their attention to supplying children with many pleasant and harmless occupations, to provide an outlet for restlessness which cannot be pent up. So much has been said on this subject, that I need not hesitate to be silent about it. When the environment is so arranged, that childish activity can itself find the track of the useful and spend itself thereon, then government is most successful.

III.

Government superseded by Education.

Threats, in case of need enforced by compulsion,¹ supervision by persons who are generally cognisant of the dangers to which children are liable—authority and love combined—these powers will pretty easily obtain a certain degree of ascendancy over children; but the more tightly the string is already strung, the more power is proportionately required to screw it up to its true note. Instant obedience following a command on the spot² and with entire acquiescence, which teachers, not wholly without reason, look upon as their triumph—who would force this from children by merely cramping regulations as well as military severity? Such obedience can only in reason be associated with the child's own will; this, however, is only to be expected as the result of a somewhat advanced stage of genuine education.

Assuming the pupil has already a lively sense of the gain which intellectual guidance brings him, and of the loss which he will suffer from every deprivation, or indeed, diminution of it,³ he may then be shown that as a condition of the continuance of this guidance, a perfectly stable relationship is requisite, which can be calculated upon in all instances; and that the teacher must be able to confidently assume there will be instant obedience as soon as he has ground for requiring it. There is now no question at all of mere blind obedience; that is not consistent with any friendly relationship. But everywhere there occur cases in which only one can decide, and the others must follow without opposition. This nevertheless must be followed at the first opportunity by an explanation

¹ *Introd. to Science*, p. 160.

² For comparison between the views of Herbart, Locke, and Rousseau as to the benefit of reasoning with children, see *Introd. to Science*, p. 159.

³ Compare with this the following from *Aphor. zum Pädagogik*: "Everything must appear to the boy as his work; he must wish to feel he has himself to thank for his improvement. The years from ten to fourteen, when the boy feels intensely he must be educated, are very important. If these are neglected, formation by education is lost. Earlier, from the sixth year onwards, it is difficult to awake and maintain this spirit in the child; and in the pupil's seventeenth year education proper is impossible, or at most only possible in those who see what they have missed, and in whom the wish to submit themselves to education is keen. This feeling, however, will not last long, at least not beyond the time that they feel they can carry on their education for themselves."

less must be followed at the first opportunity by an explanation why that decision was arrived at and no other, so that the pupil's future judgment may meet the command half way. Conviction of the necessity of subordination must therefore concede what the teacher for himself would not dare to ask. It is the same with education. The strange teacher entirely compromises himself when he appears to arrogate to himself an authority which is neither derived from the parents nor yielded by the pupil.

IV.

Preliminary Glance at Education Proper in contrast with Government.

Education proper is cognisant, like government, of something which may be called compulsion; it is indeed never harsh, but often very strict. Its extreme form is the mere expression, *I will*, to which the mere expression *I wish*, pronounced without addition, soon becomes equivalent; so that both expressions need great discretion in their use. For they demand something from the pupil which can only be exceptional, namely submission, following on the communication and mutual consideration of the reasons for it. These two expressions thus denote a rare dissatisfaction of the teacher and unusual causes for it, which must be sought for in order to be reckoned with.

Education constrains, though less abruptly, yet to just the same extent as government, by persistently insisting on that which is unwillingly done, and by persistently leaving out of account the wishes of the pupil. In this, as in the former case, the teacher reminds the pupil in silence, or, if necessary, aloud, of the pre-existing contract: "Our relationship exists and endures only on such and such conditions." This, it must be admitted, has no meaning if the teacher does not know how to secure for himself a certain free position. This is soon followed by the withdrawal of the customary signs of favour and approbation. Such customary signs presuppose that as a rule the pupil will be treated as a human being, with ordinary kindness, and perhaps, as a lovable boy, with all the affectionate sympathy he deserves. This includes the yet wider presumption that the teacher has taste and a

feeling for all the beauty and attractiveness that humanity and youth may possess. The sour-tempered person who is insensible to this feeling would do better to avoid the young—he does not so much as understand how to look at them with proper consideration. Only he who receives much, and is therefore able to give much, can also deprive of much, and by such pressure mould the disposition and direct the attention of the youthful mind according to his own judgment.

But he will not guide it without sacrificing to a great extent the liberty of his own disposition. If he is always coldly indifferent, how can he imbue the boy, wandering by himself in the noonday of carelessness and growing physical strength, with the fine shades of intellectual activity, without which there can be no living sympathy, no refined taste, no true penetration nor spirit of observation? Very few natures pass of themselves out of the shallowness which constitutes what we call common-place; and except as imparted to them, fewer still attain to the spirit of *discrimination*, whose work it is to cultivate within and without. The teacher, therefore, must stimulate the boy while analysing him; he must reflect on him his own picture, rich in the expanding and restraining power which urges and impels any human being during the process of his own culture. And whence is he to obtain this power, except from his own moved soul? The first advance out of mental crudeness is made by a boy when he experiences afterwards how certain ideas expressed by himself affected the teacher, and this is the most direct benefit of education. But for the teacher to experience it *beforehand* demands a painful change of personal feeling which is no longer becoming to the mature man, and is suitable and natural only to those who are still in the period of striving after cultivation. Education, therefore, is the business of young men in the years when susceptibility to self-criticism is at its height, and when it is indeed an untold help to the teacher in looking at a younger life, to have the unexhausted wealth of human capacities at his disposal, with the whole problem of making the possible, real, and of educating himself with the boy. This susceptibility cannot but disappear in time, whether it be because he has become satiated, or because hope sinks and work presses. With it disappears the power and the inclination to educate.

Circumstances decide whether much or little speech be necessary for the expression of individual emotion. A reserved character which never overflows in speech, a helpless organ without depth or height, a style without a variety of turns, and incapable of expressing disapproval with dignity, and approbation with hearty sincerity, would leave the best will in the lurch, and land the finest feeling in perplexity. The process of education requires that much should be spoken, and often spoken without preparation. Artificial ornamentation it can dispense with, but it cannot altogether dispense with form.

How often is impressiveness needful—impressiveness which must be free from harshness! Whence can it spring, except from some unexpected turn; from a seriousness which deepens as it develops, and causes solicitude as to its ultimate end—from measures which will build up or destroy something that must remain either as a memory of disappointed or of fulfilled hopes? The teacher retires into himself, tears himself free by force as from a false relationship, which seems to mock him; or he comes out of himself, and rises above the trivial, which was too narrow for him. The pupil sees the torn threads lying; “looking before and after,” the right principle or the true means begin to appear indistinctly before him; and when he is ready to seize and restore them, the teacher hastens to meet him, dissipates the darkness, helps to unite what is severed, to smooth difficulties, and to strengthen the wavering.¹ These expressions are too general, too figurative; create for yourselves examples to illustrate them.

Only let there be no wearisome sulkiness, no artificial gravity, no mystical reserve, and, above all, no false friendliness. Honesty must be the soul of all activity, however numerous its changes of direction may be.

The pupil will have to test the teacher in many ways, before there grows up that subtle tractability which ought to spring from mere knowledge of, and regard for his feelings. When,

¹ Herbart used and tested the value of this treatment with the three pupils before alluded to, of which we have abundant proof in his letters to their father.

however, it is manifested, the teacher's attitude must be more steadfast, more equable; he must not lay himself open to the suspicion that no enduring relationship is possible with him, or that his heart is not a safe resting-place.

CHAPTER II.

EDUCATION PROPER.

THE art of arousing a child's mind from its repose—of securing its trust and love in order to constrain and excite it at pleasure, and to plunge it into the whirl of later years before its time, would be the most hateful of all bad arts, if it had not an aim to attain, which can justify such means even in the eyes of those whose reproof is most to be feared. "You will be thankful for it some day," says the teacher to the weeping boy, and truly it is only this hope that justifies the tears wrung from him. Let him be careful that, in overweening confidence, he does not too frequently have recourse to such severe measures. Not all that is well meant is thankfully received, and there is a weak spot in the class of that teacher, who, with perverted zeal, considers that as good which his pupils only experience as evil. Hence the warning—do not educate too much; refrain from all avoidable application of that power by which the teacher bends his pupils this way and that, dominates their dispositions, and destroys their cheerfulness. For thus, the subsequent happy recollection of childhood will also be destroyed, and that frank gratitude which is a teacher's only true thanks.

Is it then better not to educate at all? to confine ourselves to government, and limit even this to what is absolutely necessary? If every one were candid, many would agree to this. The praise already given to England would be repeated; and if once it became a question of praising, excuses would be found for the lack of government, which allows so much license to young gentlemen of position in that happy island. But let us put aside all disputes. The sole question for us is, *can we know beforehand the aims of the future man, a knowledge for*

which he will one day thank us, instead of having had to find and follow them by himself alone? If so, no further foundation is needed—we love the children, and in them, the men; love does not love doubts any more than it cares to wait for the categorical imperative.¹

I.

Is the Aim of Education Single or Manifold?

The effort to attain scientific unity often misleads the thinker to artificially force into connection with each other, and deduce from each other, things only lying side by side, and in themselves many and distinct. People are even carried away into committing the mistake of inferring unity of things from unity of knowledge, and of postulating the former with the latter. Such a misconception does not affect the science of education; so much the more does the need exist of being able to grasp in one conception the whole idea of a work like that of education, so immeasurably manifold, and yet so intimately connected in all its parts. For from such a conception proceeds unity of plan and concentrated power. Looking then at the results which educational research must show, in order to be completely serviceable, we are driven to presuppose and require for that unity, which the result cannot dispense with, a corresponding unity in the principle from which it may be anticipated. The question, therefore, is twofold²—firstly, if such a principle of unity exists, whether the method of constructing a science on the basis of one conception is known. Secondly, if such a prin-

¹ By the "categorical imperative" Kant means the moral law, so far as, independent of the external world and of every other command and consideration, it commands, and with its *Thou shalt* claims unlimited, unconditional, obedience. Instead of beginning with this absolute "shall," Herbart demanded that moral teaching should exhibit the highest point of view of willing and action, the determining judgments regarding the Good and Bad, the moral aims of internal and external activity—and while doing so himself, he arrived at his doctrine of ideas (Herbart's *Pädagogische Schriften*, *Anmerkung von Karl Richter*, 80).

² The contradiction between "the twofold question" and the enumeration of three points immediately after, is found also in Herbart's works collected by Hartenstein, who had the written remains of the philosopher at his disposal for reference. The oversight was therefore Herbart's own.

ception — ciple offers itself here, whether it contains by implication the entire science. Thirdly, whether *this* construction of the science, and this view which it affords, is the only one, or whether there be others which, although suitable in a less degree, are still natural, and which, therefore, cannot be excluded. I have in a treatise,¹ which is appended to the second edition of my *A B C of Observation (A B C der Anschauung)* treated the highest aim of education—morality—according to this method which there seemed necessary. I must beg my readers with all due respect to compare carefully that work—yes, even the whole of it—with the present one; or, at least, to avoid repetition, I must presume they have done so. To understand that treatise properly it is before all things necessary to observe the manner in which moral culture is related to the other parts of culture, that is to say, how it (moral culture) presupposes them as conditions from which alone it can with certainty be developed. Unprejudiced persons will I hope, easily see that the problem of moral education is not separable from education as a whole, but that it stands in a necessary, far-reaching connection with the remaining problems of education. But the treatise itself shows that this connection does not affect all parts of education in such a degree that we have reason to foster those parts only in so far as they stand in this connection. Other aspects of the direct worth of general education, which we are not justified in sacrificing, come now to the front. I therefore believe that the mode of consideration which places morality at the head is certainly the most important, but not the only and comprehensive, standpoint of education. It must be added that if the examination which is begun in that treatise were to be prosecuted, it would lead straight through a complete system of philosophy. But education has no time to make holiday now, till philosophical questions are once for all cleared up. Rather is it to be desired that pedagogy shall be kept as free as possible from philosophical doubts. For all these reasons, I here take a course which will be easier and less misleading for the reader, and which touches more directly upon all parts of

¹ *The Æsthetic Revelation of The World.*

the science, but which is disadvantageous for the final thinking out and co-ordination of the whole to the extent that some residue of isolated considerations remain, and something is lacking to the perfect unity of the manifold. So much then for those who feel themselves called upon to sit in judgment on, or better still, to erect a science of education out of their own means.

It is impossible, from the nature of the case, that unity in the aim of education can follow; simply, because everything must proceed from the single thought, namely, *that the teacher must represent the future man in the boy, consequently the aims which the pupil will as an adult place before himself in the future must be the present care of the teacher; he must prepare beforehand an inward facility for attaining them.*¹ He ought not to stunt the activity of the future man; consequently he ought not to confine it to single points, and just as little weaken it by too much diversity. He ought to allow nothing to be lost, either in *Intension* or *Extension*, which his pupil might afterwards demand back from him. However great or little these difficulties may be, so much is clear—*since human aims are manifold, the teacher's cares must be manifold also.*

It is not however, here contended that the multiplicities of education cannot easily be classified under one or a few main formal conceptions;² on the contrary, the kingdom of the pupil's future aims at once divides itself for us into the province of *merely possible aims* which he might perhaps take up at one time or other and pursue in greater or less degree as he wishes—and into the entirely distinct province of the *necessary aims* which he would never pardon himself for having neglected. In one word, the aim of education is sub-divided according to the aims of *choice*—not of the teacher, nor of the boy, but of the future man, and the aims of *morality*. These two main headings are at once clear to every one who bears in mind the most generally recognised of the fundamental principles of ethics.

¹ *Introd. to Science*, p. 68. ² *Note by Herbart*.—"I must, from scientific considerations, here observe that I do not give the name of Principle to those Concepts and Propositions to which we can only subordinate a manifold which does not follow from them by strict necessity."

II.

Many-sidedness of Interest¹—Strength of Moral Character.

(1) How can the teacher assume for himself beforehand the merely *possible* future aims of the pupil?

The objective of these aims as matter of mere choice has absolutely no interest for the teacher. Only the Will of the future man himself, and consequently the sum of the claims which he, in, and with, this Will, will make on himself, is the object of the teacher's *goodwill*; while the power, the initiative inclination, the activity which the future man will have wherewith to meet these claims on himself, form for the teacher matter for consideration and judgment in accordance with the idea of *perfection*.² Thus it is not a certain number of separate aims that hover before us now (for these we could not beforehand thoroughly know), but chiefly the *activity* of the growing man—the totality of his inward unconditioned vitality and susceptibility. The greater this totality—the *fuller, more expanded, and harmonious*—the greater is the perfection, and the greater the promise of the realisation of our good will.

Only the flower must not burst its calyx—the fulness must not become weakness through being too long scattered in many directions. Human society has long found division of labour to be necessary, that every one may make what he attempts perfect. But the more limited, the more sub-divided that which is to be accomplished, the more manifold is that which each receives from all the rest. Since, then, intellectual receptivity rests on affinity of mind, and this again on similar activities of mind, it follows that in the higher realm of true humanity, labour ought not to be divided up to the point where each man is ignorant of his neighbour's work. Every man must have a love for all activities, each must be a virtuoso in one. But the particular *virtuosoship* is a matter of choice; on the contrary, the manifold receptivity which can only grow out of manifold beginnings of one's own individual efforts, is a matter

¹ See *Introd. to Science*, p. 95. ² See *Introd. to Science*, p. 65–70. Herbart refers here to two of his five practical ideas.

of education. Therefore we call the first part of the educational aim—many-sidedness of interest, which must be distinguished from its exaggeration—dabbling in many things. And since no one object of will, nor its individual direction, interests us more than any other, we add to this, lest weakness may offend us by appearing by the side of strength, the predicate—*proportionate* many-sidedness. We shall thus get at the meaning of the common expression, “harmonious cultivation of all the powers,” in connexion with which the question arises, what is meant by multiplicity of powers of soul? and also what is signified by the harmony of various powers? ¹

(2) How is the teacher to assume for himself the *necessary* aims of the pupil?

Since morality has its place singly and only in the individual's will, founded on right insight, it follows of itself, first and foremost, that the work of moral education is not by any means to develop a certain external mode of action, but rather insight together with corresponding volition in the mind of the pupil.²

I leave untouched the metaphysical difficulties connected with this development. He who understands how to educate, forgets them; he who cannot free himself from them, needs metaphysics *before* a science of education, and the outcome of his speculations will prove to him whether the idea of education is, or is not, a possible one for him.

I look at life, and find very many upon whom morality is a stunted growth, very few with whom it is the principle of life itself. Most men possess a character independent of goodness,

¹ “The interest which a human being feels directly ¹ is the source of his life. To open many such sources, and to cause them to flow forth plentifully and unchecked, is the art of strengthening human life, and at the same time of fostering love of one's kind. If each of these interests is as varied as the achievements of many individuals taken together, then the latter are united in one bond by a happy necessity. On the contrary, when each individual cares only for *his* own business or avocation, and all besides is but means to this end, society is a machine, and each member of it keeps his life warm at a single spark, which may be extinguished, and then nothing remains but dismal coldness, satiety, and disgust.”—*Aphor. zur Pädagogik*.

² See Translators' Introduction, p. 37, and *Intr. to Sci. of Educ.*, p. 13 (note).

¹ “Directly” is used as adverb of mode, not of time.

and a plan of life formed only according to their own inclination; they do the good when convenient, and gladly avoid the evil, when the better leads to the same goal. Moral principles are wearisome to them, because for them nothing follows from those principles, except now and again a limitation of their course of thought—indeed everything adverse to this limitation is welcome to them. The young poacher has their sympathy, if he sins with some boldness, and they pardon at the bottom of their heart everything which is neither ridiculous nor malicious. If it be the object of moral education to lead the pupil into the ranks of these, we have an easy task; we need only take care that he grows up, without being teased or insulted, in the consciousness of his power, and receives certain principles of honour, which are easily impressed, because they treat of honour not as a wearisome acquisition, but as a possession which nature makes a present of, and which must be protected and put in force on certain occasions, according to conventional forms. But who will warrant us that the future man will not himself search out the good, to make it the object of his willing, the aim of his life, the standard of his self-criticism? Who will protect us against the severe judgment which will then overtake us? How will it be, if he calls us to account, because we presumed to anticipate the chance, which yet, perhaps, might have brought about better opportunities of genuine elevation of spirit, and would certainly not have caused the delusion that education for him is already a thing accomplished. There are instances of the kind; and it is never safe to set up as business manager for another if we have no mind to do the work well. No one at any rate would like to lie under so severe a condemnation from a man of strict moral sense, as he would who has arrogated to himself an influence over any one which might have made him worse.

Therefore that the ideas of the right and good in all their clearness and purity may become the essential objects of the will, that the innermost intrinsic contents of the character—the very heart of the personality—shall determine itself according to these ideas, putting back all arbitrary impulses—this and nothing less is the aim of moral culture. And although I may

not be entirely understood, when for brevity's sake I speak of the ideas of the good and right, still, it is well for us that morality has at last thrown aside those half measures, to which it formerly at times condescended under the guise of the doctrine of happiness. My fundamental thought is thus so far clear.

III.

The Individuality of the Pupil as Point of Incidence.

The teacher aims at the universal; the pupil, however, is an individual human being.

Without compounding the soul out of all kinds of forces, and without constructing the brain out of organs¹ positively useful and able to relieve the mind of a part of its work, we must accept those experiences undisputed, and in their entirety, in harmony with which, the spirit, according to the physical form in which it is embodied, finds in its functions sundry difficulties, and their conversely relative facilities.

But however much we may be challenged to test the flexibility of such natures by experiment, and in no way out of respect for their superiority to attempt to excuse our own inertness, we see already that the purest and best presentation of humanity shows us at the same time a particular man. Yes, and we feel that the individuality *must* come to the surface, if the example of the race is not to appear insignificant by the side of the race itself, and fade away as indifferent. And, finally, we know how beneficial it is for mankind, that different men should resolve upon and prepare for different work. Moreover the individuality of the youth reveals itself more and more under the teacher's efforts, and fortunate is he (the teacher) if that individuality in no way combats his efforts, or, by giving them a crooked direction, causes something different to be developed, which neither teacher nor pupil would desire. The latter fate almost always befalls those who have had no experi-

¹ Herbart jests here about the science of phrenology, founded by Gall, and applied by Leune to Pedagogy in his *Entwicklung der Gall'schen Theorie*, 1803.

ence in dealing with men, and therefore are ignorant of the way in which to treat in the boy, the already existent man. Out of all this there results a negative rule in relation to the aim of education, which is as important as it is difficult to observe, *i.e.* to leave the individuality untouched as far as possible. To do this, it is absolutely necessary that the teacher should discriminate his own peculiarities; he should carefully observe the occasions when his own wishes and his pupil's actions do not agree, and there is no intrinsic preference either for the one or the other. In such cases, his own wishes must at once give way, their expression must be suppressed whenever possible. Undiscerning parents may drill their sons and daughters according to their tastes—they may lay all kinds of varnish on the unpolished wood, which in years of independence will be roughly rubbed off, but not without pain and injury. The true teacher, if he cannot prevent all this, will at least not participate in it. His own structure, for which he always finds a wide and clear space in the child's soul, claims his whole attention. He will be careful how he undertakes matters for which he will earn no thanks; he cheerfully leaves undiminished to the individuality the only glory of which it is capable, namely, to be sharply defined and recognisable even to conspicuousness; he makes it a point of honour that the clear impression of person, family, birth, and nationality may be seen undefaced in the man submitted to his will.

IV.

On the Need of Combining the Aims previously distinguished.

We cannot develop our view of the aim of education from one point, without shutting our eyes to the manifold requirements which lie in the nature of the case, for we must at least bring back to one point what is to be the aim of a single plan. For where otherwise would our work begin, and where end? How can we save it from the urgent claims made upon it every moment by widely diverse views? Can any teacher have taught thoughtfully without being daily convinced of the deep need of singleness of aim? Can any one think of teaching

without being frightened at the mass of varied anxieties and problems which present themselves?

Is *individuality* consistent with *many-sidedness*? Can the former be preserved, while the latter is cultivated? Individuality is angular; many-sidedness is even, smooth, rounded, for agreeably to our demand it ought to be proportionately cultivated. Individuality is defined and circumscribed; many-sided interest, on the contrary, presses outwards in all directions. It must sacrifice itself while individuality remains quiescent or is thrust back; the one must move about in all directions, while the other remains calm in itself, to rush forth impetuously when the time comes.

In what relation does individuality stand to character? They appear either to harmonize with, or directly to exclude each other. For it is by his *character* that one recognizes a man; but by his *moral* character that one ought to recognize him. The less moral individual is not cognizable through morality, but on the contrary by many other individual traits, and just these as it appears make up his character.

The worst difficulty of all lies between the two chief parts of the educational aim itself. How will many-sidedness allow itself to be confined within the narrow bounds of morality, and how will the stern simplicity of moral humility bear clothing in the gay colours of a many-sided interest?

If ever complaints are made that education is thought out and pursued as a whole only with passable mediocrity, we need but refer to those who, by their development of the idea of the destiny of man, have given us so little help towards drawing us out of the sorry mean between those views which, as it appears, have to be reconciled with each other. For in looking up to the height of our destiny, the individuality and the manifold earthly interests are generally forgotten, until we come to forget them altogether—and while morality is rocked to sleep in the belief in transcendental powers, the *true* powers and means which rule the world are at the disposal of the unbeliever.

To repair all at once what is wanting in the preparatory work is a problem which we dare not think of here! Suffice it if we

are but successful in bringing the points in question more distinctly into view. Naturally, our chief business is to distinguish most carefully between the different chief concepts, *i.e.* many-sidedness, interest, character, morality—for on them must be directed all the labour which we propose to expend. During the analysis, the relationships of each to the others will perhaps adjust themselves. As to individuality however, it is evidently a psychological phenomenon; the examination of it therefore would belong to the second part of pedagogy already mentioned, which would have to be built on theoretical, while the present must be based on practical, conceptions. We cannot, however, here put individuality entirely on one side, or we should be constantly disturbed by the remembrance of it, and hindered from confidently concentrating our minds on the work of thinking out the main lines of the aim of education. Some steps therefore must here be taken to adjust individuality to character and many-sidedness: the definitions and relationships arrived at can be mentally carried forward to the following books, and further progress made in bringing the objects of education into view from all sides, without losing the one in the other. Mere doctrines, however, can never take the place of personal practice.

V.

Individuality and Character.

Each thing is differentiated, by its individuality, from others of the same species. The distinguishing characteristics are often called individual character, and thus in common language the two words, which we wish to define as opposites, are confounded with each other. But as soon as characters in a play, or the want of character in children, are spoken of, we immediately feel the word character is used in different senses. Mere individualities make a bad drama, and children have very marked individualities without possessing character. Children are wanting in that which *dramatis personæ* must possess, what above all goes to make up character in men as reasoning beings—that is WILL, and we mean will in the strict sense, which is far different from variations of temper or desire, for these are not

determined, while the will on the contrary is. The *kind* of the determination constitutes the character.

Willing—determination—takes place in consciousness. Individuality, on the other hand, is unconscious. It is the mysterious root to which our psychological conjecture¹ (*psychologische Ahnung*) refers everything which, according to circumstances, comes out ever differently in human beings. The psychologist ultimately attributes character also to individuality, while the teacher of transcendental freedom, who has eyes only for the expressions of the already formed character, separates the intelligible from nature by an impassable gulf.²

Character then, almost inevitably expresses itself in opposition to individuality by conflict. For it is simple and steadfast; indi-

¹ In the 1st ed., "psychological heredity." This passage has puzzled both translators and readers. In Richter's (the standard) edn. of Herbart's educational works used by us, the term *Ahnung* is given. In Hartenstein's 1st edn. of Herbart's complete works, a rare book, which is now accessible to us, and which is presumably correct, as he was Herbart's literary executor, *Ahnen* (conjecture) is employed in place of *Ahnung*. We therefore substitute conjecture for heredity, which renders the passage clear.

² The following note from Richter's edn. (*Anmkg.* 93), explains the theory of transcendental freedom, to which Herbart often alludes, and his reasons for rejecting it. "The reference is to Fichte's philosophy, against which Herbart earnestly protested, because it accepted the theory of transcendental freedom. This theory was previously admitted by Kant, who assumed man has a two-fold character—an *empirical* determined by experience, intercourse, temperament, etc., and an *intelligible* (absolute capacity), which exists as a thing in itself transcendental, that is outside experience, time, and all chains of causation, and thus is not determinable, but determines only, and is at the same time the basis of that transcendental freedom. Still more sharply did Fichte define the concept. According to his whole teaching, the pure absolute Ego postulated that its activity was of endless duration, that it comprehended all that was real in itself, and, by means of absolutely unrestrained reflection on itself as a natural being, gained unlimited power over itself, and thereby acquired the capability of self-determination unconditionally and without exception, in conformity with the idea of independence. According to this it depends merely on a man's freedom whether he has placed himself on a higher instead of a lower level, for 'only one resolution is necessary, and man is raised above all nature; the formation of another character, if the present has become worthless, merely depends on his freedom.' That from such a standpoint, the cultivation of morality—that is to say education which strives after this cultivation, would be negatived is apparent. Fichte perceived this himself, and could only return to it by roundabout ways. For if morality depends on a free resolution without any external incentive, we can the less help any one to attain to it by external influence, since inward absolute freedom does not permit itself to be reached by external means. Herbart, therefore, was perfectly right in renouncing this freedom entirely, and in declaring its acceptance to be inconsistent with the aim of education."

viduality, on the contrary, continually sends forth from its depths other and new thoughts and desires. Even if its activity be conquered, it still enfeebles the execution of resolves through its manifold passivity and susceptibility.

This struggle is not confined to moral characters ; every character knows it. For each individual in his own way seeks consistency. The ambitious man and the egoist complete themselves in victory over the *better* traits of individuality. The hero of vice and the hero of virtue, alike complete themselves in victory over self. In ridiculous contrast, weak individuals also exist, who, in order also to have a theory and a consistency, base their theory on the principle of not fighting but letting themselves slide. Truly a wearisome and a wonderful struggle out of light into darkness, out of consciousness into the unconscious. It is at least better to wage it sensibly than in a spirit of blind obstinacy.

VI.

Individuality and Many-sidedness.

If we had previously to separate things which appeared merged one in another, we have here to place in due order that which admits of arrangement.

Many-sidedness has neither sex, nor rank, nor age. With mental feelers everywhere, with ever-ready sensation, it suits men and girls, children and women ; it is as you will, either courtier or citizen, it is at home in Athens and in London, in Paris and in Sparta. Aristophanes and Plato are its friends, though neither possesses it. Intolerance is in its eyes the only crime. It observes the gay, thinks the loftiest, loves the most beautiful, ridicules the distorted, and exercises itself in each. Nothing is new to it ; but everything remains fresh. Custom, prejudice, aversion, and torpor disturb it not. Awaken Alcibiades, lead him through Europe, and you will see the many-sided man ! In this one man, the only one as far as we know, individuality was many-sided.

In this sense, the man of character is not many-sided, because he does not *will* it. He *wills* not to be the medium for all the sensations which the moment sends, nor the friend of all who attach themselves to him, nor the tree whereon the

fruits of all moods grow. He scorns to be the centre of contradictions. Indifference and strife are alike hateful to him. He maintains his sincerity and his earnestness.

Whether the many-sidedness of Alcibiades may or may not be reconcilable with individuality is a matter of indifference to the teacher, who cannot forego the culture of character. Deeper down the conception of many-sidedness as an attribute of the person will nevertheless be dissolved in ideas which may not harmonize with that picture.

But to individuality, which at times assumes airs, and makes demands, merely because it *is* individuality, we oppose the picture of many-sidedness, with whose demands it can compare its own.

We concede then that individuality may come into collision with many-sidedness; we do not forget that we declared war against it in the name of the latter, if it would not allow of proportioned many-sided interest. While we, however, at once rejected dabbling in many things (*Vielgeschäftigkeit*), a large sphere yet remains for individuality in which to exercise its activity—to make choice of its vocation, and to acquire the thousand little habits and comforts, which so long as no more value is attached to them than they are worth, will do but little harm to the receptivity and mobility of the mind. The principle has been previously laid down, that the teacher should not make attempts which are beside the aim of education.

There are many individualities; the idea of many-sidedness is but one. The former is contained in the latter collectively as the part in the whole. And the part can be measured by the whole; it can also be enlarged to the whole. This has now to be accomplished by education.

But we must not picture this enlargement, as if to the already existent part other parts were to be gradually added. Many-sidedness in its entirety floats constantly before the teacher, but diminished and enlarged. His task is to increase the *quantity*, without changing the *outlines*, the proportion, the *form*. Only this work undertaken with the individual does always change his outline, as if from a certain centre point on an irregular angular body a sphere gradually grew, which was nevertheless incapable of ever covering over the extreme

projections. The projections—the strength of individuality—may remain, so far as they do not spoil the character; through them the entire outline may take this or that form. It will not be difficult after the taste is formed, to unite with each of these a certain peculiar fitness. But the solid content of an interest equably enlarged on all sides, determines the store of the immediate intellectual life, which since it does not hang on one thread, cannot be destroyed by one stroke of fate, but can merely be diverted by circumstances. And since the moral order of life takes its direction from circumstances, a many-sided culture gives a priceless facility and pleasure in passing on to every new kind of activity and mode of life, that may at any time be the best. The more individuality is blended with many-sidedness, the more easily will the character assert its sway over the individual.

We have thus united what up to this point admits of union in the elements of the aim of education.

VII.

Preliminary Glance at the Measures of Education proper.

Interest arises from interesting objects and occupations. Many-sided interest¹ originates in the *wealth* of these. To create and develop this interest is the task of instruction,² which carries on and completes the preparation begun by intercourse and experience.

In order that character may take a moral direction, individuality must be held dipped, as it were, in a fluid element, which according to circumstances either resists or favours it, but for the most part is hardly perceptible to it. This element is *discipline*, which is mainly operative on the arbitrary will (*Willkür*), but also partially on the judgment.

Much has already been said about discipline, when speaking of government and of instruction in the Introduction. If it is not apparent therefrom why the first place is assigned to instruction, and the second to discipline in thinking out educational

¹ *Introd. to Sci.*, p. 95.

² For the relation between Interest and Instruction see *Introd.*, p. 101.

measures systematically, we can only again call attention to the relation between many-sided interest and moral character in the course of this treatise. If morality has no root in many-sidedness, then certainly discipline may be properly considered independently of instruction; the teacher must then directly so grasp, so charm and so constrain the individual, that the good rises with strength, and the evil sinks and gives way. Teachers, however, must ask themselves whether a mere discipline, so abstract and compulsory, has been recognized as possible till now? If not, they have every reason to suppose that *the individuality must first be changed through widened interest, and approximate to a general form, before they can venture to think they will find it amenable to the general obligatory moral law.*

In dealing with previously neglected subjects, the teacher will have to measure that which admits of treatment, besides taking into account the individuality before him, chiefly by the subject's receptibility and fitness for a new and better circle of thought. If the estimate of this receptibility and fitness be unfavourable, it is clear that education proper must be superseded by a watchful and trustworthy government, which will have to be undertaken by the State or some other influential body.

SECOND BOOK.

MANY-SIDEDNESS OF INTEREST.

CHAPTER I.

THE IDEA OF MANY-SIDEDNESS.

PERHAPS in common parlance the word many-sidedness has not been defined with sufficient clearness, hence a suspicion might easily arise, that a vague, variable idea had taken shelter behind it, which if properly determined would require another term.

Some think to improve the expression by suggesting *all-sidedness*. In effect, how many sides has many-sidedness? If it be a whole, and as such I considered it when contrasting it with individuality, then all the parts will belong to the whole, and there will be no need to speak of a mere number of parts, as if it were the great number that amazed us.

We can possibly hereafter enumerate exhaustively all the chief sides of many-sidedness. If, however, the separate parts do not immediately appear as making up one main concept, and indeed as existing only to that end—if we calculate upon finding them not together, but scattered singly and in infinite combinations in the mind—and finally, seeing that we originally included the manifold acts of volition in our educational aim only as *wealth* of the inner life without fixing their number (Book i. Ch. 2, Sect. iii.)—under all these conditions then many-sidedness is the most expressive term possible, inasmuch as it indicates to us we must count to the aggregate any one of these many parts as necessarily implying the remainder.

Although however, the various directions into which interest branches out, are as numerous as the manifold forms and colours in which its objects appear before us, yet all ought to start from one point; or rather the many sides should represent sides of the same person, like different surfaces of one body. All the

interests of a single consciousness must find their place in that person; we must never lose this unity.

It is obvious we have differentiated here the subjective and the objective of many-sidedness. As we wish first to develop the mere formal concept without reference to the materials of many-sided culture, we have no further distinctions to make in the objective. The subjective, on the contrary, supplies matter for thought. Shall we, to avoid one-sidedness, plunge into frivolity? The frivolous man is a new person every moment, or at any rate differently coloured, for he himself is properly nothing at all. He who gives himself up to impressions and fancies has never possessed himself or his surroundings; the many sides are not there, for the personality of whom they must be sides does not exist.

We are now prepared for the development.

I.

Concentration (Vertiefung) and Reflection (Besinnung).¹

He who has at any time given himself up *con amore* to any object of human activity understands what concentration means. For what occupation, or what kind of knowledge, is so mean, what gain on the road of culture allows itself to be so quickly

¹ Herbart, in the *Ältesten Heften*, gives another exposition of the concept of many-sidedness, which was probably intended for the *Allgemeine Pädagogik*, but was afterwards exchanged for that given in the text. In the same place he thus explains the terms "Vertiefung" and "Besinnung": " 'Vertiefung' occurs when a thought or series of thoughts becomes so powerful within us, that it supplants those presentations which usually accompany our consciousness. 'Besinnung' occurs when the ordinary contents of our consciousness come forth. The expression 'ordinary consciousness' is obviously vague, but this indicates that both 'Vertiefung' and 'Besinnung' are very partial, and therefore may be very multifarious. 'Vertiefung' does not always subdue all the contents of consciousness, nor does 'Besinnung' re-establish them." It is impossible to find exact English equivalents for these terms. In the absence of such, we have adopted for "Vertiefung," Concentration, and for "Besinnung," Reflection, and shall use them whenever the words occur in this work as expressing Herbart's meaning—i.e. "Vertiefung"—an act of thought concentrated upon any subject or object to the exclusion of all others, and "Besinnung"—an act of recollecting and co-ordinating reflection on any of the contents of consciousness.

won, that there is no need to bury ourselves therein, and withdraw awhile from all other thoughts. As a suitable light is necessary to every picture, as judges of art require a fitting frame of mind in the observer of every work of art—in like manner a suitable attention is due to everything worthy of being observed, thought, or felt, in order to understand it wholly and correctly, and to transport oneself into it.

The individual grasps rightly what is natural to him,¹ but the more he exclusively cultivates himself in this direction the more certainly does he falsify through his habitual frame of mind every other impression. This the many-sided man should not do. From him many acts of concentration are expected. He must grasp everything with clean hands; he must give himself wholly up to each one. For all sorts of confused markings are not to be scratched upon him; the mind must go out clearly in many directions.

The question arises—How, in doing this, can the personality be preserved?

Personality rests on the unity of consciousness, on co-ordination, on Reflection (*Besinnung*). The acts of concentration exclude each other, and thus even exclude the Reflection in which they must be united. These processes cannot be contemporaneous; they must therefore follow one upon the other; we get first one act of concentration, then another, then their meeting in reflection. How many numberless transitions of this kind must the mind make before a person, in the possession of a rich reflection and the completest power of reverting at will into every concentration, can call himself many-sided.

But many-sidedness depends also on the result the acts of concentration will give when they meet together. By no means pure reflection, and consequently no true many-sidedness, in so far as they bring together contradictories. They then either do not combine, but remain lying near each other, in which case the man is scatterbrained, or they grind each other down and torment the mind by doubts and impossible

¹ *I.e.* what is peculiarly his bent.

wishes, until kindly nature herself must see if she cannot conquer the disease.

Even if they contain no contradictions (such as modern fashion provides in no small measure), it makes a great difference how, and how perfectly they penetrate each other. The more perfectly they become one, the more does the person profit. When the blending is imperfect, the many-sided individual becomes what is sometimes called "a scholar" in a bad sense, just as a whimsical virtuoso is developed out of a single kind of concentration accompanied by careless reflection.

We must not do more here in the name of many-sidedness than show generally the necessity of reflection. To know beforehand in what manner it is composed on every occasion of such and such concentrations would be the business of psychology; to feel it by anticipation is the essence of educational tact, the most precious treasure of the art of education.

In regard to this we may here observe, that between the extremes of perfect concentration and exhaustive reflection, lie the ordinary states of consciousness, which may be considered as we please—on the one side as partial concentrations, on the other as partial reflections. As then, perfect many-sidedness is unattainable, and since we must be content with some kind of, possibly rich, but yet only partial reflection instead of the most comprehensive, we might ask, what outline shall be given to it, or what part shall be preferably selected out of the whole—if the answer did not lie ready before us. It is the individuality, and the horizon of the individual determined by his opportunities, that cause the first acts of concentration, and therefore determine if not the central point, at least the starting-point of advancing culture. To these we certainly need not pay anxious respect, but yet ought not to neglect them so much that the gifts of education and the gifts of circumstances cannot easily flow into one current. Instruction gladly begins by starting from what is nearest. But we need have no fear, if that from which instruction starts is separated from us by great distances of space and time. Thought travels quickly, and only that lies far removed from reflection, which is separated by many intermediate concepts or by many modifications of thought.

II.

*Clearness.
System.*

*Association.
Method.¹*

The mind is always in motion. At times the movement is very rapid; at others, scarcely perceptible. Presentations existent at the same time in whole groups, change perhaps but slightly for a time; the remainder are stationary, and, so far as they are concerned, the mind is quiescent. The mode of progression itself is shrouded in mystery. Nevertheless these preliminary considerations provide us with a basis for division, of which we shall frequently stand in need, to bring down the concepts whose extension is too wide into the sphere of the practical.

The concentrations ought to change; they ought to merge in each other, and in reflection, reflection again in new concentrations. But each in itself is quiescent.

Quiescent concentration, if it be but clear and pure, sees single things distinctly. For it is only clear when everything is kept at a distance that makes the act of presentment a turbid mixture, or when several varied concentrations disintegrated by the teacher's care are presented one by one.

The presentations are associated by the progress of one Concentration in another. In the midst of the crowd of associations hovers imagination; it tastes every mixture and despises nothing but the tasteless. But the entire mass is tasteless as soon as the elements can commingle one with another, and that is possible, if the clear antithesis of single things does not prevent it.

¹ Clearness (comprising Analysis and Synthesis), Association, System and Method, are the five formal steps of the modern Herbartian school. For an analysis of them see *Introd. to Science*, p. 107; and for the law of the alternation of concentration and reflection, *Introd. to Science*, p. 111. Herbart repeatedly returns in his psychological works to the concepts—Concentration and Reflection—as if to emphasize at once their importance and their difficulty. In his *Lehrb. d. Psych.*, Par. 210, *Werke* v. p. 146, he says: “‘Vertiefung’ and ‘Besinnung,’ as forming the act of mental respiration, ought always to alternate with each other. ‘Vertiefung’ takes place when presentations are successively brought into consciousness in sufficient strength and purity, as far as possible, without obstructions. ‘Besinnung’ is the collecting and binding together of these presentations. The more perfectly and purely these operations are performed, the greater will be the success of instruction. In the *Essay on an Obscure Side of Pedagogy*, *Werke* vii. p. 69, ‘Besinnung’ is described as the mingling of the comprehensions previously existent apart in consciousness.

Quiescent reflection sees the relationship of the many; it sees each particular thing as a member of the relationship in its right place. The perfect order of a copious reflection is called System. But there can be no system, no order, no relationship without clearness in single things. For relationship does not lie in mixture, it exists only amid separated and re-united parts.

The progress of reflection is Method. It runs through system, produces new members of it, and watches over the result in its application. Many use the word who know nothing of the thing. The difficult business of cultivating the mind according to method must be on the whole left to the teacher; if the present book does not show how indispensable it is to order methodically one's personal thoughts on education, it will have availed nothing with the reader.

Experience continuously accumulates confused masses in the mind of the child. Much of it is again gradually analysed as objects come and go before the mind, and there remains a beneficial facility of association for that which has been analysed. Much however awaits the teacher, who finds an especially long task with those who have spent many years without intellectual help. The mental condition in such pupils is very inert towards everything which ought to stimulate them to change. Man sees nothing but the old in the new, so long as each similarity only brings out by reminiscence the whole and the same mass.

Faulty association is most often to be found in knowledge acquired at school. For either there was not sufficient force in the matter learned to impel it forwards to the sphere of the imagination, or the learning checked even the course of the imagination day by day, and the mind stiffened in every part.

No one expects system either from experience, or in common fairness, from such sciences as till now had, more correctly speaking, some sort of an arrangement than a system of their own. But even if the exposition of a science be systematically correct, the learner yet gains at first only a series which he must for a long time revolve in association before the combining reflection makes him feel the superiority of the selected series.

How much less hope there is that the proposed system will meet with correct application.¹ Method is to most people a learned name; their thinking hovers unsteadily between abstraction and determination, and follows what charms, instead of the relationships of things. Similarities they associate as identities, and in their doggerel, "idea" rhymes with "thing."

CHAPTER II.

CONCEPT OF INTEREST.

WE contracted the scope of the manifold personal life from the dabbling in many things, to manifold interest, so that the concentrations might never stray too far from the uniting reflection. For just because the power of human concentration is too weak to accomplish much by rapid transitions in many directions (we measure it here by the standard of the totality of human activity, in comparison with which the most active are as nothing), we must therefore keep at a distance those irregular employments, which would create something, now here, now there, but which, instead of being useful to society, destroy the individual pleasure in work by imperfect results, and obscure the personality by distraction.

The concept of interest then took its origin for us in that we broke off, as it were, something from the growths of human

¹ Herbart gives an example of the application of the four concepts treated of in this chapter—Clearness, Association, System, Method—to definite matter of instruction, in the *Kurzen Encyclopädia, Werke* 3, S. 224. "Should any one desire to teach Philosophy by the guidance of this series of concepts, he must first separate from each other the objects of philosophic contemplation, and examine them as far as possible singly, for *Clearness* requires the absence of everything through which one object can obscure the rest. Then he must combine them thoroughly to bring them into manifold incidental connections, till his listeners have full power of passing from one point to another without difficulty, and especially till they are sure of no longer losing sight of one object more than of others (*Association*). Not till then will the systematic exposition begin, and not till then will its value be perceived as the arrangement and determination of the mutable (*System*). The value of that arrangement and settlement will not be fully proved, till finally *Method* is added, which shows with regard to every part of System the necessity of its position.

activity, in that we in no wise denied to inner vitality its manifold developments, but certainly denied their extreme expression. What is it that is broken off, or that is denied? It is *action*, and that which immediately impels thereto, desire. Desire, therefore, taken together with interest, must represent the whole of an upspringing human impulse. Further, there could be no intention of closing to *all* impulses an outlet in external activity; on the contrary, after we have first distinguished the various impulses by their objects, it will become clear which kind is worthy of a certain development even to its fullest expression.

I.

Interest and Desire.

Interest, which in common with desire, will, and the æsthetic judgment,¹ stands opposed to indifference, is distinguished from those three, in that it neither controls nor disposes of its object, but depends upon it. It is true that we are inwardly active because we are interested, but externally we are passive till interest passes into desire or volition. It occupies the mean between mere observation and attainment. This remark helps to make clear a distinction, which must not be overlooked, *viz.* that the object of interest can never be identical with that which is in reality desired. For the desires, while they would fain grasp, strive toward some future object which they do not already possess; interest, on the other hand, unfolds itself in observation, and clings to the contemplated *present*. Interest only rises above mere perception in that what it perceives possesses the mind by preference, and makes itself felt among the remaining perceptions by virtue of a certain

¹ Herbart, as has been explained in the translator's Introduction (page 26), applies the term to those judgments which are based on the moral intuition, and supply the ground for elective obedience to the moral law. His idea of the original unconditioned nature of these judgments in his wider field of æsthetics which includes morality, is thus expressed by an English writer in the sphere of morality: "as the instinctive impulses turn up within us one after the other, and two or more come into presence of each other, they report to us their relative worth, and we intuitively know the better from the worse."—(Dr. Martineau, *The Seat of Authority in Religion*.)

causality. From the preceding is immediately deduced what follows.¹

II.

(Merken)	Attention	Expectation	(Erwarten).
(Fordern)	Demand	Action	(Handeln).

The first causality which a presentation more prominent than others exercises over the rest is that it involuntarily represses and obscures them. As it then exercises its power to bring about what we have above termed concentration, we can designate the condition of the mind so occupied by the word Observation. The easiest and commonest course of this causality, which seldom permits the attainment of a quiescent concentration, consists in the arousing of an analogous presentation by the object observed. If the mind be merely inwardly active, and permits this movement to complete itself, then at most a new act of attention follows. But often the newly aroused presentation cannot immediately come forth, and this is always the case (to say nothing of the obscure efforts of presentiment and the spirit of enquiry) when interest started from the observation of an external reality, and when to this a fresh presentation attaches

¹ Note on the passing of Interest into Desire and Volition.—In accordance with Herbart's psychology explained in the translators' introduction, both feeling and desire are states of the presentations. When some presentations strive to retain any given presentation in consciousness and others strive to expel it, a feeling of discomfort or pain arises, which may pass into desire, provided the power of those which retain is greater than those which would expel. Desires are ordinarily excited by recollection of the object; they change with a painful feeling of renunciation, when the expelling presentations (obstacles which stand in the way of attainment) preponderate. A feeling of pleasure arises when a presentation receives such help from others, that it is raised higher in consciousness than it would be by its unaided strength. The essence of a desire is that presentations existent in consciousness work their way upwards against opposing presentations. Since on account of this opposition they can move but slowly, other presentations bound to them in series win time also to rise in consciousness, and thereby to enter into many new combinations amongst each other. In this way the obstacles to desires are an important element in the cultivation of the circle of thought and indeed as a means thereto, the "the many-sided balanced interest of the *Pädagogik* is in the *Darstellung* exchanged for the awakening of manifold desires." When desire often succeeds, it becomes united with expectation, and finally with certainty of attainment; it has then formed itself into will.

itself as if the reality moved or changed in a certain manner. So long as the reality delays presenting this progress to the senses, interest hovers in Expectation.¹

The expected is naturally not identical with that which aroused the expectation. The former, which perhaps can now for the first time put in an appearance, is in the future; the latter, on or from which the new can arise or date itself, is the present on which, in the case of interest, attention properly speaking fastens. If the condition of mind changes to such an extent that the mind loses itself more in the future than in the present, and the patience which lies in expectation is exhausted, then out of interest grows desire, and this makes itself known through the Demand of its object.

Demand however, when the faculties are at its service, comes forth as Action.

It is inglorious to be absorbed by desires,² and yet more inglorious to be absorbed by a multiplicity of desires, and if we wished to correct the many-sidedness of desire by dissolving the concentrations into a reflection, even then we should at most gain a system of desire thereby, a plan of egoism, but nothing which could be united with temperance and morality. Patient interest, on the contrary, can never become too rich, and the richest interest will be the most ready to remain patient. In it the character possesses a facility in accomplishing its resolves, which accompanies it everywhere, without frustrating its plans by pretentiousness.

However much action may be peculiarly the prerogative of character, there is yet another species of activity which is specially adapted to children who are naturally still without character, *viz.* experiment. This arises not so much out of desire as out of expectation; the result to the character in whatever way it turns out is equally remarkable; it always helps imagination forward and enriches interest.

¹ *Introd. to Science of Educ.*, p. 47.

² *Ibid.*, p. 51.

CHAPTER III.

OBJECTS OF MANY-SIDED INTEREST.

THE formal concepts hitherto treated of would be empty, if what they presupposed were non-existent. It is the interesting which the concentrations ought to pursue, and the reflections collect. Clearness and connection, system and method belong to that which is observed and expected.

We have now to take our way through the sphere of the interesting. But shall we undertake to enumerate the sum of interesting things? Shall we lose ourselves in the objects, in order not to omit any subject worthy of knowledge in the catalogue of useful lessons? Here our sight is obscured by the sultry atmosphere of perplexity, in which the ardour is so often stifled of those pupils and teachers, who think the attainment of many-sided culture impossible, unless they accumulate much apparatus, and undertake as many tasks as the day has hours. Immoderate ones! Heaven endows every kind of interest with thousands of opportunities; they pursue all these and attain nothing but weariness.

A slight error of opinion must here be corrected. Do not forget interest among interesting things; classify not objects, but *conditions of mind*.

I.

Knowledge and Sympathy.

Knowledge¹ imitates what lies before it in Idea. Sympathy transports itself into the feeling of another.

In knowledge there is an antithesis between the thing and the idea. Sympathy, on the contrary, multiplies the *same* feeling.

¹ A clear explanation of the process of knowledge and of the antithesis between the Thing and the Idea is given in a "Study of Spinoza," by Dr. Martineau, p. 108. "In all knowledge there is an idea of the cognised object presenting within us; that which is not within us. This Idea is other than the object, and indeed is antithetic to it, planted as it is in the opposite sphere. . . . Yet this Idea, though other than the object, *agrees with the object* so as to report *what it is*, i.e. to take its essence into one thought. The Idea of an ellipse is different from the ellipse, having no area and foci; yet presents in thought the characteristic properties which the figure possesses in fact.

The objects of knowledge are wont to be at rest, and the mind goes from one to the other. Feelings are wont to be in movement, and the mind in touch with them accompanies their course.

The circle of objects for knowledge embraces nature and humanity. Only certain expressions of humanity belong to sympathy.

Can knowledge ever end? It is always at its beginning. Receptivity is as becoming in the man as in the boy.

Can sympathy ever be too active? Egoism is always near enough; its power can never meet with too strong a counterpoise. But without reason, without theoretical culture, a weak sympathy falls into one folly after another.

II.

The Parts of Knowledge and Sympathy.

Here the idea of the *many*, which belongs to mansidedness, falls apart. As we have only to deal with mansidedness, we do not trouble ourselves about the principles of division, but merely about the distinct contrast of the parts. Let any one see whether more of them are to be found than the following:—

<i>Knowledge</i>	<i>Sympathy</i>
Of the manifold,	with humanity,
Of its law,	with society,
Of its æsthetic relations.	and the relation of both to the Highest Being. ¹

(1) *Specific distinction among the parts of knowledge.*

However rich and vast nature may be, still so long as the mind receives it as it presents itself, it will only be more and more filled with the actual. The manifold in the mind is merely that of phenomena, just as the unity in it is merely that of their similarity and inter-connection. The mind's interest² depends on the strength, variety, novelty, and varied succession of these phenomena.

But in that which is according to law, necessity is discerned or at least assumed; the impossibility of the contrary is either

¹ For analysis and illustrations of the six classes of interest see *Introd. to Science*, p. 96.

² That is, the mind's interest in the manifold.

seen or taken for granted; a *datum* is analysed into matter and form, and the form is re-formed by way of experiment. Only in this way can the connection appear first as given, and then further as necessary. Interest¹ depends on concepts, on their opposition and interconnection, on their mode of comprehending various aspects, without becoming confused with these.

Taste does not supply a contrary but an addition to contemplative observation (*Anschauung*). Its judgment always follows—suppressed or expressed—upon every completed act of presentation provided that this latter has not at once vanished in change. It does not lie in mere perception;—approval, disapproval, are verdicts on the object, not an immersion in it. Interest² attaches itself to the idea, not to the thing,—to relationships, not to number or mass.

(2) *Specific distinctions among the parts of sympathy.*³

If sympathy simply accepts the affections it finds in human minds, follows their course, enters into their varieties, collisions, and contradictions, it is merely a fellow feeling. Such would be the sympathy of the poet, if he were not as artist the creator and master of his materials.

But it can also abstract the varied affections of many men from the individuals, it can seek to reconcile their contradictions, it can interest itself in the welfare of the whole, and

¹ That is, interest in the law of the manifold.

² That is, interest in the æsthetic relationships.

³ As a further explication of Interest excited by the parts of knowledge, that is interest in the Objective, and of interest excited by the parts of Sympathy, that is interest in the subjective, Herbart gives the following in his *Kleinere Schriften*:—

“The first kind of interest—that in the objective—is felt partly in the comprehension of objects, partly in the grasping of their interdependence according to law, partly in the approval which their harmony and adaptability to an end win from us.

“The second kind of interest—in the subjective—devotes itself partly to men as individual beings, partly to society, and partly to the relation of nature to humanity. In all these aspects the characteristic of this second kind of interest lies in the sympathy, in the concentration on human feelings (whether personal or those of others). Quite foreign to this, on the contrary, is all mere observation, however interesting, of human beings; this belongs to the first kind—the objective. Both kinds touch at their highest point and meet together in Religion, for its object is Providence.

then again distribute this interest in thought amongst the individuals. This is *social* sympathy. It disposes of the particular, that it may attach itself to the general. It requires exchange and sacrifice, opposes actual emotions, and imagines possible better ones in their place. This is the attitude of the politician.

Finally, it can pass over from mere sympathy into fear and hope for these emotions by contemplating the state of men in relation to their environment. This solicitude, against which all skill and activity in the end appear weak, leads to a religious need, to a moral as well as to a eudæmonistic need. Belief springs out of need.¹

If we wish to avoid exaggeration and difficulty in our progress, an explanatory parallel may be here permissible. Both knowledge and sympathy originally take what they find, as it is; the one seems immersed in empiricism, the other in compassion. But both work their way upward, impelled by the nature of things. The riddle of the world extorts speculation from empiricism, the conflicting claims of humanity extort the social spirit of order out of sympathy. The spirit of order gives laws, speculation recognizes laws. Meanwhile, the mind having freed itself from the burden of the mass of particulars, and being no longer sunk in single things, is now attracted by relationships; quiescent contemplation is attracted by the æsthetic relationships, fellow-feeling by the relationship of the desires and powers of humanity in their subordination to the course of things. Thus the former rises to taste, the latter to religion.

CHAPTER IV.

INSTRUCTION.

To leave man to Nature, or even to wish to lead him to, and train him up in Nature, is mere folly. For what *is* the nature of man? To the Stoics and Epicureans, it was alike the convenient peg on which they hung their systems. Human

¹ *I.e.* a need which concerns itself with morality as well as with happiness.

nature, which appears to be suited for the most diverse conditions, is of so general a character that its special determination and development is entirely left to the race. The ship constructed and arranged with highest art, that it may be able to adapt itself to every change of wind and wave, only awaits the steersman to direct it to its goal, and guide its voyages according to circumstances.

We know our aim. Nature does much to aid us, and humanity has gathered much on the road she has already traversed; it is our task to join them together.

I.

Instruction as the Complement of Experience and Intercourse.

From Nature man attains to knowledge through experience, and to sympathy through intercourse.¹ Experience, though our teacher through the whole of life, supplies nevertheless but an infinitesimal fragment of a vast whole; infinite time and space veil for us an infinitely greater possible experience. Perhaps intercourse is relatively less barren, for the feelings of our acquaintances are as a whole like those of the rest of humanity; but sympathy rests on the finest distinctions, and one-sidedness of sympathy is much worse than one-sidedness of knowledge. Therefore the gaps left by intercourse in the little sphere of feeling, and those left by experience in the larger circle of knowledge, are for us almost equally great, and in the former as in the latter, completion by instruction must be equally welcome.

But it is no light task to make good such important deficiencies, and before we burden instruction with it, we must indeed consider of what it is, and is not, capable. Instruction spins a long, fine, flexible thread, which the striking of the clock severs, and again joins, which binds at every moment the pupil's own mental activity, and, whilst it unwinds itself according to its own measure of time, confuses *his* tempo, does not follow its leaps, nor allow time for its pauses. How different it is with contemplative observation (*Anschauung*). It at once spreads out a surface broad and wide; the eye,

¹ *Introd. to Science of Educ.*, p. 82.

recovered from its first astonishment, separates, unites, moves hither and thither, rests, renews its glance. To all this the sense of touch and the other senses are also added, thoughts gather, experiments are begun from which new forms arise and new thoughts awake; everywhere there is free and full life, everywhere enjoyment of the abundance that is offered. This abundance, this offering without exaction or compulsion—how can instruction attain to it? How far can it vie with intercourse, which is constantly claiming the expression of its own power—intercourse which, as a thoroughly mobile and plastic element, gives itself up with a susceptibility as great as the activity and power, with which it enters into the depths of the mind to remould and mingle therein all kinds of feelings?—intercourse which not only enriches sympathy with the feelings of others, but also multiplies one's own feeling in the hearts of others, that it may be returned to us strengthened and purified? If the latter advantage be peculiar to personal contact, and on the other hand is decidedly weaker in intercourse by writing, it must be finally lost in the mere representation of the strange feelings of unknown persons from distant countries and times, by which alone instruction is able to enlarge the circle of intercourse.

Indeed, who can dispense with experience and intercourse in education?¹ To do so would be to dispense with daylight and content ourselves with candlelight! Fulness, strength, individual definiteness in all our presentations, practice in the application of the general, contact with the real, with the country and the age, patience with men as they are—all this must be derived from those original sources of mental life.²

But, alas! education has not experience and intercourse in its power. Compare the farmyard on the estate of an industrious farmer with the rooms in the palace of a fashionable lady who lives in town. In the former, the pupil can be taken everywhere; in the latter, he must be kept back everywhere. Let him be what he may—peasants, shepherds, hunters, workers of every kind, and their sons, will be for him in his earliest years the best society; wherever they take him he will learn and gain from them. On the contrary, amongst the children

¹ *Introd. to Science of Educ.*, p. 85.

² *Ibid.*, p. 86.

of aristocratic families in town, amongst the servants in town, how much there is that is dangerous!

All this admits of much closer limitation—it admits of exceptions. But finally, if we again remember our aim—many-sidedness of interest—it easily occurs to us how limited are the opportunities which circumstances afford, and how far beyond them the really cultivated mind travels. Besides, the most advantageous environment is so limited, that we could not by any means take the responsibility of confining the culture of a young man within it, if not compelled by necessity. If he has leisure and a teacher, nothing exempts the latter from the duty of enlarging his pupil's mental scope by description, from taking from time the light of the past, and revealing the ideas of the immaterial world.

And ought we to conceal from ourselves, how often the distant space is more exquisitely illuminated in descriptions and drawings than the present; how much more satisfying and elevating is intercourse with the ancients than with contemporaries; how much richer in insight is idea than observation, and indeed how indispensable to action is the contrast between the actual and what ought to be?

Experience and intercourse are often wearisome, and we must sometimes bear it. But the pupil must never be condemned to suffer this from the teacher. To be wearisome is the cardinal sin of instruction; it is the privilege of instruction to fly over steppes and morasses, and if it cannot always wander in pleasant valleys, it can train on the other hand in mountain climbing and reward with the wider prospect.

Experience seems, as it were, to expect that instruction will follow her, to analyse the masses which she has heaped together; to arrange and connect her dispersed and formless fragments. For what does the mind of an uninstructed man look like? There is no settled top or bottom, nor even an ordered series; everything is mixed up together. The thoughts have not learned to wait. On a given occasion all come forward; so many of them become excited by the threads of association, and so many come suddenly into consciousness. Thoughts, which through frequently repeated impressions have acquired

most power, make themselves felt; they attract what suits them and reject what is not agreeable. That which is new is wondered at, but left unconsidered, or condemned by a judgment based on recollection. There is no rejection of what does not belong to them, no emphasis laid upon the important point; even if beneficent nature gives a happy hint, means are still wanting to pursue the discovered track.¹ This is seen when we begin to educate a raw boy between ten and fifteen years old. At first attention cannot be brought at all to run in an even stream; because no ruling main thought preserves order, because subordination is wanting, the mind tosses restlessly to and fro, and upon curiosity there follows distraction and wanton play.² Compare with him the cultivated youth, who finds no difficulty at the same age in grasping and working out several series of scientific lectures without confusion.

Just as unsatisfactory would be the results of mere intercourse. To make sympathy the constant spirit of intercourse, too much is wanting. Men contemplate, observe, try each other; children already use and obstruct each other in their play. Even benevolence and love on one side is not at all sure of arousing similar feelings on the other. We cannot compel love with service. Kindnesses expended without further care, generate enjoyment, and enjoyment creates desire for more, but no gratitude. This obtains in the intercourse of children with each other, and of children with adults. The teacher who tries to earn love will himself experience the truth of this. Something must be added to the kindnesses which determines their intention, the feeling must exhibit itself in such a manner that it arouses a similar feeling of the child's own. This exhibition falls within the sphere of instruction, yes, even the regular school hours, within which no one would systematically

¹ The four concepts Clearness, Association, System, and Method form the basis of this description. Astonishment or inattention is opposed to clearness of comprehension, the collision and rebound of presentations is opposed to conscious association; the separation and elevation of the chief point answers to system; and the pursuit of a track to method. The passage immediately following is the outcome of Herbart's experience with his pupil Ludwig von Steiger. ² *Introd. to Science of Educ.*, p. 37.

confine the expression of inward feeling, are nevertheless indescribably important for preparation for, and predisposition to, sympathy, and have to make this their care, no less than knowledge.

The entire life, the whole observation of mankind proves, that every one makes out of his experience and intercourse something answering to himself—that he here works out the ideas and feelings he has brought with him. There are frivolous old men, there are unwise worldlings, and on the other hand, there are circumspect youths and boys. I have seen both. And all my contemporaries must have observed how little the greatest historical events can prevail over preconceived ideas. The most remarkable experiences lie before us all in common; intercourse unites all nations, but differences of opinion and disharmony of feeling were hardly ever greater than at the present time.¹

The kernel of our mental being, then, cannot be cultivated with certain results by means of experience and intercourse.² Instruction most certainly penetrates deeper into the laboratory of the mind. Only think of the power of every religious doctrine! Think of the dominating influence which a philosophic lecture so easily, nay, almost unawares, exercises over an attentive listener. Add thereto the frightful power of novel-reading, —for all this belongs to instruction, either bad or good.

It is true the instruction of to-day is confined to the existing (yet not merely the present, but also the past) condition of science, art, and literature. Everything depends here on the utmost possible utilisation of what is existent, which yet admits of being immeasurably perfected. Nevertheless, during education we hit upon a thousand desires that go beyond the science of education, or rather which make us feel that interest in education is nothing separate and apart, and that it can

¹ To understand this, we must understand the spirit of the time—when Napoleon's star was in the ascendant, and his work of general destruction in progress—when each man sought a different cause for the universal disaster—when science was reviled, enlightenment condemned, and people discontented with the present looked back with veneration to the past. Even Fichte, in his *Characteristics of the Time*, called it "the age of completed sinfulness."

² *Introd. to Science*, p. 89.

least of all thrive in such minds as have been pleased to take up the business of education and the companionship of children, only because everything else was too lofty or too serious for them, and yet they must be first somewhere.

Interest in education is only an expression of our whole interest in the world and in humanity. Instruction concentrates all the objects of this interest—where our timid hopes will finally be saved—in the bosom of the young, which is the bosom of the future. Without this, instruction is of a surety empty and meaningless. Let no one say, he educates with his whole soul—that is an empty phrase. Either he has nothing to perfect through education, or the greater part of his reflection belongs to what he imparts to the boy, and makes accessible to him, belongs to his expectation of what more carefully cultivated humanity will be able to accomplish, beyond all that our race has hitherto experienced. Then, indeed, there flows from the full soul a fulness of instruction which can be compared with the fulness of experience, then the active mind imparts unfettered movement to the listener also, and under the broad folds of the mantle of such teaching, there is room enough for a thousand subsidiary thoughts without any loss in the clear outline of the essential idea. The teacher himself will be to the pupil an object of experience, at once as fruitful as it is direct; yes, in the hours of teaching an intercourse grows up between them which is, at the least, a foretaste of intercourse with the great men of antiquity, or with the clearly drawn characters of the poet. Absent historic or poetic characters must receive life from the life of the teacher. Let him only make a beginning; the youth, even the boy, will soon contribute from his imagination, and the two will often be together in great and chosen company, without needing a third.

Finally, instruction alone can lay claim to cultivate a balanced all-embracing many-sidedness. We picture to ourselves a plan of instruction divided at first merely according to the parts of knowledge and sympathy, leaving entirely out of sight all classification of the materials of our knowledge, for these do not enter at all into the question of balanced many-sidedness, since they do not distinguish between sides of the personality.

Through comparison with such a plan, we easily see what portions of it in a fixed subject, and under given conditions, are by preference to enjoy the contributions of experience and intercourse, and which parts, on the contrary—doubtless much greater—are to receive nothing. We find for instance that the pupil is more inclined from his environment to social, possibly patriotic interests, than to sympathy with individuals—or that he is prompted to value matters of taste more than those of speculation, or *vice versâ*; in each case the fault is equally great. In this there lies a two-fold hint. First, the mass on the side of the overweight must be analysed, completed, arranged. Secondly, the balance must be restored, partly in connection with this, partly directly through instruction. By no means, however, should the presence of incidental prominent tendencies in the years of cultivation be regarded as a sign that they are to be further strengthened by education. This practice, which shelters disproportion, is devised by love of arbitrariness, and recommended by bad taste. Doubtless the lover of the bizarre and of caricature would rejoice to see, instead of many fully and proportionately developed men fit to move in rank and file, a crowd of humpbacks and cripples of all kinds, tumbling wildly over each other. But this is what happens where society is composed of men of widely different modes of thought; each brags of his own individuality, and no one understands his fellows.

II.

*Steps in Instruction.*¹

τί πρῶτον, τί δ'ἔπειτα, τί δ'ὀστάτιον καταλέξω.²—HOMER.

What things must take place consecutively and one through the other, and what on the contrary must do so contemporaneously, and each with its proper and original power—are questions which touch all employments and all plans in which a great number of complicated measures have to be carried out. For a beginning is always made at the same time from several

¹ *Introd. to Science of Educ.*, p. 106.

² "What shall I choose first, what next, what finally."—*Odyssey*, ix. 14.

sides, and much always must be prepared by what has gone before. These are as it were the two dimensions,¹ conformably to which we have to guide our steps.

Our preceding concepts show us that instruction has to develop knowledge and sympathy *at the same time*, as diverse and fundamentally individual states of mind. If we look at the subordinate parts there is clearly a certain succession and dependence, but nevertheless no strict sequence. Speculation and taste doubtless presuppose the comprehension of the empirical; but while this comprehension always goes forward, they do not perhaps wait for its end. Indeed they rather become active betimes, and develop themselves thenceforward parallel with the expansion of mere knowledge of the manifold, and follow everywhere at its heels if no impediment intervene. Especially remarkable is speculative activity during the period when children perpetually ask—Why? Taste hides itself, perhaps more amongst other movements of attention and sympathy, yet it always supplies its quota to the preferences and dislikes by which children show their distinction of things. And how much more rapidly would it develop were we to present to it at first the simplest relationships, and not throw it at once into incomprehensible complications. Since taste as well as meditation is something original which cannot be learned, we ought, independently of experience, to expect that in the sphere of sufficiently known objects, both must become active without delay, if the mind be not otherwise distracted or oppressed. It is a matter of course, that teachers, to perceive what is moving in the children's minds must, themselves possess that same culture, the most subtle traces of which they have to observe in them. This is just the misfortune of education, that so many feeble lights which glimmer in tender youth, are long since

¹ Herbart further explains his meaning in his *Aphorismen zur Pädagogik*, thus: "There is a length and breadth in instruction, formed respectively by those subjects which must be learned together, and those which must follow each other. The breadth of instruction must be less than its length, which is prolonged through several years. But there are only two main threads which can and ought to be spun out in both directions—knowledge of nature and knowledge of humanity; languages are but instruments (to acquire this knowledge)."

completely extinguished in adults, who are therefore unfitted to kindle those feeble lights into flame.

The preceding is also true of the parts of sympathy. Among a small group of children, if only a little sympathy exists and is kept awake, a certain need of social order for the common good develops itself spontaneously. And as the most barbarous nations are not without divinities, so the souls of children have a presentiment of an unseen power, which can exercise influence in some way or other in the sphere of their wishes. Whence else comes the facility with which various kinds both of superstitious and genuinely religious ideas obtain entrance into, and influence with, the little ones? For a child, however, who finds itself in close dependence on its parents and guardians, these visible persons certainly occupy the place which the feeling of dependence assigns to the unseen powers, and just for this reason, the earliest religious instruction is only an exceedingly simple expansion of the relation of the parents to the children, as in the same way the first social ideas will be taken from the family.¹

The varieties of interest then which instruction ought to cultivate, present to us only differences in things simultaneous, but not a distinct succession of steps.

On the other hand, the formal fundamental concepts developed in the beginning, are based on the antitheses between things which follow one upon another.

Concentration, above all, ought to precede reflection, but at what distance? This question remains generally undetermined. Both certainly must be kept as near as possible together, for we desire no concentrations to the detriment of personal unity, which is preserved by means of reflection. Their long and unbroken succession would create a tension, incompatible with the existence of the healthy mind in the healthy body. In order then always to maintain the mind's coherence, instruction must follow the rule of giving equal weight in every smallest possible group of its objects to concentration and reflection; that is to say, it must care equally and in regular succession for clearness of every particular, for association of the manifold, for coherent ordering of what is associated, and for a certain

¹ For Hiertart's thoughts on the direction of religious growth see *Int. to Sci.*, p. 76.

practice in progression through this order.¹ Upon this depends the distinctness which must rule in all that is taught. The teacher's greatest difficulty here, perhaps, is to find real particulars—to analyse his own thoughts into their elements. Text books can in this case partly prepare the ground.

If however, instruction handles each little group of objects² in this manner, many groups arise in the mind, and each one is grasped by a relative concentration until all are united in a higher reflection. But the union of the groups presupposes the perfect unity of each group. So long, therefore, as it is still possible for the last particular in the content of each group to fall apart from the rest, higher reflection cannot be thought of. But there is above this higher reflection a still higher, and so on indefinitely upwards, to the all-embracing highest, which we seek through the system of systems, but never reach. In earlier years nothing of this can be attempted; youth is always in an intermediate state between concentration and distraction. We must be contented in earlier years with not attempting to give what we call system in the higher sense, but must on the other hand so much the more create clearness in every group; we must associate the groups the more sedulously and variously, and be careful that *the approach to the all-embracing reflection is made equally from all sides.*³

Upon this depends the articulation of instruction. The larger members are composed of smaller, as are the lesser of the least. In each of the smallest members, four stages of instruction are to be distinguished; it must provide for Clearness, Association, Arrangement, and the Course of this order. These grades, which with the smallest members quickly succeed each other, follow one another more slowly, when those next in comprehensiveness are formed from the smallest members, and with ever-increasing spaces of time, as higher steps of reflection have to be climbed.

If we now look back on the analysis of the concept of interest, we find therein also, certain steps differentiated—Attention, Expectation, Demand and Action.

Attention depends on the relative power of a presentation to that of others which must yield to it—depends therefore

¹ For formal steps see *Int. to Sci.*, p. 107.

² For method, *ib.*, p. 106.

³ *Ib.*, p. 116.

partly on the intrinsic strength of the one, partly on the ease with which the remainder yield. The latter leads to the idea of a discipline of thought, which we preferred to treat of specially in the *A B C of Anschauung*. The strength of a presentation can be partly attained through the power of the sensuous impression (as, for example, through the simultaneous speaking of several children, also by the display of the same object in different ways with drawings, instruments, models, etc.), partly through the vividness of descriptions, especially if already connected presentations rest in the depths of the mind, which will unite with the one to be given.¹ To effect this union generally, there is need of great skill and thought, which aims at anticipating future efforts by giving something to prepare the ground for them, as for instance the *A B C of Anschauung* does for mathematics, as the play of combinations does for grammar, and as narratives from antiquity do for a classical author.

Through observation the singular becomes distinct, but association, order, and progress according to order, must also be observed.

In the same way we get clearness of the expectations and association of them; in fact, systematic and methodical expectation.

Nevertheless these complications do not now claim our chief interest. We know that when the expected appears, only a new observation is produced. This is generally the case in the sphere of knowledge. Where some store of knowledge is already accumulated, it is not easy to observe anything to which expectations were not attached, yet the expectation dies out or becomes satisfied with new knowledge. If vehement desires arise therefrom, they would fall under the rule of temperance and consequently of discipline. But there is a species of observation which is not so easily satisfied or forgotten; there is a demand which is intended to be transformed into action; this is the *demand for sympathy*. Whatever rights then temperance exercises in this case, that education would nevertheless be a failure which did not leave behind resolutions to work for the good of humanity and society, as well as a certain energy

¹ *Introd. to Science of Educ.*, p. 84.

of the religious postulate. Accordingly, in the cultivation of sympathy, the higher steps to which interest may pass come much into consideration. And it is quite clear that these steps correspond with those of human life. In the child a *sympathising attention* is appropriate, in the boy *expectation*, in the youth the *demand for sympathy*, that the man may act for it. The articulation of instruction, however, here permits again, even in the smallest subjects which belong to early years, demand (for sympathy) to be so stimulated that it would pass into action. Out of such stimulations there grows in later years, assisted at the same time by the formation of character, that powerful demand which begets actions.

Allow me briefly to define the results in few words, which can easily be understood.

Instruction must universally

point out,
connect,
teach,
philosophise.

In matters appertaining to sympathy it should be

observing,
continuous,
elevating,
active in the sphere of reality.¹

III.

Material of Instruction.

The material of instruction is contained in the sciences. Their enumeration will not be expected in a treatise on the general science of education.


Let each enquire of himself how much in his mental store belongs to knowledge only, and how much to sympathy, and how each of these divisions is apportioned under the above-named headings. A self-examination of this kind will gener-

¹ We give on the following page Dr. Willmann's epitome of Herbart's terms of definition (see his edition of Herbart's works, vol. i. p. 391).

ally reveal a considerable inequality in one's own culture, and lay bare even in its most important parts, much that is fragmentary. Some suffer from want of culture in taste; they have perhaps busied themselves with a very subordinate part of the fine arts—with flower-painting, a little music, distiches, sonnets or novels. Some know nothing of mathematics, others nothing of philosophy. The most learned will perhaps take a long time to guess where the entire half, which we call sympathy, is to be sought in the wide realm of their knowledge.

Education inevitably suffers from all these deficiencies. The degrees in which it suffers are very varied; it depends on the teacher, on the pupil, on opportunities, which may or may not present themselves by the way.

The more honest the teacher is to himself, and the more dexterous he is in the use of existing materials, the better will it be. It is rare that any one is entirely stupid in any of the different



It will be seen from the above that the interest of knowledge is limited to observation and expectation, and only the interest of sympathy passes through the four stages, which are paralleled with the stages of human life.

parts. Much can be learned with a good will even during the lessons; the novelty of personal interest compensates sometimes for what is wanting in the ability of the exposition, and it is not so difficult for the adult to win a little start of the young boy. Such a mode of proceeding is at least always better than entirely neglecting important branches of culture, and wishing to impart his (the teacher's) own perfected, but extremely limited attainments and school knowledge.

Sometimes it is only needful to give the pupil the first start in certain things, and the teacher continuing to supply motive and matter, he goes forward of himself, and is perhaps soon beyond the teacher's sight. In other cases, it is extremely difficult to discover anywhere in the stupid head a single mobile spot, the merest trace of craving interest. It is just in such cases that most knowledge is needed so that experiments may be made, and also greater dexterity so that the right methods may be detected. If the weaknesses of the teacher and the pupil do not cover each other there is nothing to be done.

There is often some one near at hand, who knows how to impart happily enough what we do not ourselves understand, but yet find necessary to teach. Then let not the teacher's vanity stand in the way of the use of such a person. To be ignorant of something which education has a right to require is truly no humiliating confession, for the whole of knowledge is too vast for the individual to possess.¹

What remains to be said about individual subjects of instruction in connection with the already developed fundamental concepts, will be found briefly collected in the following chapter. First of all a distinction, as a result of which these subjects more or less directly affect our Interest, requires our attention.

¹ Herbart gave practical proof in his teacher years that the spirit of conceit had no place in him. Being himself comparatively ignorant of natural history, and seeing a knowledge of it would be desirable for his eldest pupil, he attended with him a course of lectures on the subject saying, "it would be a pleasure to him to transform himself from Ludwig's teacher into his schoolfellow, in which relation his example ought to be of as much value to his pupil, as his instruction.

Instruction then has to do with
Things
Forms
and Symbols.¹

Symbols, for instance languages, obviously afford interest only as the medium for the presentation of what they express. The form, the universal, that which is separated from things by abstraction for instance mathematical figures, metaphysical concepts, simple normal relations of the fine arts—these do not merely interest directly, but their application can also be reckoned on. But if any one would also say of things themselves, the works of nature and art, of men, families, and states, that they are interesting only in so far as they are useful to our aim, we would ask him not to let an opinion of such evil import be heard in the sphere of our many-sided effort, or a fatal egoism might ultimately remain as the only immediate interest.

Symbols are to instruction an obvious burden which, if not lightened by the power of interest in the thing symbolised, throws both teacher and pupil out of the track of progressive culture. Notwithstanding this, the study of languages monopolizes such a considerable part of instruction! If the teacher yields to the usual claims of prejudice and custom, he inevitably degenerates from the teacher to the schoolmaster, and when school lessons no longer educate, then all that is common in the surroundings forthwith draws the boy down to its level, inward tact disappears, supervision becomes necessary, and his occupation becomes distasteful to the man. Make therefore a stand as long as possible against every instruction in language without exception, which does not directly lie on the high road of the culture of interest.² Whether ancient or modern language it is all the same. That book alone has a claim to be read which interests *now*, and can prepare the way for fresh interest in the future. Over no other, especially over no sort of Chrestomathy, which is always an aimless rhapsody, ought a single week to be lost, for a week to a boy is a long period; if the in-

¹ *Introd. to Science*, p. 105. ² Herbart applied this negative principle in his school at Königsberg. See Translators' Introduction, p. 21.

fluence of education be weakened for the space of one day, it can be directly traced in him. Still with any book in use for the lesson, however difficult its language, all difficulties are surmountable by skill, patience and effort.

The art of imparting the knowledge of symbols is however, identical with that of instructing in the sphere of things. Symbols from a certain point of view are things; they are perceived, observed, copied like things. The more powerfully and variously they impress themselves on the senses, the better. Clearness, association, arrangement and regular progress must follow one another in strict sequence. The *meaning* of symbols must not be too hastily insisted on; it should be left entirely on one side for a time; time will be gained thereby. Moreover there is no object in learning the theory of symbols thoroughly at first. Only so much should be taught as is absolutely necessary for the next interesting use of them; then the feeling of need for a closer knowledge will soon awake, and when this co-operates all will go on more easily.

In considering Forms, or the abstract, it is first of all necessary to remember in general, what is often urged in special cases, namely that while the abstract itself should never appear to become a thing, its meaning must be always verified by actual application to things. Abstraction should take place from examples, from the observed, from the given, and though individual acts of concentration (*Vertiefungen*) upon pure form are necessary, reflection (*Besinnung*) must always be kept in close contact with actuality.

The boy stands in the middle between Platonic ideas and noumenal existence. As little as the abstract ought to be for him a reality, so little is it his business to search behind sensuous phenomena for the unattainable substance, and behind his consciousness for the pure Ego, or even behind the many for the One, which is not many and yet is All. Should he at any time successfully enter into these modes of presentation, it is to be hoped that he, first in full possession of his own impartial senses, may go on till he comes to that elastic spot (the knotty point) which drives mathematicians off at a bound.¹

¹ Note.—Herbart's meaning here is the boy ought not to be occupied with

Things, then, are to the boy nothing more than the given combinations of those properties which we take out in abstraction, and contemplate separately. There is, therefore, a path from individual properties (forms) to things in which they exist side by side; there is also a reverse path from things to the properties into which they can be analysed. Upon this rests the difference between synthetic and analytic instruction which is discussed in the following chapter.

But unhappily it is not easy to every one to comprehend things as aggregates of properties. To every one of us, each thing is a confused mass of its properties, whose unity we blindly presuppose, of whose possible manifold subordination under each of its properties, we hardly think. None even of our philosophers appears to have perfectly thought out either the one or the other. The consequence is the constraint and inflexibility of minds which do not know how to seize the actual in the midst of the possible. But I cannot here explain everything; to many difficulties other investigations must lend assistance.

IV.

Manner of Instruction.

Manner is welcome nowhere, and yet it is found everywhere; how can it possibly be otherwise? Every man develops it with his individuality, and in every joint labour such as this between teacher and pupil, it is present on both sides.

Nevertheless individuals become accustomed to each other, at least in a certain degree. Beyond this, lies the insufferable, which becomes ever more repugnant by repetition. To this belongs the affected, and the directly disagreeable. The latter is unpardonable, because it is a wilful fault; the former

the higher forms of abstraction. He ought first to give himself up unreservedly to external impressions, and to collecting facts of experience till he arrives at "the elastic spot" where he becomes conscious of that antithesis between *being* and *becoming*, between the multitude of properties, and the unity of the thing, the reconciliation and explanation of which have given rise to the philosophical theories of every age, and to the assumptions of metaphysicians amongst them.

wears out patience, because the impression of disagreeableness is strengthened by repetition.

Let every affected manner be banished from instruction! Catechising as well as dogmatising, fun as well as pathos, polished speech as well as sharp accent—all are distasteful, as soon as they seem arbitrary additions, and not to proceed from the subject and state of mind. But out of many things and situations there are developed many modes and turns of the lesson. Hence, that which teachers have discovered and so abundantly recommended under the high-sounding name of Methods, will increase more and more, and can be variously used without one or other gaining unconditional superiority. The teacher must be capable of many happy turns, he must vary with facility, must adapt himself to opportunity, and while playing with the accidental must so much the more emphasize the essential.

All mannerisms that compel the listener's passivity, and extract from him a painful negation of his proper activity, are in themselves unpleasant and oppressive. Therefore the logically connected lesson must set the mind in motion by ever-eager expectation, or where the teacher cannot do this—and with children it is difficult—then the lesson must not aim at being continuous, but permit interruptions, or itself cause them. That manner is the best, which provides the greatest amount of freedom within the circle which the work in question makes necessary to preserve. For the rest, let it only put the teacher as well as the taught at their ease. Every one has his own individual way, which he cannot altogether ignore without loss of ease. Therefore so far as no real harm is done, *veniam damus petimusque vicissim*.¹

¹ The period was one of many methods—the Socratic, Catechetic, Acroamatic, Heuristic, Mnemonic, etc. The school of Pestalozzi claimed to have discovered the method *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, the absolute method, and called the rest, Manners. Herbart on the contrary restored the word *Manier* (manner) to honour, while connecting with the word Method an entirely different idea.

CHAPTER V.

COURSE OF INSTRUCTION.

To apply in practice everything hitherto developed, interwoven together, and connected with the manifold objects in our world, is the great and really immeasurable task of those who aim at educating through instruction. By means of a few general concepts, direction may be given to what in its working out would require the unceasing effort of many individuals and much time.

What I mean to give here is only a sketch. It is merely intended to make the combination of the concepts already developed easier, and to prepare a view of the field of work which lies before us. The general science of education ought not to allow itself to be absorbed to such an extent by special details, that its survey is contracted from the whole to any part. To guard against this, I myself would seek to attain through the sensuous, to the mental eye, and try to include in our survey what must at the same time be thought out and put into practice.

I.

Merely Presentative—Analytical—Synthetical Instruction.

Whenever it may happen that a plan of instruction has to be made for any individual, there will always be an existent circle of intercourse and experience in which that individual is placed. Perhaps this circle is capable of being judiciously widened according to the idea of balanced many-sidedness, or its contents may be more thoroughly examined; this is the first thing which requires attention.¹

But further, the vital fulness, the penetrating clearness of experience and intercourse allow of being carried beyond their circle, or rather many parts of instruction can be advantageously placed in the light which radiates from them. From the horizon which bounds the eye, we can take measurements, by which

¹ *Introd. to Science of Educ.*, p. 83.

through descriptions of the next-lying territory, that horizon can be enlarged. The child may be led back by the life thread of older persons surrounding it; we can generally render perceptible to the senses through *mere presentation* everything sufficiently similar to, and bound up with, what the boy till then has observed.¹ Thus there are word-pictures of foreign towns, countries, customs, opinions, coloured by what he knows; there are historical descriptions which deceive by a kind of presence, because they borrow the features of the present. Instruction may at this stage summon to its assistance all kinds of pictures; they will give it all the more aid, the less they have been previously misused by being looked at thoughtlessly, or as a senseless pastime. ✕

Mere description must lose in clearness and penetration the further it is removed from the child's intellectual horizon; it will, on the other hand, gain in power in proportion as the horizon widens. For this reason, it is uncertain in what way, and to what extent, we may reckon upon it, just as it is also difficult to prescribe rules for it. For, according to its nature, this species of instruction has but one law—to describe in such a way that the pupil believes he sees what is described.

Supported more by its own strength, analytical instruction attains also more to the general. That it may be known, at least approximately, to what I refer, I instance Pestalozzi's Mother's Book (*Buch der Mütter*), and Niemeyer's Exercises in Understanding (*Verstandesübungen*). Every thoughtful teacher is led by his healthy tact to analyse the masses which accumulate in children's brains, and which are increased by merely descriptive instruction, and he must concentrate attention successively on the little and the least, to secure clearness and transparency in all presentations. This must be carried out.

The contemporaneous environment can be analysed into separate things, the things into their component parts, and these last again into properties.² Properties, elements, things, and the entire environment may be used for abstraction, so as to form out of them various formal concepts. But there are not only contemporaneous, there are also successive properties in things, and the mutability of things gives occasion to analyse

¹ *Introd. to Science*, p. 84. ² *Ibid.*, p. 85.

events into the successions¹ which in those events run through and along with one another. In all these attempts we come in part on that which cannot be separated, *i.e.* on law for speculation, and in part on that which should, or should not be separated, *i.e.* on the æsthetic for taste.

Intercourse can also be analysed,² and we can concentrate the mind on the particular feelings of *sympathy* which it supplies. And this *must* be done, that the feelings may be purified and gain in fervour. For the sum total of feeling towards a person, and indeed towards a number of persons, is always composed of many separate feelings, and from the feelings *against* others, those *for* them must be carefully distinguished, that egoism may not suppress sympathy, at least not unobserved. Women of fine feeling best understand how to analyse intercourse, to introduce more sympathetic consideration among children, and thereby to increase their points of contact, and heighten the intensity of intercourse. One can easily see whether a person in early years has come under such womanly influence.

Whilst then analytical instruction dissects the particular which it meets with, it reaches upwards into the sphere of the universal. For the particular takes its constituents out of the universal. We remember at any rate the definition, "*Per genus proximum, et differentiam specificam,*" and recollect that the specific difference, taken separately, is also a genus, in which, just as in the first, *higher genera can be contained*, together with the differences appertaining thereto, of each of which again the same holds true.³ So it is well to bear in mind how

¹ Herbart seems to be referring here, first to the necessary successions of cause and effect, and then to varying successions of mere co-existence.

² See *Introd. to Science of Educ.*, p. 88.

³ The definitions, "*Per genus proximum, et differentiam specificam,*" serve to make a concept clear, that is, to preserve its contents completely by specification of its genus (*Gattung*) and its differentia (*Artunterschiede*); it suffices to give the next highest genus (*genus proximum*) and the specific difference (*differentia specifica*) of the concept to be defined. For instance, a square is a four-cornered figure all the angles of which are right angles and all its sides equal. Since however, as Herbart further remarks, not only the given genus (four-cornered figure), but also the differences taken each by itself contain further higher genera together with differences which again can be analysed into these, the definition of a thing at last resolves the concept into a complex of simple properties which all belong to it. Thus, for instance, in the definition of the concept square, the genus concept four-

logic and the doctrine of combination come in contact with each other, and why the analysis of what is combined within the mental horizon of an individual points to the logic of the universal, and thus increases the receptiveness of the mind for other new comprehensions, in which the elements already known may occur in new forms and with new combinations. Doubtless this occurs originally in us all, and over that which takes place spontaneously, the teacher ought to detain neither himself nor the children. But still it does not take place so completely and quickly but that much work remains for the teacher, who in any case must observe his pupils.

Inasmuch as analytical instruction rises upwards to the general, it facilitates and assists all kinds of judgments. For the matter to be judged is there purified from confusing side issues; the simple is more easily penetrated than the complex. The elementary presentations have acquired more strength, and distraction caused by the number and variety is at an end. Besides the general judgments lie ready alike for future use and future examination on new occasions.

The association of premisses likewise, upon which facility in drawing logical conclusions entirely depends—the scientific imagination—gains much by repeated analysis of what is given. For just because experience is no system, it best provides for the varied mixture and fusion of our thoughts, if we do but always accompany our experience with thought.

But all the advantages of analytical instruction are fettered and limited by the limitation of that which experience and intercourse, together with the descriptions connected with them, have been able to supply. Analysis must accept material as it finds it. Further, the repetition of sensuous impressions, by which a preponderance is created on one side, is often stronger than the artificially produced concentrations and considerations by which the teacher strives to counteract it on the other. Moreover the general, which only in certain cases is brought into notice by

cornered, and the differences which can be also considered as genus concepts, *i.e.* equal sides and right angles, can be again defined, so that in the definition of square an increasing number of simple properties contained in it make their appearance. (*Anmerkung von Carl Richter.*)

abstraction, reaches with effort that free position in the mind by which it proves equally efficacious whether *as* general or in dealing with all special combinations. And, properly speaking, analysis is not able to do more for speculation and æsthetic judgment than lay bare the points with which they are concerned. We know that experience can *give* us neither the theoretical nor the æsthetical necessity, therefore necessity cannot be discovered *as such* by the analysis of the given.¹ Even analytical examination of accepted speculative and æsthetic modes of presentation, although it could make us feel what is wrong, nevertheless seldom attains to that strength of (the new) impression necessary to erase the earlier one; it never reaches that sufficiency which is a necessity to the awakened mind. Confutation and criticism alone can effect little; *the right standard must be set up.*

Synthetic instruction, which builds with its own stones, is alone capable of erecting the entire structure of thought which education requires. It certainly cannot be richer than our sciences or our literature, but still for that very reason it is incomparably richer than the individual environment of the child. Nor indeed will it be richer than the means which the teacher possesses, but the idea itself will gradually create abler teachers. The whole of mathematics with what precedes and follows, the entire progress of humanity in the steps of culture from ancient to modern, belong to synthetic instruction. But there also belong to it the multiplication tables, vocables and grammar, and thus we are easily reminded how much harm may be done in this sphere by wrong treatment. If the elements must necessarily be imprinted on the mind by mere learning by rote, schoolboys would have had good reason to protest against all extension of synthetic instruction. Dictation, repetition, recapitulation, examples, symbols of all kinds are well-known means of mitigating this evil. I have suggested marking out with bright nails on a board the typical triangles, and placing them continually within sight of the child in its cradle. I was laughed at.² Well, people may laugh at me

¹ *Æsthetische Darstellung*, page 64.

² Herbart borrowed the idea of the much-ridiculed cradle instruction from

still more! For I, in thought, place near this board, sticks and balls painted with various colours; I constantly change, combine, and vary these sticks, and later on plants and the child's playthings of every kind. I take a little organ into the nursery and sound simple tones and intervals on it for a minute at a time. I add a pendulum to it for the child's eye and for the unpractised player's hand, that its rhythmic proportions may be observed. I would further exercise the child's sense to distinguish cold and heat by the thermometer, and to estimate the degrees of heaviness by weights. Finally, I would send him to school with the cloth manufacturer to learn as correctly as he, to distinguish finer and coarser wool by touch. Yes, who knows whether I would not adorn the walls of the nursery with very large gaily painted letters. At the foundation of all this lies the simple thought that the abrupt and troublesome process of stamping things on the mind, called learning by heart, will be either not necessary, or very easy, if only the elements of synthesis are early made constituent parts of the child's daily experience. They will then, so far as possible, steal imperceptibly in among the incomparably greater accumulation of things with their names which, at the time of learning to speak, can be comprehended with such wonderful facility. But I am not the fool to think the salvation of mankind depends on such trifling aids which may more or less lighten and forward instruction.

But now to our subject. The object of synthetical instruction is twofold; it must supply the elements and *prepare* their

Pestalozzi, who himself found it in a peasant's cottage. In *How Gertrude Taught her Children*, Pestalozzi says, "We are not so advanced as the Appenzell woman, who hangs a large paper bird gaily painted over her infant's cradle. Any one who has seen how the child of two or three weeks old tries to get at the bird, with his hands and feet, and then thinks how easy it would be by a series of such objects to lay a general basis for the sensuous observation of natural and artistic things in the child's mind, which could be gradually more exactly defined and always extended—whoever, I say, thinks of this, and then does not feel what we miss, in our not merely Gothic-monkish, but *crippled* Gothic-monkish rut of education, which has become obnoxious even to ourselves, is past amending. The Appenzell bird is to me, as the bull was to the Egyptians—a sacred thing, and I have done my very best to begin my education at the point from which the Appenzell woman starts."

combination; *prepare*, I say, not entirely perfect it. For such perfecting is endless! Who can measure all the relations of all kinds of things? The cultivated man works ever unceasingly on his thought-building; but it is culture in youth which must supply him with means to work at it on many sides. It must also, after the elements, provide every possible method and facility for their use.

The most general kind of synthesis is the *combinative*.¹ It is found everywhere, it contributes in everything to mental activity, and therefore must be exercised as much and as early as possible, till the greatest facility in its use is attained. It holds sway principally in the province of empiricism, where nothing hinders it from affording the recognition of the (logical) *possible*, of which the *incidental real* forms a part, and under which it can be classified in many ways. From this point it finds its way to the practical sciences, where it is the helper when successions of ideas have to be applied to successive aspects of a given manifold, of which the science of education will shortly afford an example. In the sphere of speculation the loss of this combinative synthesis may be sorely felt if it is wanting; this mathematicians have realised. Alike here, and in the sphere of taste, it becomes obscured through the peculiar kind of synthesis which rules therein, and which partly rejects inadmissible connections, and partly removes the mind from all irrelevant play of thought.

Closely connected with the combinative concepts are those of *number*. Each combinative act is made up of a number of elements of complexion; number itself is the abstraction of these.

Forms proper to empirical synthesis are, as is well known, those in space and time, the geometric and the rhythmic. To

¹ Herbart further insists on the importance of this form of synthesis in his Aphorisms to Pedagogy, thus: "Combination occurs in 1 and 1, in one times 1, in the *A B C* of *Anschauung*, in grammar, in natural history, chemistry, mathematics, logic—in a word, in all knowledge. Everywhere it is the easiest process and the most neglected. To the teacher it is of infinite importance for the opportunity it gives him of exhibiting the same object in varied ways."

these belong the *ABC* of *Anschauung*. It is *synthetic*, since it proceeds from the elements, although its arrangement is determined by the analytical consideration of the forms which occur in nature, and which must permit of being brought back to nature again.

Speculative synthesis proper, entirely different from the logical-combinative, rests on *relationships*.¹ But the method of the relationships no one knows, and it is not the business of education to exhibit it. Neither is it the business of early years to take up a critical attitude towards nature. On the other hand, it is just as little desirable to leave the mind altogether unpractised in speculation, till those years when an impatient longing for conviction (certitude) develops of itself, and obstinately seizes the best theory which first comes to hand, with which to satisfy itself. This neglect is least of all desirable in our day, when the disruption of opinions affects every one, and only the frivolously-minded, or those filled with a resignation as rash as melancholy, can give up the quest for truth. On the contrary must the teacher seek out, entirely regardless of *his* system, the least *dangerous* ways to prepare capacity for investigation as much as possible, and to awaken on many sides the impelling feeling aroused by single problems—the elements of speculation—for fear the young thinker should believe that he will soon be at the end of his search. The safest without doubt is the study of mathematics; unfortunately, it has too much degenerated into a game assisted by lines and formulæ. Let it be led back, as far as possible, to the thinking out of the *concepts* themselves. Logic is also serviceable, but too much must not be expected from it. Among the problems of philosophical speculation, those are to be most thoroughly developed which are connected with mathematics, physics, chemistry; the youthful mind can, under skilful guidance, be variously employed to its great advantage in those which concern liberty, morality, happiness, right, and the State. Everything bordering on religion² needs great discretion. As

¹ The method of searching for necessary complementary concepts when they are hidden, Herbart calls the Method of Relationships (*Beziehungen*).

² Herbart urges the necessity of the early foundation of religion in his

long as possible the religious feeling, which ought from the earliest years to depend on the single thought—Providence—must be preserved undisturbed. But all religion has a tendency to enter spontaneously into speculation, and expand itself into self-sufficient dogmas. This tendency will not fail to be aroused in a mind beginning to be trained by many-sided culture. Then it is time to speak a serious word—of the fruitless attempts of many mature minds of all times to find fixed doctrines in religion; of the necessity with regard to such subjects of awaiting the end of all preparatory speculative activity; of the impossibility of suddenly restoring a lost religious *feeling* by speculative conviction; of the concurrence of the order of nature encompassing us with the inexorable needs which the spectacle of human dependence creates in us, and by which religion is firmly rooted in the ground of sympathy. Positive religion does not come into the province of the teacher as such, but into that of the church and the parents; in no case *ought* he to put the slightest obstacle in the way, and, at least among Protestants, he cannot reasonably desire to be allowed to do so.

The theory of *Taste* is too obscure for any one to undertake to point out the elements of the various forms of the æsthetic and their synthesis. But it is easy to agree in this—that æsthetic worth lies not in the matter, but in relationships; that taste is founded not in what is perceived, but in the mode of perceiving. Our temper of mind is spoiled for nothing so easily as for the beautiful. Even to the child's clear eye the beautiful is not clear, although it may seem to us it needs

Aphorisms thus: "The foundations of religious interest must be laid deep and in early life—so deep that in later years the mind rests untroubled in its religion, while speculation follows its own course. Philosophy as such is neither orthodox nor heterodox, and faith is, of course, not philosophy." On the use of religious instruction in education, he writes in the same place: "Education must look upon religion not as objective, but as subjective. Religion befriends and protects, but nevertheless it must not be given to the child too circumstantially. Its work must be *directing* rather than *teaching*. It must never exhaust susceptibility, and therefore above all must not be prematurely made use of. It must not be given dogmatically to arouse doubt, but in union with knowledge of nature and the repression of egotism. It must ever *point* beyond, but never *instruct* beyond the bounds of knowledge, for then the paradox would follow, that instruction knows what it does not know."

only to be seen. For the uncultured eye doubtless sees the mass; it doubtless grasps everything placed before it, but it does not of itself gather up the threads of the relationships, as the cultivated man in his best hours loves to do, and does most easily. Taste and imagination generally go together, although the two are entirely different. It is easy to imagine how the latter can aid the former. For example, in the ever-shifting pictures of the imagination, the relationships change, and amongst these numerous relationships are some which rivet attention by their effect, and group other pictures around them. In this way the mind creates poetry. The problem for synthetic culture of taste would accordingly be how to cause the Beautiful to arise in the pupil's imagination. Whenever possible, the material must first be supplied; afterwards the imagination must be occupied with it by conversation, and then the work of art be shown. The contents of a classical drama should first be related—not the sequence of the scenes, but the action. We should try to grasp the relationships, the situations of the action; they must be combined first in one way, then in another, and pictured here and there; then finally the poet will complete what would be too difficult for us. The idealized embodiment of special moments in the action might be attempted, and a picture or a piece of sculpture might be found which would present the group to us. With music everything is more definite; the fundamental relationships with their simplest synthesis are in the hands of the teacher of thorough bass, who however must not be a pedant.

We come to that instruction the task of which is to cultivate *Sympathy* synthetically. Through it the heart must become large and full, even in those cases where there are no sweet family relationships, no happy youthful friendships, perhaps even no high degree of natural liking between teacher and pupil, to come to its aid. Where is such an instruction to be found? Must it not be acknowledged that the ordinary method of study seems to aim at crushing the mind under its load, and chilling it by the seriousness of science and even of much lauded art? Does not this ordinary method of study, we ask, seem to

alienate us from men, from individual real human beings, and the individual real circles that they form? They may be little to our taste, too lowly for speculation, and mostly too far removed from observation; but to work for them out of sympathy is our most gracious ornament, and to their race we must acknowledge, perhaps with a feeling of humiliation, but in any case necessarily, that we belong.

We have tabulated the combinative scaffolding of history—this varied series of names from different countries run off on a chronological thread—in order that it may be impressed on the memory. We have tried to gain from the study of languages and knowledge of antiquity, exercises for the reasoning intellect. We have also elevated the poets of old as models of all art. All most admirable! Finally, we have attempted to grasp with various imported ideas the history of humanity in one view as a vast development—and then we turned our eyes away again, and not without reason, for truly as a drama the whole is not a whole, is not very elevating or satisfying. Must it then amidst all this be forgotten, that here on every hand we are speaking of human beings to whom sympathy is due, to whom we ought to bring none but sympathizing on-lookers; and that this sympathy comes most naturally to those, who cannot as yet look with us into the future, because they have hitherto not so much as understood the present, and for whom on this very account the past is the true present? Is not the *childlikeness*—that common possession of all ancient Greek authors—sufficient to break down the self-important learned feeling with which we sit down to them, or rather, have we so little feeling ourselves not to observe that a time of youth is depicted there, such as we ought to have passed through, but by no means an age of men to which we now might well return? ¹

We can no longer escape the distorted culture of which we are often painfully sensible. We feel that something has been left behind which we ought to have with us. Vainly would we wish to make it up by efforts that would only put us to shame.

¹ These observations are directed against Fichte. See note, p. 140.

But nothing prevents us from allowing our younger brothers to begin from the beginning, that they may then go straightforward into the future, independent of extraneous support.

If they would, however, continue the work of their forefathers, they must have travelled the same way; before all things they must have learned to recognize these forefathers as their own from their early years.

We are then in no difficulty regarding the object of sympathy. Shall we set about the work synthetically, elementarily?

In the first instance we will not enumerate the elements of sympathy, we will not combine them formally according to a synthetic method. Here warmth of mind is needed; not the momentary flickering glow from a blazing flame, but one which is perpetual, produced by material which permanently develops a gentle heat.

Sympathy further relates to human emotions; gradually progressing from its elements, it is related to the progress of human feelings. The feelings, however, take their direction from the condition of men, and advance with it. What *we* feel in society is the outcome of the complicated political and social relationships of Europe. If sympathy for society is to arise from simple, sincere, transparent feelings, each of which has clearly come into consciousness on its own account, so that the whole knows what it desires, then it must follow the course of human conditions up to the present, beginning from that condition which is the first to express itself clearly enough, and to expand itself sufficiently through the range of the manifold movements of the mind which belong to it.¹ For truly the

¹ Herbart in a powerful passage in his *Aphorism. zur Pädagogik* (*Werke*, ii. 457), too long to quote in full, develops his idea of the course history should take, and the purpose it should serve in education. It ends thus: "The youth must see humanity in history rather than men. That it is one and the same human nature which passes through so many transformations, ought to be to him as valuable as an interpretation of his own personality. Moved by the fearful possibility of error and corruption, himself still pure and full of force, endowed with what is certain in human thought, and inwardly familiarized with the infinite working of external Nature in its ordered uniformity, he is capable of resolving, and ripe to resolve freely and firmly, upon sympathy with the whole of humanity, and to elevate what till now was but a yielding feeling, into a conscious volition."

past has divulged but a few of its conditions; still more seldom has it impressed itself as clearly and many-sidedly as education might wish. Priceless, therefore, are those documents in which it speaks to us with full-toned loving voice; we must complete the rest in imagination.

Finally, sympathy develops most naturally, most simply and most continuously in the intercourse of children with each other. But even this intercourse is determined by the contributions brought by each to it, these contributions in turn by the occupations and outlook of each, and the occupations and outlook again (if the children are not allowed to grow up wild) without doubt by the material given to their minds to work upon. It cannot be denied that the intercourse of boys and youths is totally different according to the guidance they receive. If this guidance advances by leaps and bounds, then they have trouble in following; they follow unwillingly, they retreat into their childish play and pursuits, they mutually strengthen themselves therein by their intercourse. There comes, however, a time when they *must* go forth into society, into the world. What wonder if they there mutually hold themselves aloof—if they, going without sympathy as if among strangers, persevere the more obstinately together in their trivialities. What wonder if finally society itself is composed of a loose heap of little parties, each of which pursues its own amusements as best it can, and uses as a means thereto its relationships, with the whole.

How different among a patriotically minded nation! Its little six-year old children will tell you stories from its chronicles; its children will tell you of the “children of an older growth,” the heroes of past ages; they relate the stories amongst themselves, they rise upwards in union with their country’s history; they strive to become men of the nation, and they *do* become so. The ancients knew their Homer by heart; they did not learn it as men, but as boys. He it was who formed the general character of the youth, and his pupils do him no discredit. Certainly he could not do *all*, and indeed *all* we would not trust him with.

Imagine to yourselves a European patriotism!—the Greeks

and Romans our ancestors—the dissensions, unhappy signs of party spirit, with which they also must disappear. What can give prominence to this thought? Instruction can do so.

Let no one say that we Germans are too cosmopolitan as it is. Too *little patriotic*—that, alas! unfortunately is true; but is it necessary for me here to reconcile patriotism and cosmopolitanism?

Let us return to the ancients. Poets, philosophers, historians fall for us here into one series, so far as they unite in impressing human nature on human hearts. The Homeric Epos, the Platonic Dialogue, are not primarily works of art, and books of wisdom; they represent, above all, persons and opinions; they ask for these a friendly reception. Bad it is for us that the strangers recommended, speak Greek. That makes their kindly reception difficult. We must make use of translators, and gradually learn the language ourselves. Gradually I say—it cannot be done all at once, at least thoroughly. It is a matter of importance to us now, so much the more seeing that the translators themselves do not speak even the most comprehensible German. In the future, with leisure, we shall try to reach refinement of speech, and through that the art of poetry. At present both are equally distant from us; the Fables should *only amuse* us, but the characters ought to interest us. To that end, a certain philological skill is doubtless indispensable to the teacher, that he may confine grammatical instruction within the narrowest possible limits, but *within* them be able to carry out that which he begins with strictest consistency. Nevertheless this skill must not attempt to gain more than the credit of good *service*. That Homer represents the oldest known forms of Greek speech, that the construction is exceedingly simple and easy, that the antiquarian gain for all future progress in the literature is decisive—these remarks are true, but they have no weight in this place. If the difficulty were doubled, and the gain of learning but half as great, the preceding principles would remain in their incomparable strength. But the question is in what spirit does one grasp them?

Three steps must be taken in order to work out this special part of the art of education. First, a selection must be made,

chiefly from Homer, Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Plutarch; from Socrates, Euripides, and Plato, as well as from the Romans, who, as soon as there has been due preparation for them, must be added to the others. Secondly, the method of teaching must be exactly defined; and thirdly, certain auxiliary writings are necessary for all accompaniments of narration and examination, which can advantageously go along with them. Without wasting time I merely mention that of Homer's works, the cruder *Iliad* is not suitable, but the entire *Odyssey* is, with the exception of a single long piece in the eighth book (individual expressions can be easily avoided). The *Philoctetes* of Sophocles in early years, then the historical writings of Xenophon (not, however, the essentially immoral *Memorabilia*, which owe their reputation to the greatest happiness doctrine), and in later boyhood, after a few easy *Dialogues*, the *Republic* of Plato can be read. This last is exactly suited to the awakening interest in wider society; in the years when young men seriously devote themselves to politics, it is just as little satisfying as Homer to a youth, who is just at that period when he throws everything childlike behind him. Plato, as the teacher of idealism, and Homer, as the poet, always remain for riper age; but do not these writers deserve to be read twice? Has not the teacher of youth the choice of spending much or little time in his own hands?

Enough has been said about synthetic instruction. It must be begun early, and its end is not to be found. But it will show that parents and youths must extend the years of culture further than is now customary, for they will certainly not wish to leave the costly fruit of long toil half-ripe to chance. For the majority this would be a reason for not beginning, but there are those who desire the best if it can only be found.

If a teacher, however, be summoned too late, and does not find a retarded childlikeness unspoiled (which is seldom the case), let him leave the Greeks on one side, and trust more to analytical instruction. Only he must not try to analyse the heaped-up accumulation into its smallest parts all at once; the concentrations to begin with must on the contrary move in com-

pany, then, by means of continued conversation (which at any rate will be naturally suggested by the books chosen within the already existent mental scope, which are read together)—then, I repeat, by means of this, in the course of continuous feeling after the sensitive parts of the mind, one part after another must give up its components, not so much to the end that it may be corrected, but that the individual may become conscious of his store. As soon then as he has become an object of self-observation it will be seen how he pleases himself, how much power he possesses, where and how synthetic help can be given to him.¹

For mere descriptive instruction, we must desire in the teacher, as remarked above, vivacity and the spirit of observation in place of rules. The concepts developed in a previous chapter are to be applied in combination to analytical and synthetical instruction. Only the reader must bear in mind that merely a sketch is now given, and he will not expect a more detailed articulation of instruction within the narrow limits of a synopsis.

¹ The mode of procedure here described was carried out by Herbart with his pupil Ludwig von Steiger. See Herbart's *Briefe*.

II. ANALYTICAL COURSE

Empiricism.

To point out, name, and give permission to handle and move things takes precedence of everything else. This process is applied first to the whole, then by degrees to its parts, and finally again to the components of those parts. The parts are associated by determining their relative position. Objects are analysed into their properties, and the properties are associated by comparisons. When the manifold in a circle of experience is sufficiently worked out in this way, then the events arising

Speculation.

The analytical examination of the circle of experience meets everywhere with signs of an ordered coherence in the nature of things—with intimations of causal relationships. Without questioning whether these signs have objective authority—whether they may be described as immanent or transcendent,—it is important to the culture of youth that they should be comprehended as they occur, that the uniformity of nature in the entire course of events should be traced out with the eye of the physicist or scientific historian, and not of the fatalist talkers. The first steps consist in pointing out and drawing forth the connection between means and ends, as well as that of cause and effect. With this, the rela-

Taste.

The æsthetic (under which name is included the beautiful, the noble, the comic, together with their finer shades and their opposites) first begins for us in sustained contemplation. Younger children ordinarily see the mass, only like other masses. At first the gay, the contrasting, the moving are beautiful to them. When they have looked at them enough, and we come upon them when they are in a perfectly tranquil but also alert frame of mind, then is the time to try whether their minds can be occupied with the beautiful. At first we must point out the beautiful, by raising it out of the mass of the æsthetically unimportant. Then we must begin to analyse it, that is into parts, of which each in

OF INSTRUCTION.

Sympathy with Mankind.

The main idea for the analysis of intercourse for the awakening of sympathy with individuals is to lead back the inclinations, the lower as well as the higher, to *natural* affections, the *possibility* of which every one finds in his own consciousness, with which therefore he can *sympathize*. But a genuine understanding of the feelings of others, presupposes the com-

Sympathy with Society.

Considerations regarding the proprieties of intercourse, and social institutions of all kinds, point back to the necessity that men should accommodate and help each other. Supported by such necessity, instruction explains the forms of social subordination and co-ordination. To make this perceptible, it takes, in preference to anything else, the nearest example—the pupil himself; all his social relationships are placed in their true position, and he should be made to feel the conditions and dependence of his existence in their entirety. While sympathy trans-

Religion.

Sympathy with the universal dependence of men, is the essential natural principle of all religion. We must direct the pupil's eye where human beings express the feeling of their limitations, and point out to him every piece of arrogance, as a false and dangerous imagination of strength. Worship should be represented as a pure confession of humility; neglect of worship, on the other hand as leading—which it really does—to the suspicion of a proud activity, bestowing too much care on transitory success. Continuous observation of the

Empiricism.

from the collision of different agencies are analysed into the changes which each undergoes. The use which the individual makes of things is evolved. The concepts of cause and effect, of means and end, which have no place here, may be omitted. Empiricism has only to do with the sequence of events, with the course of their succession. The object of this analysis in youth, is on the one side the human body (even amongst outward objects the most important, for individuals are not only conscious of their own, they see also the bodies of other human beings), on the other side it is the sum of surrounding things,

Speculation.

tions of condition and dependence must reveal themselves through varying experiments with varying results, as for instance by driving a machine more quickly or more slowly, and checking it here and there to show which wheels move, and which do not. To this end we must be master of the result; it must attract attention, but not be too common or startling. The individual experiments previously presented should be associated and exhibited in association, —the pendulum with the works of a clock, the mechanically produced warmth with the explosion of powder in cannon, the expansion of steam with the contraction through cold in the steam engine. In

Taste.

itself has a separate value for taste. For instance, we should take a well-grown shrub, then cut a single branch from it, just where it shoots forth, then from this a leaf, and from the compound leaf a single leaflet, or the flower from which the petals can be separated and singly shown. False division—for instance, a cut in the middle of the leaf—the pupil must observe and criticise. In this way, the simplest form of the beautiful, the articulation of the composite beautiful, and the new beauty of the fresh outlines recombined—each of these must be individually comprehended and *associated*. In the same way, the beautiful must be divested of the

INSTRUCTION.

Sympathy with Mankind.

prehension of one's own. Therefore we must analyse the youthful soul to itself; it should discover in itself the type of the movements of the human mind. It must also learn to interpret the expression whereby human feeling shows itself, at first the involuntary, but gradually also the measure and weight of conventional signs. In addition care must be taken always to exhibit one's self plainly to others in one's own con-

Sympathy with Society.

forms this feeling into the comprehension of the mutual dependence of all, and while the continual revolutions of social movement, together with all their vicissitudes, are ever more clearly perceived, and ever contemplated with fuller hope, the *general order* must become clear to the boy as inviolable, and worth the sacrifices which it may at some time require from him. If bodily strength be considerable in youth, then it will be right to raise the mind to the thought of the defence of his fatherland, by the sight of

Religion.

whole of human life and destiny, should make reflections easy on the shortness of life, the fleeting nature of pleasure, the equivocal worth of this world's goods, the relation between reward and work. In contrast, should be placed the possibility of frugality, the peace of those whose needs are small, the contemplation of nature, which meets our needs, makes industry possible, and on the whole rewards, however much it forbids dependence on its single isolated results. Thence we should lead the pupil to a universal

ANALYTICAL

Empiricism.

houses, furniture, plants, animals. Human doings and sufferings are connected with the human body, as are also the closest and simplest relationships of human beings amongst each other. Here merely presentative (*darstellende*) instruction comes in; it widens the knowledge of Nature and of Man, through the earliest beginning of knowledge of countries and peoples. From this, geography and history will gradually develop, in which, demonstration and association should always precede teaching. *Pari passu* with this, the empirical observation of men in the pupil's near surroundings continues imperceptibly. Analytical exercises in the mother tongue must be

Speculation.

going this, we must examine where everything remains, and what becomes of each part. The residue must not be forgotten; the *totality of the results* should be observed, or the point noted, where their course withdraws itself from observation. But further, how human beings either depend upon, or presuppose or else hinder one another in their work, in the house, the farm, in business, in the State, associated again with the dead mechanism of the subservient or harmful powers of Nature; all this, where it is found in experience or descriptive instruction, must be carefully marked out and laid bare for the pupils by quiet, continuous

Taste.

interesting and the touching, the essence must be divested of the adornment, the idea of the diction, the subject of the form. But all this disintegration should always come as an aid to synthesis, for towards that the comprehending mind strives. We must illuminate the particular without throwing the whole into shadow. Nor is it wise to commence with objects too large; the simpler produce clearer judgments of taste. Not only in the arts, but also in life, in intercourse, in behaviour, in expression, what is fit should be pointed out, and required from children as far as they know how to produce it through their own taste.

INSTRUCTION.

Sympathy with Mankind.

duct, to avoid misunderstandings and heedless wounding of others. These beginnings of a *psychology visible to the inward sense* must be continuously enlarged by intercourse with, and knowledge of, men, and must increasingly occupy the mind. In its light every human phenomenon should become more and more explicable, every aversion, as against what is strange, more impossible to us, and union with all that is human, more fervid. But for this it is requisite that all human lineaments should become clearer, as in a transfiguring mirror, that they should become more perfect of their kind, less marred than in

Sympathy with Society

military force—that brilliant spectacle of state which appears so bright to youthful eyes, and so easily becomes detrimental to education, unless instruction supply an adequate counterpoise to the incitements of savage violence and pride. To all the glamour which military and other state institutions throw around themselves, instruction opposes the constant reminder of the genuine power which

Religion.

teleological search, which however must remain in the sphere of Nature, and not go astray in the chaos of human pursuits.

Above all the mind must keep Sabbath in religion. It should turn to it for rest from all thoughts, desires, cares.¹ But for its highest solemnisation, community with many, with the church, should be welcome. Only the pupil must remain sufficiently tem-

¹ *Introd. to Science*, p. 190.

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Empiricism.

carried on through its entire extent, in preparation for orthography, style, and general grammar, and even for separating concepts for the time being. What has been pointed out and associated, receives through fixed co-ordinated recapitulation the *form of teaching*, and, where the question arises which place is suitable for this subject or that, a germ of philosophy will enter.

Speculation.

and searching observations, but must by no means be offered for hasty inspection, astonishment, alarm, or even hurried devotion. Separation of boundaries amongst concepts, search after definitions, development of one's own thoughts, may later on be combined with them. Teaching and philosophy belong here to physics, and later on to the speculative systems.

Taste.

This will take place better, the further all obtrusive decoration is kept at a distance, and the clearer the frame of mind we are in general able to maintain. The teaching of æsthetic analysis according to rules of art, and philosophizing thereon, is mostly of doubtful value.

III. SYNTHETIC COURSE OF INSTRUCTION.

Prefatory Remarks.

Synthetic instruction supplies a number of new presentations, and has to work them out. It should observe constantly whether it *overfills* the mind, or leaves it *too empty*. We shall find here that not only the capacities, but also the disposition varies at different times, and the treatment must be regulated accordingly. Further, government and discipline, but above all, the whole concentration of the teacher on the subject in hand, should operate in arousing an effort to comprehend everything completely, correctly, and immediately, and to grasp it clearly and luminously. Finally, beware of building *too quickly* on

INSTRUCTION.

Sympathy with Mankind.

common life. They should approach nearer to a poetic height, should present themselves to a frame of mind which is not merely carried away, but also imitates, though without passing into the fabulous beyond the *real*, and consequently also *beyond sympathy itself*. Classical poets make this intelligible.

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the brave man brings with him to his post, and of the real limits to which every public servant must reconcile himself.

Religion.

perate while there, to despise fantastic and mystic jugglery, as well as the affectations of mysticism, as being far beneath the dignity of religion.

Note.—For the nourishment of sympathy in the time of boyhood, presentative instruction possesses historical narratives, vivid biographical pictures of men and societies of men—But beware of anything from modern politics!

ground newly prepared. What is clear to-day is obscure again to-morrow; and he who is thinking laboriously on the particular, cannot connect or apply it. As to the elements, we must take care, whenever it is possible, that they lie ready long before they are wanted; further we ought always to build on a somewhat broad foundation, that there may be work to do now here and now there, and change may thus be ensured. With respect to what is complex, it is very important, as far as possible, to occupy the mind with its forms, that it may anticipate the method of connection and search for it itself.

SYNTHETIC

Empiricism.

We ought to point out very early, numerous examples of *combinative* operations, chiefly of those *variations* most commonly used. Quite independently of this, we should show the series of properties of sensuous things, such as for example are found in text-books of mineralogy, as the gradations of colour, degrees of heaviness, hardness, etc. To this stage also belong the forms of space, at first squares and circles, as appearing oftenest in surrounding objects without analysis, then angles. For illustration, we use the hands of the clock, the openings of doors and windows, etc. Angles of 90° , 45° , 30° , 60° , must be first pointed out. My *A B C of Anschauung*, which has its place here, presupposes a knowledge of this. Instead of examples of the combinative construction of things out of the series of their properties, which must be preceded by a free association of these

Speculation.

The discovery of relationships, or synthesis *a priori*, presupposes in all cases of importance, difficulties previously felt and concentration on speculative problems. The true ground of these problems, however, is experience, inward and outward, and youthful culture especially should possess itself of this as fully as possible. The analytical illumination of the circle of experience guides to a succession of causal relations whose genesis is not to be discovered in the entire breadth or depth of the world or of consciousness. The physical branches of

Taste.

Just as little as philosophers are made by extensive philosophical reading, as little is Taste created by a cursory view of many works of art, even if really classical. Numberless single understandings with one's self, which the mind inwardly arrives at in quiet contemplation, finally develop the æsthetic sense — mostly, however, only of one kind, either this or that Taste. Still earlier, *before* the young soul is exposed to strong impressions which can remain as reminiscences, it ought to have partially perceived the simple relations, the æsthetic consti-

INSTRUCTION.

Sympathy with Mankind.

To men *above all*, to *humanity* diverse as it is, and as it may and will be found by us, a sympathy is due, which cannot merely develop analytically from intercourse with individuals known or described, and which is still less likely to grow from any general concept of race, such as humanity. Those alone partly possess, and can in some degree impart it, who have created within themselves numberless varied pictures of humanity—only the worthiest, as supplied by poets, and next to them by historians. We seek in them for the clearest *perception* of general

Sympathy with Society.

In the representations of poetry and history, the *social compliance* and *non-compliance* of human beings must shine forth, and at the same time the pressure of necessity, whereby opposing forces are quieted and held together. References to that which truly united beings manifest, and how they can manifest *themselves*—how, on the other hand, no one singly is able to become, or perfectly accomplish anything great—how each individual, within and without

Religion.

To create and form the idea of God is the work of religious synthesis. As the ultimate point of the universe, as the summit of all sublimity, this idea must glimmer in early childhood, as soon as the mind begins to venture an outlook over its knowledge and thought, its fear and hope—as soon as it tries to look beyond the bounds of its horizon. Religion will never occupy that tranquil place in the depths of the heart, which it ought to possess, if its funda-

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series, or instead of examples of the analysis of given things that leads back to the ground prepared by combination (for this is one of the cases where many conceivable complications are absent in the concrete example), I will say just one word on the subject of grammar, and more particularly of conjugation. Here, in the first place, we have to distinguish the general concepts contained in it, *viz.* Person, Number, Tense, Mood, Voice, from the inflexions by which they are expressed in the different languages. Further we have to distinguish clearly each separate concept with its inflexions, from the development of the type of conjugation, which merely arises out of the variations of these inflexions. But this type would develop naturally if, besides the general concepts, the *form* of the variation which is independent of all grammar was already known. If only a

Speculation.

science lead to a host of hypotheses to pass from which back to nature synthetically, cannot usually be attempted without a stumble. These hypotheses and problems must be pointed out singly as opportunity arises, the imagination must be occupied therewith, and time allowed to elucidate the modes of presentation as far as is possible, or at least to associate them variously. Gradually out of the problems which appear immediately to touch the real, their concepts must be abstracted, and it must be made clear that the thinker is imprisoned

Taste.

tients of the larger compositions. This applies to each of the adjacent and overlapping spheres of art. The perception of the relationships depends on the clearness and maturity of the comprehension; the mind must be affected, not torn away; it must be moved gently, not violently. It must therefore be surrounded by the materials of the relationships—by those which are fully contained in the circle of comprehension then existing. These must be associated in all kinds of ways. Even the simple relationships should be

INSTRUCTION.

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psychological truth. But this truth is continuously modified according to different conditions of men in time and space. And the susceptibility to it is continuously modified with the advance of years. It is the duty of the teacher to take care that both these modifications shall always affect each other rightly, and progress simultaneously. To this end *there must be a chronological progress from the old to the new.* This progress will of itself broaden out at the sides, and with enlarged, transplanted, imitative culture, will bring the gradual *divergencies of individu-*

Sympathy with Society.

himself, ever works out only that which time and environment offer to him—must arouse a guiding interest in conformity with that docility, which directs and restrains human beings in such a way, that they can move forward to their own higher aims. But with this, instruction must lay claim to the whole of the natural modesty of unspoiled youth; it must turn round and enforce the claims of docility upon the pupil himself, and point out to him the unsuitability of the

Religion.

mental ideas are not among the earliest which belong to recollection—if it is not bound up and blended with all which changing life leaves behind in the centre of the personality.¹ This idea must always be placed anew at the end of Nature, as *the ultimate pre-supposition of every mechanism* which shall at some time develop to a given end. The family should be to the child the symbol of the order of the world; from the parents idealized, it should learn the attri-

¹ *Introd. to Science*, p. 76.

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Empiricism.

single language has to be taught, say Greek, then after this general preparation, the most constant features should be first pointed out, such as those of the Future, Perfect, Subjunctive, Optative, and searched for in simple words, then the less constant features must be gone through as anomalies which need to be specially learned. The mind is thus occupied with conjugation; its varieties are associated in all possible ways before the step to learning by heart is taken, though this can by no means be dispensed with. With sufficient practice in combination, facility in applying the type to other forms is acquired; this takes place when the order of the series is changed by variation. A yet simpler example would be the musical score, where the series of tone signs is varied by that of time signs. Such practice can also be made use of in botany, chemistry,

Speculation.

here in the entanglements of his own thoughts, and that consequently he must possess the right method to be able to use them. Here logic steps in. The study of mathematics (for which the *A B C* of *Anschauung* has already prepared by pointing out the relative dependence of certain magnitudes) must by this time have been carried to a considerable extent. By it, drawing logical conclusions through middle terms, in analysis as well as in geometry, must have been long before perfected by practice. The study of speculative systems (begun most

Taste.

pointed out when present, as in music. But the æsthetic temper of mind must also be cared for. All the powers must not be divided between learning and bodily activity; external wildness must be kept in bounds. Free vivacious conversation most conduces to this temper of mind, reflective solitude helps to perfect it. Should there be any signs of growing Taste, we must try to watch over the imagination. A confidential relationship will assist this. Here especially let the pupil be certain of a kind reception of his confidences, without

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alities nearer to the mind. Besides this, the distorted and artistically false, which we come upon in these divergencies, represented in such a (chronological) course with all its opposites and contradictions, will lose the contagious influence it is wont to exercise over the unprepared, who, seeking after culture without sure direction, are so easily deluded, and often so harmfully influenced. Moving forward on the *heights* of human culture, and having arrived at our present literature, we can easily pass by its low and unclean spots, and thus gain

Sympathy with Society.

passion for ranting argument, which fills idle heads with ambiguous talk, and robs public activity at critical moments of its effect. Social interest scorns all forwardness and hastiness; it unites itself, on the contrary, with an *economic* reflection of a higher kind, which equalizes aims, and balances difficulties against opportunities. Not merely what relates to *intercourse*—the stimulus of natural and artificial need, which quickens it, the public influence which

Religion.

butes of the Deity. It *may* speak with the Deity as with its father. The men of old must acknowledge to the boy with ever increasing clearness, that he cannot belong to their gods, their destiny. He must receive in early years from the hand of art itself, what retrogressive culture would re-inaugurate with futile art. The epoch of Socrates must be marked out for him when Fate (*real predestination without causality and will*) began to be supplanted by the then new

Empiricism.

mathematics, and philosophy ; by its help alone can the scaffolding of science be rightly presented, classifications be rightly taught, and philosophizing thereon made possible.

The combinatory survey—a treasure beyond price, in all cases where many things have to be considered—becomes especially useful to instruction in exercises in the Syntax of Language, and in the comprehension of the framework of history. The acquirement of this is an occupation peculiar to later boyhood, which must be *kept entirely distinct* from the *sympathetic* comprehension of historical narratives, many of which should precede this period. In the framework, many series of names which belong to the chronicles of different lands, or, if you will, to the chronicles of the Church, many series of names of the various sciences and arts, lie near each other, and it is important not only to be able to follow the individual successions

Speculation.

advantageously with the oldest and simplest) must now be added, and psychological interest in human opinions will then follow. To teach Synthesis itself *a priori* will doubtless be left to education proper; it will be enough if the teacher of the young prepares for it impartially. The beginnings of speculation may doubtless occupy a healthy-minded youth (and even older boys) too much and too exclusively, but they can never do so too vigorously, so long as they do not affect other interests, and so become burdensome and disquieting. As

Taste.

severe criticism, but also without warm praise. If he himself creates anything, he ought not to be overwhelmed by its charm, nor exhaust himself, nor become self-satisfied. Cooled but not checked by gentle hints, he will be guided on his way from one production to another. That he may not be too early absorbed in his *own* taste, masterpieces of various kinds should be placed before him. These, periodically studied, offer a standard for his own culture. But all Taste is late in acquiring a settled character. To

INSTRUCTION.

Sympathy with Mankind.

considerable security against everything ensnaring in the world of to-day. The whole course will end with the contrast between the age and the intellectual ideal of what Humanity ought to be, together with the mediating reflection how it can reach that ideal, and what help the individual can give thereto. To urgently demand, or anxiously expect, anything from *the moment* is least natural to him who has traversed the ages with long steps, and has everywhere recognised the same humanity.

Sympathy with Society.

protects or oppresses it, the various branches of state administration, but also what unites human beings into communities—speech, belief, knowledge, love of home, and public amusements—all will be taken into consideration. A delineation of society, a map as it were of all its positions and ways, must first make the youth acquainted with every vocation, before he himself can choose one, which choice, made with firm determination, can hardly take place late enough. The chosen

Religion.

idea of Providence. Our positive religion should be compared for him with that in which Plato desired to rear the youth of Greece. The youth must test himself in various opinions. His character, however, must guard him against ever thinking it desirable to be without Religion, and his taste must be sufficiently pure to make that discord for ever afterwards unendurable, which inevitably and inextricably arises from a world without moral order, and consequently (to the extent to which he

SYNTHETIC

Empiricism.

easily, but to be able to combine them in twos and threes at will. Something similar could be said about legal relationships, and the positive enactments regarding them, to receive some knowledge of which is beneficial to earliest youth, as attention to real life is sharpened thereby, and the future care of personal affairs will be lightened.

Speculation.

soon as this takes place, speculation must be abruptly broken off by means of other occupations. The speculative temper of mind is then as it were spoiled for the time being.

Taste.

work this out, the individual must allow the whole power of his peculiar conscience to act with full force upon himself.

IV.

On Plans of Instruction.

We see at the first glance that the foregoing synopses are not intended as a plan of instruction, since so much is included in them which does not allow of a fixed course of lessons, but depends much rather on opportunities of combining it with some kind of instruction. The *Plan of Instruction* is the preparation of these opportunities. It cannot be sketched out until the teacher, having maturely considered the circle of thought here marked out, has placed his collected knowledge within it, and has sufficiently investigated the pupil's needs. The plan of instruction, if it is to be effectual, must be dependent on many contingencies, which have nothing in common with the general idea of many-sided cultivation. For this efficacy proceeds from the individual powers of the teacher and the pupil; these, taken as they are found, must be used to the greatest advantage.

Much depends on the degree and the manner in which the pupil answers to the teacher's efforts. An instruction which

INSTRUCTION.

Sympathy with Mankind.

Himself but little affected by change, he will seek to make others as free as our nature permits. This is the height of sympathy.

*Sympathy with Society.**Religion.*

vocation must possess the whole heart, and adorn beneficent activity with the fairest hopes.

remains a Realist) from a real Nature without a real Deity.

begins betimes, and which will be chiefly synthetic, can pretty well rely upon the power it exercises through what it offers. *But the pupil ought properly speaking to provide the material for analytical instruction*, especially in later years when the hoard of ordinary experience is used up, and only that which has already sunk into the depths of the mind is worth analysis. In accordance with this, the fact is easily explained, that *when* grown-up youths express themselves openly, the influence of education succeeds very quickly, and particularly at the commencement (so far as analysis goes) almost marvellously; if, on the contrary, they are reserved, all effort is useless.

The medium proper of analytical instruction is conversation, woven together, maintained in its course by independent reading, and, when possible, supplemented by written papers which the pupil and teacher lay before each other. The reading must be in a familiar tongue, must have numerous points

of contact with the pupil, and not interest to such a degree that frequent interruptions—possibly long digressions which ought to be pleasing to him—should become distasteful. The exercises must be neither long nor artificial, but clearly and perceptibly reproduce with the utmost care the material of the conversation, besides distinctly and strikingly expressing its main thoughts. They must prove that the mind is concentrated on its subject. If the pupil does not do this satisfactorily, the teacher must improve on it. He may, if necessary, use argument and disputation to brace up slackness, only on no account grow hot himself. In cases of retarded youthful culture, education must lay most stress on such exercises, and try to arrange them in such a manner that by degrees they touch all sides of interest. To fill up the mind, we can add some sort of vigorous descriptive instruction, and even join on some allied studies, unimportant in themselves, but yet as greatly contrasted as possible. This will be the whole form of the plan of instruction in those cases where education has already lost her fairest rights; but, as an addition, these exercises will be almost indispensable, even with an otherwise synthetically progressing instruction, in order that what is going on in the mind may not escape the vigilance of the teacher.

If synthetic instruction begins at the right time, and with promising expectations, it will easily find in the preceding developments the *two main threads*¹ which run from one end of

¹ In his fourth letter to Herr von Steiger, Herbart, then in the midst of his practical work as teacher, defines the "Hauptfäden" thus:—"I picture the whole instruction of the young as running on two lines, one for the understanding, the other for feeling and imagination." In cultivating the understanding he recommends mathematics because its truths are certain and enduring, and physics, for which mathematics in a great measure prepare the way. The heart he considers will be best trained by the gradual guidance of all feelings and by lessons of morality, which since they must never present difficulties to the intellect must be carefully suited to the age of the child, and never interrupted, because the moral feeling needs increasingly better nourishment. This moral feeling must be given through various interesting representations, which by the approval or disapproval they arouse will lead the child to form principles for himself. "And," he asks, "to this end what can we do better than follow the traces of moral growth in humanity and, guided by the hand of history, enter the school of Socrates,

education to the other, and should never be allowed to drop out of our hands. Taste and sympathy require chronological progression from the ancient to the modern. The plan of instruction must provide for this, by arranging for earliest boyhood a beginning in Greek, for the middle stage a beginning in Latin, and for the youth the study of modern languages. Speculation and empiricism, so far as they are illuminated by it, require before all things a systematic and variously applied study of mathematics. I venture to name as most advisable for the commencement of these two courses, the *Odyssey* and the *A B C of Anschauung*. A course of heterogeneous studies may be taken as a third series, among which natural history, geography, historical narratives, and the study of positive law and politics are the most important. With these, it is not necessary that the earlier shall be finished before the later are begun; only the periods must follow each other, since each one in its order has a *preferential* influence on the mind. And each one requires such a period, that it may settle firmly and permanently. If the exercises described, which must be devoted from time to time to the analytical process, be added, the leading features of the complete plan of educating instruction are before us, and it is only necessary further to add in thought the auxiliary to the main studies. The chief studies will be surrounded by many auxiliary studies, which mostly fall outside the lessons, but not outside the sphere of the influence of a consistent discipline. For the rest, we may trust that a boy whose interest is aroused, will bear the burden which it brings with it. Only take care that the interest is not dissipated. Anything which disturbs the *continuity* of the work will inevitably cause this. It

there among men whom we already know and love, and the growth of whose morals and character we have seen in history, to linger awhile, then with glad and reverent mind to enter the circle of Christ's disciples, and after following him with our eyes and hearts into heaven, return with nobler spirit to further pursue the course of the world's history, to perceive the traces of Providence in the slow, solemn, often apparently retrogressive, but yet ever advancing progress, and looking far beyond the events of our own time, steady our courage and learn to guard our hearts against the manifold destructive influences of the age.

"I have proposed thus to study history myself, and I think it possible it can be done in my young friend's company with mutual satisfaction."

must be so arranged that it carries with it the necessary *variety* in its own province, but it must never degenerate, from love of change, into an aimless rhapsody. The most experienced teachers appear here to need experience. They do not seem to realize the effect of a method of teaching, which follows the uniform track of the same interest without a break. Whence else comes the broken sequence of lessons in the majority of time-tables. It ought to be known that, of all the external conditions of a thorough instruction, the first and most indispensable is, *to devote to the same study one lesson daily*. But truly the number of subjects must have room found for them.

There are cases where synthetic instruction cannot be carried out to its full extent, and yet one will not give it up altogether. Then the task is to condense without at the same time deforming it. Curtailed uniformly in due proportion, its form the same, it will be as if seen through a diminishing glass, showing more vivid colours and sharper contrasts, but losing inevitably in fulness, contour, and effect. The majority of languages should be omitted, translations and extracts should be used, where in the other case originals and entire works should be read. But the main ideas must be the more insisted on, the less their operation can be assisted by a variety of illustration. We must forego something in mathematics to exhibit the infinitely varied interchange between the parts of this science; the main principles alone should be given and the most important modes of calculation, but these in an encyclopædic manner from the lowest to the highest, for the highest are not necessarily the most involved. And what is shown should be shown fundamentally, and so that it remains a lasting possession. In natural history, geography and history, the memory should be spared many names, but care taken that the world and humanity may appear in luminous outline.¹

In the educational treatment of the sciences we must arrange for similar abbreviations by means of definite selected *episodes*.

¹ Herbart gives a complete plan of instruction so contrasted in his *Pädag. Gutachten über Schulklassen*, 1818.

In this way many-sidedness of interest may be cultivated, even if much internal strength and versatility of expression must be given up.

The plan of study, be it what it may, will be stultified, unless the opportunities it provides are utilized. I trust this book will be delivered from superficial friends, who fancy they have followed its precepts, if they only begin Homer and the *A B C of Anschauung* sufficiently early. I shall not thank them, if they do not at the same time give themselves the trouble to exhibit the characters of the poets, and to articulate the form of things. The vainest of all plans of instruction are probably the *school schemes* sketched out for whole countries and provinces, and especially those which a school-board *in pleno* agrees upon, without previously hearing the wishes of the individuals, testing the strength and weakness of each one, searching into their private relationships one with another, and preparing its deliberations accordingly. A good school government needs more than a little knowledge of men and politics. For it must unite many men, of whom each pair might fairly be described as a pair of rivals, if only from zeal for knowledge, in such a way that they may work together sincerely to bring their whole influence to bear on the scholars. Everything from all sides must be used to minimise the touchy points of this rivalry as well as to raise the better spirit in these men—expressly in *these individuals*—and to indicate to each one a beneficent activity suited to him (how much is denied to a learned man if he is not permitted to pursue what he likes), so that at last the general desire for the proper cultivating effect of each subject of instruction shall inspire them all. What does a plan of instruction for a whole land know of all this? Such a plan, designed without consideration for the individuals who have to carry it out in the various districts, does all that it can if it avoids rough collisions with the course of studies and *with the existing spirit of the inhabitants*. Therefore it can never perform much. I confess I feel no real satisfaction, when States apply themselves to educational matters in such a way, as if to them, *as such*—to their government and watchfulness—it were possible to entrust what alone can be obtained by the

strenuous efforts of the talent, the faithfulness, the industry, the genius, the virtuosoship of individuals, what is created by the free activity of those individuals, and is capable of being spread by their example. Here it only remains for the government to remove obstacles, to smooth the way, to provide opportunities, and to give encouragement, which is still however a great and very estimable service to humanity.¹

CHAPTER VI.

RESULT OF INSTRUCTION.

A TEACHER has no greater happiness than the frequent knowledge of noble natures, which open and manifest to him unreservedly the wealth of youthful susceptibility. His own mind will be kept open, and his efforts unencumbered thereby, and he is convinced he possesses, in the idea of the cultivation of human beings, the true model for his own work. He is untouched by the impressions of want of appreciation which mutually put both teacher and pupil out of tune, when the one imposes what the other does not wish. He is not misled into turning instruction into play, nor on the other hand designedly into work; he sees before him a serious business, and tries to forward it with gentle but steady hand. He burdens the catalogue of the lessons but little with his polyhistory (in which everything would be considered but the pupil's interest in the subject); he has enough to do in caring that the many-sidedness of the teaching shall not be less than the capacity which comes out to him. For it is no light thing to lastingly *satisfy* and *fill* the untroubled youthful mind.

Filling the mind—this it is, which before all other more detailed purposes ought to be the general result of instruction. Cultivated humanity continually needs, in its artificial condition, art; after comforts are acquired, treasures accumulated,

¹ For further details on this subject, see *Ueber Erziehung unter öffentlicher Mitwirkung*, 1810.

after nature is no longer employed from necessity, energy must be given something to do; it must not be allowed to be idle. The lazy rich man's life has aroused the anger of observers in all times. "Crucify the flesh; or back into the woods." Such speeches will ever be made anew by humanity against itself, if it does not learn to prevent the excrescences which, rank as ugly, are wont to spring from civilisation. Impulse must exhaust itself in mental efforts; then the mischief is avoided.

In the hope, then, that there will be no lack of *quantity* in the instruction treated of up to this point, either in breadth or strength, we will examine the *quality* of the condition of mind prepared by it.

I.

Life and School.

*Non scholæ sed vitæ discendum.*¹ This wise proverb would be somewhat clearer if we knew what it meant by school and what by life.

Perhaps the following short version throws light on it—*not for ostentation, but for use!* Thus rendered, it is a wise economic rule, as suitable for the purchase of furniture as of knowledge.

But life does not merely consist of the use of sundry means to various ends. Such a life would be open to the suspicion of having smothered manifold interest under a few desires. This is certainly not the result of the instruction we have in view. And we identify mere utility with life, just as little as we identify ostentation with the school. Our version then of this proverb is *not* applicable. Without

¹ This saying comes from Seneca, though in another form. At the end of his third letter to Lucilius, Seneca expresses his opinion that men waste their sagacity on useless things, and in so doing are made students, not good men; wisdom is a simpler matter, and a good mind does not need so much scholarship. He thought, therefore, that men strive after knowledge, not that they may become better, but that they may dazzle their fellow creatures with it, and he concludes with the sentence: "*Quemadmodum omnium rerum sic literarum quoque intemperantia laboramus; non vitæ sed scholæ discimus,*" i.e. we suffer in knowledge as in all else from want of proportion; *we learn not for life, but for the school.* The school proposition had to be changed into its contrary *non scholæ sed vitæ discendum*,—we must learn not for the school, but for life.—*Anmerkung von Carl Richter.*

entering into lengthy amendments of the exegesis, let us rather ourselves try to explain the relationship between school *and* life, undisturbed if in doing so we again meet the contradiction "*non scholæ, sed vitæ.*"

We shall certainly comprehend life most easily, if we ask ourselves, how will the known parts of interest probably *continue to live on with us* in future years.

Empiricism proper—mere observation—finds no end as it seeks none; it delights in novelty of which each day brings its own supply. Whatever the day brings, part of it always belongs to sympathy, for the well-being of men and states is ever changing. Thus observation and sympathy are the movements by which we make every moment of time our own—*through which we properly live*. When their pulse beats faintly, leisure becomes a burden; the bolder spirits then open the door of time and seek eternity.

Speculation and taste are not made for the *current* of life, for change. Change does not put systems only to shame. Every individual also, when once his views and taste are formed, gives them up unwillingly, and cannot indeed give them up entirely. Our principles are too much a work of effort and of years, to be easily remoulded when once formed.

They are the anchor of *reflection* and *personality*; observation on the contrary, and with it sympathy, gives itself up to ever new *concentrations*.

Doubtless he who has seen and felt much, has already reached with time a certain *atmosphere* which is beyond the storm of the passions. The new is trivial compared with that already felt. But this atmosphere is not *rest*, not *mastery*, it is only a less yielding mobility.

With those of the world's better ones, who are less accustomed to thought, religion almost entirely guides the rudder of life; it takes the place at once of speculation and of taste. *All* require religion for mental *rest*, but the activities of the mind subject those who have culture for it to a double discipline, *i.e.* of *theoretical* and *practical* judgment.

Observation which would endlessly collect and lose one thing in another, and finally itself in all—Sympathy which in the

fervour of its claims would penetrate activity everywhere, and in so doing be exposed to deathly chills—both of these, *speculation* is fitted to keep moderate and cool because it quits change to rise into being—yet still more, because looking back from the immaterial, it defines and limits the general possibility of the material, and again uniting itself with experience warns those who do not reflect on space and time and the whole vast course of forces, against all hastiness, over-estimation, exaggerated hopes and fears, against all mistakes and petty cleverness.

To worthily employ the developed power which, through the accumulation of knowledge, waits within the bounds of reflection till its guide appears, Taste¹ has its models and its ideas. The proper, the beautiful, the moral, the right, in one word, *that which in its perfect state pleases after perfect contemplation*—to show this would be the happy work of the purely reflective life, if previous effort were not necessary to remove the unpleasant, the burdensome accumulations which lie heaped up all around, where unreflecting men have acted from impulse. Taste is strict, and retracts nothing. Life must be ruled according to the laws of Taste, or it sinks under its reproaches.

To completely teach how life is determined by its two rulers, Speculation and Taste, we must search for a *system of philosophy*, the keystone of instruction.

Melancholy is it, to witness how our philosophy up to the present time, has so often confounded the opposite and completely independent nature of the two—has misused taste in the name of speculation, or speculation in the name of taste; melancholy to see how it has oppressed through both the spirit of observation and sympathy, and so injured life itself; melancholy to see the convulsive struggles under which youths, often of ability, swaying hither and thither unprepared between the universal and the ego, of which one is too broad, and both are too deep, despairing and almost lost, glory in the acquired insight, *that everything is nothing*. Nothing is more shocking

¹ In the following, the term Taste is used in the wider sense, as in the *Æsthetic Revelation of the World*.

to the feeling of the teacher, than the carelessness by which the result of careful instruction is so often thrown into the whirlpool of the age's speculative adventures, and exposed to its doubtful consequences. Useless laments over it here are not for me, still the science of education must point out the dangerous spot.¹

The course of the human race certainly requires, that those who are fit should venture themselves in order to seek the anchor of reflection, and must seek until they find it.

It is possible, that individuals in the obscure simplicity of Nature can live on for themselves happily enough. Where the waves of life do not run high, it does not need much power to keep oneself afloat.

But we in the midst of a system of civilised States, with interest for humanity and society, are driven through this interest to search for a unity of thought, which may form the meeting-place of the *general reflection* gathered from the innumerable *concentrations*, in which the many dissipate themselves. Solon's old reproof to the Athenians, "Individuals have understanding, but combined they have none," points to a need of humanity from time immemorial—namely the sources of a common understanding.

All concentrations should be gathered together, co-ordinated, in reflection, and *the ever new life should ever create the school anew*. This does really take place in periods when there are intellectual men, who understand how to take care of the fruits of life. We do not complain that till now diverse schools have been created, we remember rather the short periods and small powers which have hitherto been devoted to them.

Let us now translate more truly than before the term "school," and give to the noble word its true signification: *school*² is *leisure*, and leisure is the common property of speculation, taste and religion. Life is a participation of the sympha-

¹ Note by Herbart.—More may be required from me. If any one wishes to call me to account, I must refer him provisionally to the supplement of my treatise, *De Platonici systematis fundamento*.

² Note by Reviser.—This is a reference to the double meaning of the Greek word σχολή (leisure, and later, school). Aristotle in his *Ethics*, insists

thetic observer in the alternations of external action and endurance. The hard proverb which seems to make change the *object* of leisure, and *reflection* into a *means* for concentrations, is not inexorable, and permits us to move hither and thither from one to the other, and to use the transition from doing and enduring to leisure, and again from leisure to doing and enduring, as the breathing of the human mind, as the need and as the characteristic of health.

So much for the kind of mental condition which many-sided interest endeavours to prepare, as far as the knowledge of the age allows. *The joy of life* is combined in it, with *the elevation of soul which knows how to part from life*.

II.

Glance at the end of the educational period of Youth.

Just at that period when natural activity has reached its highest tension, and is most at the service of the extension of interest, the particular points come more prominently into view, fastened upon which, the mental vision contracts itself more and more. These points themselves do not interest us, but only their general results.

Every human being has to act, and the youth dreams of his actions. So he does also of the means and ways, hindrances and dangers—of those certainly, be they great or small, which hang together with *his* actions. That which is *useful* and *harmful* thus becomes interesting to him, and that indifferent which does not touch this sphere. Human beings, objects, and knowledge are sifted. The realities of life rise, learning sinks. The old languages die, the dead ones give place to the living. Taste and enquiry seek the heights of the age, that they may be at home with contemporaries. Instead of sympathy, love arises, and the good wishes for society seek a vocation. Now come well-wishers, and enviers, and double dealers; the young man must watch, be considerate, win, circumvent, dazzle,

strongly on the value of leisure as an indispensable condition of contemplation (*θεωρία*), the highest activity of man. Doubtless Herbart had this passage in his mind.

frighten, flatter; and with so many interests, many-sidedness is amply provided for.

It is but natural that the teacher should witness this impoverishment of spirit with sorrow. It would however, be a cause of shame to the friend of education, if his serious purpose could ever have been to prevent this impoverishment by pre-existing poverty.

The evil will not be so great as this, and a well-grounded, genuine, many-sided interest, cultivated by a persevering and forcible instruction, will withstand the contraction—will itself give its vote on the plan of life, itself choose and reject ways and means, open out prospects, win friends, put the envious to shame; it will *step forth in action* through the mere manifestation of a sterling personality, and beyond this also, through the wealth of so many capacities which, if necessary, could soon become attainments. Crude impulses will thereby be brought back into bounds, through which they can break no more.

On the direction which this development takes, depends *who* the future man will be. At this point, what the man *wills*, and *wills not*, separates itself, and then *the estimate he forms of himself* is expressed. The inward code of honour becomes determined. Intercourse becomes defined, and out of close connection with persons whose esteem he desires to win, proceeds a kind of obligation to deserve it. Here all influences come into play. What the youth till now has learned, thought, practised, is instrumental in pointing out to him his place among men, and in himself, and thus all blends and becomes one. What he wishes, loves, acknowledges, despises, disposes itself in due order, while conjointly determining his views and plan of life. The consequences of this continue, running straight on through life. He who allows himself to be urged into a career of public activity will hardly put much of his own mind into his business; the favourite amusement separates itself from duty to the detriment of both. He whose path is marked out by egoism, looks henceforth on men and things in the inverse relation of their distance to himself. Whatever is conceded to sympathy in the choice of a future career, and whatever consideration is vouchsafed to the care of individual cultivation,

is secured to them both, though not necessarily in actual practice, yet in the will, the personality, provided the youth has learned to *withstand infirmity of purpose*.

We see here the result of instruction in contact with the result of *the formation of character*. It will be tolerably clear, that with the growth of genuine many-sided instruction, the adjustment of character is duly provided for. Its *firmness, decision, and invulnerability* is, however, something entirely different.

To explain these to ourselves as satisfactorily as is possible, without the definite presupposition of psychology and practical philosophy, we must first go back to a development of concepts similar to those with which the present book commenced.

THIRD BOOK.

MORAL STRENGTH OF CHARACTER.

CHAPTER I.

WHAT IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD BY CHARACTER ?

IN the foregoing we considered the will as the seat of character, naturally not the changeable wishes and moods of the will, but its uniformity and firmness, that whereby it is *determinately* this and no other. That kind of the determination we called character—*that which a man wills as compared with that which he wills not.*

In such a comparison the form of each thing is determined. It is removed from an indeterminate, larger sphere ; it is perceived through differentiation. Accordingly character is the embodiment of the will. It can only be comprehended in the contrast between that which it purposes, and that which it excludes.

In the negative part of character we have to distinguish the deficient will from the denying will. A deficient will, which however may develop, would belong to the indeterminate faculties of man. Only what is already excluded thereby as inconsistent with the rare positive will, is quite as characteristic as express not-willing. Yet the latter serves to strengthen.

We observe human nature in order to know what we have in it, to fix it as an object. A man himself feels the same need. In order to be conceived, he must be conceivable. This leads us to a remarkable distinction.

I.

*Objective and Subjective Parts of Character.*¹

It is an old complaint that man has often, as it were, two souls.

He observes himself, would understand himself, would please and guide himself. But, previous to this observation, while immersed in things and externals, he has a will,² and often very marked features of character. These are the objective with which the contemplating subjective either agrees or disagrees by means of a *new* will, created in an entirely different condition of soul (*Gemüthslage*).

In case of disagreement, which of the two wills determines the character? It is quite clear, that that, which combined would have strengthened it, now chafes and disintegrates it; that the better claims on us, if they only prevent a fall into the distinctly bad, can but preserve at best a salutary absence of character.

If one of the two parts of the character be weak, the earlier determination of the one can then effect much over the other. This we find corroborated in many wild but uncorrupted youths who very soon acquire considerable moral strength through the influence of an old friend or of healthful literature. It is less happily confirmed in those cases where by much early moral teaching and quickening—even of the purest kind—an endeavour is made to anticipate all the perverse traits of character which burst out from within. For although this influence acts powerfully, still it cannot ensure that in the long course of the approaching period of education, hidden impulses will not shoot up here and there amongst the good teaching, and thus at times cause strange anomalies. Nevertheless, if moral teaching is to act directly on human nature, there is nothing left for it but to turn to the subjective of the person-

¹ Herbart in his *Umriss pädagogischer Vorlesungen* defines the Objective part of character as that part of the will, which the individual finds already existent, when he begins to observe himself; and the Subjective part, as the new will which arises in and with this self-observation.

² *Introd. to Science of Educ.*, pp. 62, 63.

ality, in order that this may test itself with the objective basis, and see what it can accomplish.

On the other hand, such a method is not suitable for education. The ordinary and natural phenomenon—that men invent the maxims¹ for their inclinations afterwards, in order to enjoy the convenience of an inward prescriptive right to do as they like, must direct education to devote its chief attention to the objective part of the character, which forms and raises itself slowly enough under its observation and influence. If this first is in order, results may then be hoped for from the regulating power of good moral teaching. There will still remain to the subjective to give the sanction, the final settlement and refinement of the morally formed character, which it will, however, easily accomplish.

II.

*Memory of the Will.*²

Principle.

Choice.

Conflict.

There is an endowment tending to stability of character, which is noticeable in some instances quite early, and which I know not better how to express than by the term—Memory of the Will.

I avoid here all psychological development of the phenomena, stamped with the names of memory, power of recollection, etc., as if they presupposed a particular activity or even power of the mind. I am astonished, meanwhile, that a parallel has not been more carefully drawn between the constancy of our conceptions, and the constancy of willing³ which goes to make up the chief basis of the objective part of character.

So much is certain, that a man whose will does not, like ideas held in the memory, spontaneously re-appear as *the same* as often as the occasion recurs—a man who is obliged to carry

¹ *Maxim*, in Herbart's technology, is a collective term for a number of judgments passed on similar cases, which are subsequently rejudged (*beurtheilt*), and formed by the act of rejudgment into a practical principle of conduct. *Introd. to Science*, p. 167.

² See Translators' Introduction, p. 38, and *Introd. to Science*, p. 166.

³ Herbart here points out that the laws which govern the mutual action of presentations govern also the formation of will. For the manner in which they do so see *Introd. to Science*, p. 163.

himself back by reflection to his former resolution—will have great trouble in building up his character. And it is because natural constancy of will is not often found in children, that discipline has so much to do.

We here point out only the condition of this constancy, namely, a uniform will and adequate survey of the sphere of the presentations out of which the will proceeds. Whoever has not, in the very beginning, co-ordinated the considerations which lie at the foundation of will, and does not further continue to co-ordinate them, must certainly always be of unstable character; and upon this the environment has much influence.

That which is willed with constancy—whether the object of will be purposed or excluded—constitutes the basis of the objective in character. But this basis is manifold, and everything is not willed with equal firmness and strength. The degrees of firmness are determined by *choice*. Choice is *preference* and *rejection*. For him who carries this out consistently, each thing has a limited value, and nothing except the highest can fill the mind with illimitable endeavour. The inclinations have a firm construction, and it is through the various quantitative relationships in this construction that characters differentiate themselves; otherwise men have on the whole much the same inclinations. It is clear, moreover, that this estimate can only be made according to the individual standpoint. But it must be made, that the character may consolidate itself. We must know how dear our wishes cost us. The trivial must separate itself—must fall to the ground before the greater, the more important.

When there is memory of the will, choice will decide by itself. The weight of the wishes will involuntarily place them in their relative order. Without any theoretical consideration (for only by initiative choice can the connected motives receive further practical importance) the man becomes conscious of what he prefers, and what he will rather sacrifice, what he dislikes, more and what less; he experiences it in himself. A changeable mind, however, never obtains herein perfect experience.

When the mind, as intelligence, approaches and considers itself and the objects of its willing, it is then a question how

pure the subjective of the personality can keep itself from the objective. A sincere taste will pass judgment on the self as impartially as on a stranger; the subjective part of the character at least will be morally pure, and remain so, in spite of all want of harmony with the objective. But the man who contemplates himself, generally seeks *only* to express himself; and here, where character specially is being spoken of, we can leave out of consideration how far this self-expression may possibly deviate from the normal moral standard.

The endeavour to comprehend oneself acts directly as an endeavour to strengthen oneself, for the firmer elements are thereby brought out still more in consciousness beyond the less firm. A man easily arrives thereby at *some kind* of unity with himself. This gives rise to a feeling of happiness, which is powerful enough to make itself master of the inner monitor. Thus the most prominent features of the objective raise themselves into principles in the subjective of the character, and the ruling inclinations are thus legalized.

But this self-contemplation by which principles are developed, performs yet another service for inner stability. An individual can only comprehend himself together with his environment, and his inclinations only with their objects. If there be some power of theoretic thought, there also attaches to the principles the consideration of the variability of the circumstances, according to which their use must be decided.

Man learns to determine himself according to motives; he learns to listen to reasons, that is to say, he learns to *subsume* the subordinate principles which time provides, to his adopted main principles, on each occasion, and only then to put in action the decisions thus formed. I call this quality of the character *force of motive*, which must be directly bound up with firmness of principle.

But the objective of the personality can never be wholly and fully enclosed in the principles. Each personality is and remains a chameleon, and as a consequence every character will often be found in a state of inward conflict. In such conflict the strength of the man shines forth, and perhaps his virtue; but there is danger to mental, and in the end, to bodily health also. On this account there is reason for wishing the

struggle at an end. But a spurious morality, which teaches that man should not struggle, has no power to root out such struggles; amelioration of them must be looked for from the preventive measures of education.

CHAPTER II.

ON THE NOTION OF MORALITY.

THE preceding remarks relating to character were a specification of psychological phenomena. But every one who thoughtfully considers the word *morality* will acknowledge it is not satisfactory merely to have *any* kind of character.

It is taken for granted, then, that certain claims lie at the basis of morality as against any given character—claims which cannot be compelled to resign their rights by the opposition which in fact awaits them, although they do not possess an intrinsic power to accomplish anything. And these claims have nothing in common with the real, the natural, even with that which *is* in any sense, but come to them as something totally strange, and come in contact with them only to judge them. And a judging power does not engage in strife with the object upon which it pronounces sentence.

But a character which does not submit to a first judgment may thereby draw upon itself a new one. The disapproval in this judgment may ultimately become unbearable to men, and thus the resolution may possibly at last be formed to obey these claims as *commands*. Every one knows that all men feel themselves impelled in this direction, and that they are wont, more or less, to move thither.¹

But does any one know at once how to reproduce in one sentence what the first judgment truly affirms? The doctrines of law and morality are not alike, although each speaks in the name of all.

I drew certain conclusions from this in my treatise *On the Æsthetic Revelation of the World*, which really, however, have a meaning only for those who are able to emerge, at least for a

¹ *Æsthetische Darstellung der Welt*, p. 65.

moment, from the contradiction of attempting to force definitions out of their own opinions, into the objective and generally obligatory concept of morality.

No one will expect that the science of education will anticipate the explanations and confirmations which can be given by practical philosophy alone. For this reason therefore, I can only here ask the acceptance of an historical knowledge of some modes of presentation, which are unavoidably interwoven with the exposition of my principles of education.

I.

The Positive and Negative Sides of Morality.

However much humility there may be in morality, the *virtue* shown in its exercise is called by every one *strength*, by no one *weakness*.

Nevertheless, the exercise of morality would only be weakness if it were merely compliance with claims from *without*.

Do we not rather say to ourselves concerning those claims—we ourselves pronounce against ourselves in that we judge our character and demand obedience? This is the contemplative Subject in us, which has raised itself for the time being over the mere self-expression of the inner state.

Both sides of morality, the positive and negative, lie here in close proximity. The act of judging itself is positive, but the tenor of the judgment is negative for the character, which as shown based on the objectivity of the personality, is not in harmony with its claims. And the negating judgment transforms itself into a real elevation and self-sacrifice, so far as the personality determines to obey. It then accepts as a categorical imperative what in itself was a simple judgment.

It was certainly a mistake to *begin* ethics scientifically with this categorical imperative. The purely positive must here take precedence, and many things be unfolded in their relation and sequence which Kant had not thoroughly thought out. But they who forget themselves so far as to desire the release of mankind from the categorical imperative, make a still graver mistake.¹

¹ See note 1, p. 107, and *Introd. to Science*, p. 59.

II.

Moral.

Judgment.

Warmth.

Decision.

Self-restraint.

A moral feeling is recognized and indeed found at an early age in children. Practical reason too is spoken of, indicating that the original expression of the moral is not to be left to a changeable obscure feeling, nor to an activity and emotion of the heart (*Gemüth*); on the contrary, the very natural demand is made that expressions of such authority should be sober authoritative declarations, wherein the object, as well as the judgment given concerning it, shall be quite plainly and emphatically expressed. In giving over on such good grounds to reason the expression of the first fundamental determinations of morality, we do not notice, however, that we are delivered into the hands of a theoretical artist, who, carried away by logic and metaphysics, defines the moral law by virtue of its universality, and makes freedom the source of goodness.¹ This theoretical artist (reason) will rather summon the whole transcendental philosophy to explain the possibility of the moral consciousness, than lead us in a single point of our moral feeling to the clear reflection, that we know and feel how to separate from extraneous matters what we really choose and reject, when we use the expressions of moral approval and disapproval. Perhaps a prepossession in favour of the term taste (*Geschmack*) will not be so very difficult to win from those of my contemporaries who, notwithstanding this mistake, have become conscious meanwhile, that a moral decision is in itself neither a *feeling* nor a *theoretical truth*, especially when I assure them that what I call moral taste has nothing in common with the fashionable talk of the present day, and moreover is just as far from confusing the good with the beautiful after the manner of the Stoic maxim—*ὅτι μόνον ἀγαθὸν τὸ καλόν*.²

¹ Translators' Introduction, p. 25.

² "Only the beautiful is good." The chief ethical principle of the Stoics was to obey Nature. According to them, the natural is the appropriate, and the appropriate in its completion is the good.

By whatever name, however, moral judgment may be called, a sober, clear, firm, and determinate judgment must in any case form the foundation of the moral in man, unless in the place of moral *warmth*, a hasty impulsiveness or a morbid craving be put, both of which consider the good as an object of desire, and of which the one is as useless as the other for the purpose of timely and judicious activity. The individual finds in himself many occasions for moral judgment which must be met face to face honestly and courageously. Only out of the number and variety of these occasions, of which such an inexhaustible supply is offered in the family, in general intercourse, and in all which falls within the sphere of synthetical and analytical education—only out of this wealth, which is moreover capable of an ordered and impressive representation, and if I may be allowed a bold expression, of a poetical composition—in short, only out of the æsthetic power of the moral view, can the pure non-sensual emotion (which can be combined with courage and wisdom) proceed, whereby character is strengthened to true morality.

For the conceptions of the good and right must indeed come to an agreement in the objective of the character with the further conceptions of taste and of wisdom, and by the sheer force of their clearness take that precedence in the general choice, which is due to them before all other movements of desire. But they must also pass out into the subjective of the character; they must express themselves as principles. The moral determination, however, which introduces the negative side of morality, is, it is true, always liable to be disobeyed, and is consequently exposed to depression, since it is very rare that a human nature finds itself again wholly dominated by that determination. Nevertheless, the depression will not overthrow the determination, if enduring warmth be present, and if education has been careful not to engraft moral teaching on fleeting emotions.

Self-observation must however be added to determination as a *subsumption* to the main principles. In this, much depends on a right comprehension of one's own individuality; he who judges himself wrongly is in danger of disintegration. Every-

thing else too, which belongs to the *motivity* of character generally, must be made dependent upon the motive power of the moral principles, and exercise a reflex influence upon their use. The individual must contemplate his whole position in the world from a moral point of view; he must tell himself how his highest interest can be favoured or harmed by circumstances. He must reinforce the practical view with the theoretical; he must act accordingly. I indicated this in another place by the expression—pragmatical composition of the moral order of life.¹

Self-constraint forms the conclusion. The man learns thereby who he is, and whatever weaknesses have betrayed themselves here, their origin must be tracked and sought out through all the depths of the individuality.

CHAPTER III.

IN WHAT WAY DOES MORAL CHARACTER REVEAL ITSELF.

THE conceptions hitherto developed are entirely formal; the point now is to find for them the real—to determine *to what* the moral character is decided, *whereby* and *wherefore* it shows its firmness.

I.

Character as ruling the Desires and in the service of the Ideas.

Moral decision clearly lies *between* that which it determines, and that by which it suffers itself to be determined. Desire—*i.e.*, all that which belongs to the so-called lower appetitive *faculty*—will be bounded, arranged, and firmly held in the scale once chosen; from that on the contrary which the involuntary judgment cannot help marking in an unqualified manner with approval or disapproval, the will takes law, the principle of order, and the objects of its endeavours.² That which was marked with involuntary approbation, I call a practical idea.³

¹ *Ästhetische Darstellung*, page 63. ² Translators' Introduction, p. 45.

³ See translators' Introduction, page 28.

If we would therefore see the formal conceptions of character and of *moral* character realised, we must search for the chief parts of that which is determinable in the lower appetitive faculty, as well as of that which falls within the province of determining ideas, in order to become acquainted with the matter, and the forming nature of moral character.

II.

*That which is Determinable. The Determining Ideas.*¹

What we would suffer.	Rectitude.
” ” ” have.	Goodness.
” ” ” do.	Inner freedom.

The lower appetitive faculty is based upon the feelings of desire and dislike. A man of character bears the dislikes in part, the residue he fends off; he knows what he will suffer and what he will not suffer; he has expelled the restlessness of impatience. His desires he has also curbed—the desire attached to things which he wishes to own in order to be sure of them, as well as those which appertain to personal activity and productiveness in employment. The ideas I take from practical philosophy. Out of the series which it offers me, I pass over one which is merely formal, that of Perfection; two others² which are strictly separated there, I combine in one expression—Rectitude. I cannot give here either the reasons why, or the specific differences of the ideas themselves; for the purposes of the general science of education, the known names will be easily, rightly, and sufficiently understood. But should this part of the science be carried out in detail, this license must be given up.

CHAPTER IV.

THE NATURAL COURSE OF FORMATION OF CHARACTER.

WHEN certain movements which we would guide have already begun to take place before our eyes, it may be taken for granted,

¹ *Introd. to Science of Educ.*, p. 169.

² The ideas of Right (Recht) and Equity (Billigkeit) are here combined in the term *Rechtlichkeit* (Rectitude), *i. e.* conformity to a moral standard.

as a primary rule of wisdom, that we must first try and understand the change begun, before we interfere in our own way.

It forced itself on our notice, that we could not treat of instruction without making a connecting reference to those constant teachers of men—experience and intercourse. Here, where we have to state the means of discipline for the formation of character, we are still more forcibly impressed with the necessity for a preliminary enquiry into the course usually taken by natures left to themselves in the gradual formation of their character. For we know that man formed from any but the very softest clay, do not wait for the character which the teacher wishes to give them. How often in this respect are labour and anxiety thrown away, in the effort to produce what is self-formed, and in the end must be taken, when completed, as it is found.

I.

Action is the Principle of Character.

The elements of character and its seat when existent have been already shown. The *will* is its seat; the kind of the decision of the will, determines the species of the character.

The question what the character will be, will therefore be answered when we show how the will arrives at decision.

Let us first enquire, what would a will be *without* decision?¹

Scarcely a will at all—an emotion without determination, a mere self-inclination to an object, without the assumption that it *will* be reached—call it what you like, either a desire or a lust.

Whoever says then—I *will*, has already conquered for himself the future in thought. He already sees himself achieving, possessing, enjoying.

Show him that he *cannot*, he will then desist, for he understands you. Perhaps, however, the desire will remain and rage violently, or make covert attempts. There is again a new volition in these attempts, not now directed towards the object, but towards the movements which are made with the

¹ Note 1, *Introd. to Science of Educ.*, p. 52.

consciousness of mastery over them, and with the hope that by means of their skilful combination the object will be attained. The commander-in-chief *desires* to conquer. Therefore he wills the manœuvres of his troops. He would not *will* these if he were not acquainted with the power of his commands. But a desire may exist in some individual (this example is from Jacobi), a desire to will to dance, as a Vestris *can will* to dance. Desire so to will may be present in many, and doubtless the education of the master began with the desire, yet his act of volition could certainly not hasten the gradual accomplishment by one single step, but at the most follow at its heels.

Action therefore generates the will out of desire.

But capacity and opportunity are necessary to action.

From this point we can survey the elements collected, which are necessary for the formation of character.

It is obvious that man's activity depends in the first instance on the circle of his desires. The desires, however, are partly sensual, and partly spring from intellectual interests.

The individual capacities come secondly, together with the external opportunities and impediments. Their influence is the more complicated in proportion as the means required for a certain object are greater, and the more numerous the activities are, which can be furthered or hindered from without and within.

Before all things we must take into consideration in this, that the greater part of an educated man's activity only takes place inwardly, and that we chiefly learn our ability from inward experiences. The primary essential from which character receives its bent, depends on the direction in which we do, or do not, possess the motive and pliancy to guide our thoughts. For it depends upon which kind of external activity in all its complications the imagination succeeds in picturing with vivid clearness. The great man acted long before in thought—he *felt* himself acting, he saw himself advancing—before the *external* act, the fac-simile of the internal, became visible. A few passing attempts in performance proving in reality nothing, suffice to change a flattering faith into confidence, that he will be able to realise

in act, what he sees with inward clearness. In order to create a firm volition, this courage supplies the place of the act.

Unhappy are they who are wanting in power when they *will* something great. The path of destruction is the course of education reversed. Dejection which becomes habitual is consumption of the character.

II.

Influence of the Circle of Thought on Character.

Ignoti nulla cupido!—The circle of thought contains the store of that which by degrees can mount by the steps of interest to desire, and then by means of action to volition. Further, it contains the store upon which all the workings of prudence are founded—in it are the knowledge and care, without which man cannot pursue his aims through means. The whole inner activity, indeed, has its abode in the circle of thought. Here is found the initiative life, the primal energy; here all must circulate easily and freely, everything must be in its place ready to be found and used at any moment; nothing must lie in the way, and nothing like a heavy load impede useful activity. Clearness, association, system and method must rule here. Courage will then be sustained by the certainty of the *inner* performance, and rightly so, for the external impediments which unexpectedly appear to the foresight of a careful intelligence, can terrify him but little, who knows that, with altered circumstances, he can at once evolve new plans.¹

If this inner assurance of a sufficiently yet readily armed intelligence coexists with a mere egoistic interest, the character is soon determined, and certainly spoiled. Everything therefore that appertains to sympathy must be cultivated up to the level of demand and action.²

If, on the contrary, all the intellectual interests are awake and alive to these claims, it will easily happen that the means will not be sufficient for the many aims; the excessive activity does not attain much, possibly suffers depression; and the char-

¹ *Introd. to Science of Educ.*, p. 117.

² Demand and action, or *Fordern und Handeln*. See p. 130.

acter will remain stunted. These cases are rare, and assistance is not difficult.

If inner assurance and the intellectual interests are wanting, if the store of thought be meagre, then the ground lies empty for the animal desires; something of an abortion, which looks like the caricature of a character, will be at last the outcome of this also.

The limits of the circle of thought are the limits for the character, although not the limits of the character. For the whole circle of thought is not by any means realized in action. Nevertheless, the residue left to itself in the depths of the heart (*Gemüth*) is important for the tender parts of character. Circumstances can excite it; therefore instruction cannot by any means afford to neglect what it cannot perfectly carry out. It can at least help to determine the sensitiveness; it can increase and improve susceptibility for future impressions.

Thus far we have treated of the objective part of character. If false opinions, as imperfect presuppositions upon which it builds, are pernicious to it (the objective), all prejudices are far more damaging to the subjective—to the self-criticism and self-approval—which, as the first principle, holds fast to what is right, permissible, becoming, judicious. We scarcely know one great character whom we do not see entangled in his own prejudices. Doing violence to them means attacking the principles at their roots; it means sowing dissension between the subjective and objective; it means robbing a man of his unity with himself, and setting him at discord with himself. Those who adhere to old prejudices have truly good reason not to give themselves to new fancies; and, on the other hand, no greater sacrifice can be made for the truth, than by the acknowledgment of errors on which a personality supported itself. Such a sacrifice deserves great respect, but at the same time commiseration.

Whoever will continue for himself the reflections here begun, in which we may not wander too far, will with difficulty avoid the firm conviction, that in the culture of the circle of thought the main part of education lies.¹ But let him then compare

¹ Translators' Introduction, p. 37; *Introd. to Science*, p. 45.

the ordinary school rubbish and the circle of thought which is to be expected from it. Let him consider if it be wise to treat instruction again and again as a presentation of memoranda, and to leave to discipline alone the task of making men of those who bear the human form. Many, prematurely wearied with these considerations, will surely throw themselves upon the indolent bed of freedom, even if not on that of fate. To such I have *here* absolutely nothing to say. And if the bed of thorns upon which they throw themselves does not compel them to start up, then their peace will not be easily disturbed by mere disputation.

III.

Influence of Innate Disposition (Anlage) upon Character.

Innate disposition and opportunity are the powers which concur with the desires when they issue as activity. But before we consider them more closely, a remark may be offered in connection with the preceding, concerning the educational importance of the object of our further search. The faculties (Anlagen) develop themselves slowly, they do not ripen till manhood; and not till then does the proper opportunity for external action come, by which the inner activity first receives its proper tension. As, however, it is action which forms the character, only that which struggles inwardly towards action is essentially existent in the early years—the liquid substance, as it were, out of which the character will hereafter crystallize itself only too quickly. Just when the character thus finds and takes permanent form, consequently at the beginning of manhood upon entrance into the world, the important question is *what* dispositions and *what* opportunities concur with the previously accumulated desires? But *education is then finished, its time passed by, the receptivity for it exhausted*, and its work, we must acknowledge, is partly left to chance, against which only a perfectly balanced cultivation of the subjective and objective in the personality offers some degree of safety. For that very reason, almost the whole of the intended formation of character consists in the effect on the circle of thought, which the man

brings with him into the period when the world is all before him, and ripe bodily powers are at his service, although that effect influences but one factor of the character.

In regard, however, to the innate disposition, the most important difference does not consist, extraordinary cases excepted, in that to which the man shows inclination and facility, but rather in a formal peculiarity which varies in degrees with individuals — namely, whether the mind (*Gemüthslage*) can change its attitude with ease or difficulty. The slow-minded, provided they are clear-minded also, possess the most excellent innate disposition (*Anlage*), only they need very careful instruction. The quick-minded are easier to teach, indeed they help themselves to what they seek; but they require discipline even beyond the period of education, and are therefore exposed to chance, and hardly ever attain to so solid a personality as the former.

It is clear, then, that the primary requisite of character — memory of the will — stands in closest connection with the degree of the mind's mobility.¹ No kinds of men are more wanting in character than those who, according to their moods, look at the same thing now as black, now as white; or those who, to advance with the times, change their opinion according to fashion. Similar frivolousness is found in children, who ask one question after another without waiting for an answer, and have every day new games and playfellows; in youths, again, who learn a new instrument every month, and begin one language after another. Finally, this trait is found in young men, who listen to-day to half a dozen lecturers, to-morrow study by themselves, and the next day set out on their travels. These last are beyond discipline; the former it may still help; those, however, are most worth education, who cling to the known, and are disinclined for the new, merely as new; who keep cool towards everything which merely dazzles by its brilliancy, and live in their own world, hold, pursue, cultivate their own objects, are difficult to move from their track, and often appear stubborn and stupid without being either one or the other;

¹ Translators' Introduction, p. 38; *Introd. to Science*, p. 166.

who at first tolerate a teacher unwillingly, meet him coldly, and do not in the slightest degree ingratiate themselves with him. These individuals who most need education, who, when left to themselves, stick to one spot, who are condemned through their tenacity to a certain one-sidedness, and may even be inclined to the moral perversity of family pride, of tribal or caste spirit—it is in these that it is worth while to arouse interest of all kinds, who in their healthy will, after it is once won, afford education a sound footing.¹ For them the teacher may indeed hope they will loyally guard the purity and rectitude of their well-trained minds, when at last the final and most important steps in the formation of character are taken under conditions, not prepared by a guiding discipline, but brought about by the fluctuations of a stormy world. No one I hope will fear that such strong natures would oppose too strong a resistance to the pliant power of education. This will certainly be the case, if we meet them first *as youths*, and do not find many points of contact with them; but a *boy* who is stronger than a sound instruction, a consistently carried out government and a wise discipline,—such a boy is a monster.

The difference in the dispositions (*Anlagen*), which determines what the individual compasses with greater or less facility, must certainly be taken into consideration. For what is successful will be willingly undertaken and often repeated; and if it cannot become an aim, it can at least serve as a means. It works consequently as a force to forward other aims, and to strengthen the bent of the mind in that direction. Nevertheless that high degree of success of individual activities, which characterises a special genius, is in no way favourable to the formation of character. For genius depends too much on varying moods to permit of memory of the will; it is not at its own command. The moods of the artist do not constitute character. Besides, an artist's occupations lie always in far too remote a corner of human life and creation, to permit of the whole man

¹ This is one of the many instances of generalisations made by Herbart from his experience with his Swiss pupils. In this case he generalises from his favourite pupil, Karl von Steiger.

ruling himself therefrom. Yes, even in the whole realm of the sciences there is no single one which is capable by itself alone of carrying its devotee along the stream of life.

Only a universal genius, if such were possible, is to be desired. With special abnormities which Nature has allowed in the disposition, education ought never to make common cause, or the human being becomes disintegrated. Under the name of modest tastes, exquisite gifts may be cultivated in spare hours, and it may be seen to what point they can attain. Whether he ventures to choose his vocation accordingly is the individual's affair; the teacher may be at the same time adviser, but education does not work for the vocation in life.

The basis of all disposition is physical health. Sickly natures feel themselves dependent, robust ones dare to *will*. Therefore the care of health is essentially a part of the formation of character, though without belonging to the science of education, where even the first principles for that care are wanting.

IV.

Influence of the Mode of Life on Character.

The bad influence which an unsettled mode of life exercises on character, has been so repeatedly pointed out by teachers as well as others, that it only remains for me to wish they may be believed. I hope the most necessary precaution of excluding children from their elders' amusements will not be rebuked as pedantry, but, on the contrary, the evident benefit may be recognized which is rendered to children by those parents who carefully provide through their household arrangements for the strict regularity of daily life.

But I must not forget, that this regularity is sometimes so monotonously arranged, is so painfully strict, that the hampered energy of youth tries to get free play, and thus, even if the evil remain the smallest possible, the formation of character is at last diverted from the path of premeditated guidance, and is prompted to seek its own road. For it is all over with guidance, as soon as the pupil says to himself he wills other than his teacher.

We ought, in direct opposition to this, to try and give free play to youthful energy. Doubtless this can only be done well when the desires have been carefully guided from the beginning, and can be done best when these arise out of an evenly balanced interest. Obviously, however, the formation of character attains certainty of result, just in proportion as it is quickened and trained in the period of education. And this, according to the preceding, is only possible by making youths, even boys, active agents early. Those who grow up merely passive, as obedient children, have no character when they are released from supervision. They give themselves up to their hidden longings and to circumstances, now when no one has any longer power over them, or when any power, which can still perhaps be exercised, affects them in but a crooked manner, and must either drive them off at a tangent or crush them altogether. Unfortunately, every one can relate sad experiences enough of this kind.

One hears much of the value of a *hardening* mode of life for the young. I leave the question of physical hardening to stand upon its merits. I am, however, convinced that the proper *hardening* principle for man, who is not merely corporeal, will not be found until we learn how to arrange a mode of life for the young, whereby they can pursue, according to their own and indeed, their *right* mind, what in their own eyes is a *serious* activity. A certain *publicity* of life would contribute in no small degree to this. But the public activities customary up till now will not bear criticism; for in most cases they lack the first requisite of an activity which forms character. They do not proceed from the youth's own mind; they are not *the acts through which the inward desire determines itself as will*. Consider our examinations through all school classes, from the lowest up to the disputations for the doctor's degree. Add, if you like, the speeches and the theatrical exercises by which young people are sometimes made forward and smart. The art of appearance may gain by all this; but the future man, whom you guided through such exercises, will perhaps one day search in himself painfully, as vainly, for that power of self-manifestation and self-control on which character is based.

If I am asked what better exercises can be recommended in the place of these, I acknowledge that I have no reply. I do not believe that in our present world any important general arrangements can be made to enable the young to exercise activity suitably; but so much the more do I believe it is the duty of *individuals* to use all the advantages their position commands, that they may answer to the needs of those belonging to them. I believe that in consideration of this, fathers who allow their sons to take part betimes in family concerns will have done their character a service. For the rest, all this points back to the preceding principle, that the chief seat of the cultivation of character is the culture of the *circle of thought*. For, firstly, THOSE CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO ACT ACCORDING TO THEIR OWN MINDS WHO HAVE NO RIGHT DESIRES TO SET IN ACTION; they would only in so doing progress in badness, and wisdom in such cases consists much more in restraint. Secondly, if the circle of thought has been so perfectly cultivated, that a pure taste entirely rules *action in the imagination*, then anxiety for the formation of character in the midst of life is almost at an end, for the individual, left to himself, will so choose opportunities for external action, or so *use* those which force themselves upon him, that the right will only become strengthened within his heart.

V.

Influences which especially affect the Moral Features of Character.

Action throughout generates will from desire. It does so in the objective of the character, where it is most noticeable, that only when the individual's own action gives him either the indirect assurance, or the direct notion of his own power, does a confident "I will" result. It does so in the subjective, where the individual who not merely talks of principles, but really has them, metes out his decision over himself according to his opinion of himself, and this latter again according to his inward experiences. Consequently, that which seems too lofty for men, which they believe themselves incapable of maintaining, is relegated *only too generally* by men of firm character to

the region of pious wishes. Too generally, I say, for they ought not to judge of all by themselves. Finally, it does so in that part of morality where the true *will* resides, which, however, is only the moral resolution and self-restraint which exercises a controlling yet purifying influence over the coarse desires, so that strength of character, based on moral judgment and warmth, may be won and retained. Here also self-control is at first only an attempt; it must succeed, must make its power felt in inward experience, for, through this action alone, comes that energetic moral willing which gives the individual inward freedom. Whatever, therefore, assists self-control, tends to quicken and strengthen resolution. It is here that discipline has a great and noble task.

But the pure *positive* of morality, of which a man's innermost depth must be full, if resolution is to be kept safe from humiliation, if the noble feeling that *virtue is free*, is to be anything more than a brief ecstasy—this *primary* part of morality, which, as moral, is the opposite of arbitrariness, and which, as the basis of virtue, is a purely *volitionless* force, a force solely of the naked judgment, to which the desires bend amazed, even before resolution has made them feel its doubtful power—this belongs entirely to the circle of thought, it depends wholly upon what forms this circle. No one grows up amongst men without perceiving with his mental eye something of the peculiar æsthetic value of the various relations of will, which develop everywhere; but how diverse is the intension and sense of these perceptions, how varied the clearness of the distinctions, and the effect on the whole character. As means to a certain clearness and analysis, and to an encyclopædic acquaintance with the whole range of the elements of morality and with their most general motives in life, instruction of the better sort has for some time past provided a number of minor scenes, in which, with greater or less success, a story is represented at its supreme moment, which must commend itself to the moral consideration of the child's attention by the charm of its interest. The service our teachers have rendered thereby far exceeds, in my opinion, any deficiencies there may have been in the elementary representations. We have, moreover, a selection from a great num-

ber; and the *Campe Children's Library*¹ alone can supply many very valuable contributions for a future choice collection. But for morality, mere acquaintance with its elements is very little! It *remains* little, even if a whole course of exercises in moral acuteness, yes, even if a catechism of practical reason be added.² Clearness of judgment, however, does not constitute its weight. How far removed is clear insight in moments of conscious reflection from the feeling, which gives warning in the storm of passion that the personality is endangered. Moral strength, as is well known, is more often separated from moral subtlety than united with it.

Great moral energy is the result of broad views, and of whole unbroken masses of thought. He who has long kept before his eyes one and the same moral truth with its vivid contrasts, in its manifold reflections in the ebb and flow of its workings, in the main relations of life, in the family and the fatherland—he who has been engrossed in friendship, engrossed in religion, but yet without finding himself disappointed later on, and changing his views—or finally he who then with unbiassed mind comes in contact with a novel striking phenomenon of social disorder which reveals interesting characters suffering deeply—such an one we see step forth with heroic mind; we see him give help with thoroughness; we see him incautiously destroy; we see him persevering or desisting according as the whole personality, or only the surface, is penetrated by the impelling principle, according as the entire *Reflection* or only a stray *Concentration* rouses him into action. To attempt to replace the masses of thought active there, by a collection of many isolated moral points of contact is folly. Novels and dramas must be morally written to be pleasing to the right-feeling reader, but no particular efficacy can be expected from isolated exaltations upon which a sure

¹ Campe's *Little Children's Library* appeared between 1779–1805, and contains fables, moral tales, stories of ancient and modern times, and descriptions of foreign countries and peoples. Its contents are at the present time much read and appreciated by children.

² In his letters on the Freedom of the Will, Herbart remarks, “Years enough have passed away since Kant published his fragment of a moral catechism, but no educational miracle has happened.”

reaction follows. Their only use in education is as means of moral culture in those unhappy cases where knowledge of those moral elements must be acquired in later years,¹ which ought to have been supplied in the earliest reading, yes, even in the earliest conversations of the mother with her child.² The same applies to frequent moral exhortations and sermons, indeed even to individual religious services themselves, in so far as the primal ideas of religion have not sunk early into the depth of the mind. He who will exhort the pupil, must do so in such a way that gradually a permanent serious relationship may be built up between him and the boy, which, together with all its issues, borne upon the young man's moral sense as upon a floating foundation, will create an indestructible feeling of good or ill beyond and above all misgiving.

Suppose, then, there is really something great and deeply affecting in the life, the surroundings, and the destiny of a young man, which does not offend his moral sense, but warms and inspires; as soon as a single definite object presents itself to which his soul clings, he will take as it were a sort of one-sided bent, and confound the right and good generally with some special mode of its manifestation. A partiality, for example, will be developed resting upon weighty reasons, attracting him beforehand to many widely diverse men and principles, and alienating him from others. Or a species of religious culture will clothe him as it were in a uniform garb, so that the partisan of a sect, rather than the pure human being, will be at once seen in him. Every predilection will similarly colour his mind. Certain demands of right and morality will be burnt as it were for ever into his whole being, but will by their sharpness have destroyed in him the manifold budding of pure nature. Clear concentration (*Vertiefung*) in the new which may offer itself, will be lost amidst the fixed reflection (*Besinnung*) over previously formed convictions.

¹ *Note by Herbart.*—I assume as a matter of course the most careful selection from works of this class (moral).

² The imminent danger in such moral readings, etc., is that only what Herbart calls formal morality will be gained. For his definition of the term, see note, p. 95.

We seem here to be entangled in a contradiction. We require a large tranquil body of thought as a moral power in man, and yet if we would choose amongst all such that could possibly present themselves for the purpose, we should reject each with the objection that it gives us materialised and shrivelled up, what we require pure and entire. We want a power stronger than the idea, and yet pure as the idea. But how can the idea be replaced by a *real* power, which is not something individual, something limited and limiting?

I believe all cultured men of our day feel this difficulty. I do not mention it here in order to resolve it. Were that in my power it would have been done long ago. We have already spoken of the connection between manifold concentrations and simple reflection, or if you will between culture and inward life in relation to true many-sidedness. The entire arrangement of the circle of thought has been sketched in outline—a circle of thought which absorbs into itself whatever can affect the mind with a one-sided power,—which takes in, and where necessary brings nearer to sympathy, all that is required to spread out a wide and continuous plane of thought for such a broad survey as, rising of itself to universality, will unite purity of idea with the force of experience.

Unless an isolated part of our comprehensions is to come forward in the name of morality, and rule everywhere as its plenipotentary, the powers whose task it is to realise the ideal must indeed find a place in *every* part of our employment with human affairs. If the warm heart is to clasp a vast serene object, one not partial or limited and yet thoroughly real, then all the generations of men, past, present, and nearest to us in the future, must be made accessible as a conjoined whole to a continuous study—a study which will exercise the moral judgment and stimulate religious interest, without starving or even repressing the other æsthetic faculties or the powers of observation and speculation. In this acceptation I have in another place named “The æsthetic revelation”¹ of

¹ We use “revelation” in the strictly etymological sense of the word, namely, as an “unveiling” to others of something previously unknown to them.

the world as the chief work of education," and my reasons for so doing were deduced from the concept of morality.

Those among my contemporaries, who are free from the error of taking *ideas* as such, for *powers* which are founded in absolute freedom—and he who is not free from it should talk of anything rather than education—may perhaps at first reply, that I treat of things as new, which to them for a long time past have been self-understood. "What," they would say to me, "are our entire efforts for the spread of the humanities, but solicitude that the individual in contemplating himself, his race, and its whole relation to the rest of the world, may directly become conscious of the feeling at once warming and inspiring of which the formulæ of ethics are but the short expression? Long," it would be said, "have poetry and history and the philosophy of history recognized it as their vocation to effect with their united power this æsthetic and at the same time *moral revelation of the world!* Transcendental philosophy alone," they would continue, "might disturb past remedy the progress of these beneficent efforts, might in unhappy conjunction with political fraud give new pretexts and power of speech to violence and frivolity, the discord of which would sound above all beside, till even dull ears would feel disquiet and silence be commanded from all sides.¹ Then, however, all that is necessary is to take up again the threads already begun, and as all innovations only harm the progress of a work rightly started, we desire simply united labour, not *new* educational schemes."

Joint work with such men is in fact only practicable conditionally on the fact being clearly recognized, that by the mere exhibition of historical, philosophical and poetical representations (supposing that these representations can in all respects bear historical, philosophical and poetical criticism), nothing more is gained than *an occasional glance from the passers by*. It must also be recognized on the other hand that education has to do with a long, serious and deeply impressive

¹ The context shows that the teaching, not of Kant, but of Fichte and his disciples, is referred to here under the term Transcendental Philosophy.

method of employment, which places in the centre of the mind a weighty and interconnected (and also articulated)¹ body of knowledge, reflections, and opinions, having such influence and such points of contact with everything added to it by the flow of time, that nothing can pass by it unnoticed, no new thought establish itself, which has not first adjusted its differences with what has gone before. For the rest, as regards Transcendental Philosophy, it has certainly not shown its *beneficent influence*, though it has indeed *its superior power*, and we do not wish to conceal from ourselves that the cessation of its prejudicial influence can only be looked for in two ways—either by a general relaxation of our studies, or by those studies working themselves out completely and amending their own faults. What I would yet further add to the principles of instruction, already laid down, towards a more exact determination of the conception of the world, which I wish prepared for by education, can only be accomplished by a philosophy, which certainly must be termed transcendental rather than popular, although, in the series of the newest systems of our time, it finds nothing to which it can attach itself.

One more important educational point remains, which must here be noticed. We know that moral warmth once won is easily chilled by the course of events, and by knowledge of the world. Worthy teachers have therefore experienced the necessity of a special preparation for entrance into the world, in which they assume the well-brought-up youth will meet with many quite unexpected phenomena, and be very often obliged, with trouble and pain, to retire into himself out of his customary natural and affable openness and trust. The basis of this presumption is not so much that the youth will be rash, as that the good training itself will have kept everything at a distance which could have shocked his moral sense. Early

¹ *Note by Herbart.*—The expression *articulated body* seems contradictory. But the proof of a perfect instruction is exactly this—that the sum of knowledge and concepts which it has raised by clearness, association, system, and method to the highest suppleness of thought, is at the same time capable as a mass of interest of impelling the will with the utmost energy, by virtue of the complete inter-penetration of all its parts. Because this is wanting, culture is so often the grave of character.

knowledge of men—it will have none of it! In my eyes an educational weakness betrays itself here. However extreme the necessity may be that a youth should never become *familiar* with the bad, protection of moral feeling need not be carried so far (at least not continued so long) as to make youths amazed at men as they are. Bad company is certainly infectious, and almost as much so is a pleasing lingering of the imagination on attractive representations of the bad. But to have known men in early life, in all their many varieties, ensures an early exercise of moral judgment, as well as a valuable security against dangerous surprises. And vivid representations of those that *were*, give doubtless the readiest preparation for the observation of those that *are*, only the past must be sufficiently illuminated, so that its men may appear men like ourselves, and not beings of another species. It will be seen to what I refer. Here I break off, hoping that in treating of a system of education I shall be easily forgiven if I introduce, in the place where the title only announces *the natural course of the formation of character*, such educational remarks as suggest themselves.

CHAPTER V.

DISCIPLINE.¹

FROM Discipline (Zucht), from drawing (Ziehen), the term education (Erziehung) is derived; the chief part thus of education in conformity with the name, is usually assigned to that which I only now begin to take into consideration towards the end of my treatise.

Education proper is usually contrasted with instruction; I have contrasted it with the government of children. Why this deviation?

The concept of instruction has one conspicuous mark which will afford the simplest starting-point for our course. In instruction there is always a *third* something with which

¹ For our use of the term discipline as an equivalent to Zucht, see note 1, *Introd. to Science*, p. 156.

teacher and pupil are at the same time occupied. In every other function of education, on the contrary, the pupil is *immediately* in the teacher's mind, as the being upon whom he has to work, and who must maintain a passive attitude towards him. Thus what causes the teacher's *labour*—on the one hand the knowledge to be imparted, on the other the restless boy—supplies the basis of division between instruction and education proper. Government then must certainly itself hide unnoticed within this education proper, for it cannot surely be considered to belong to instruction. And thus what is intended to keep order, inevitably becomes the principle of great *disorder* in the sphere of education.

A somewhat closer consideration of the aim of education reveals the fact, that the motive of our whole attitude towards children is not entirely consideration *for them only*—for the *improvement of their mental condition*. We restrain them that they may not be troublesome; we protect because we love them, and this love is meant primarily for the living being in whom the parents find their joy; and then *after all this* comes a voluntary solicitude for the right development of a future reasonable being. Now since this last-mentioned solicitude doubtless implies for itself a special sphere of activity, (quite distinct from all that belongs to the care and protection of the animal being, to accustoming it to the conditions under which it will be allowed to continue to live in society, for the child's will must be cultured for the one, and for the other it must be bent until culture take the place of bending) let us hope there will be no hesitation in abandoning at last the detrimental confusion of discipline with government. We must remember, that when all goes well, government, which is at first in the ascendance, must disappear sooner than discipline; we should learn to feel that it will be most prejudicial to discipline when the teacher, as so often happens, becomes so accustomed to governing, that he cannot understand why this same act which served him well with little children continually fails of its effect with elder ones. He then fancies it is only necessary to govern the more advanced pupil in a cleverer manner; finally, seeing he mistook the whole nature of his

task, he accuses the young man of ingratitude, and perseveres in his own perversity, till he has produced a strained relationship which continues intolerable and irremediable during the whole future. A similar though lesser evil arises, when discipline (which in its turn must cease before instruction) is continued beyond the proper time; an error which is only pardonable, when a very reserved nature conceals the signs by which the moment of its legitimate cessation may be recognized.

It will be easy now to define the concept of discipline. It has in common with the government of children the property that it works directly on the mind, with instruction; that its aim is culture. We must only be careful not to confound it with government when both use the same measures. In the mode of use there are finer distinctions, which I will determine in their order.

I.

Relation of Discipline to Formation of Character.

Direct action on the youthful mind with a view to form, is discipline. It appears then there is a possibility of forming by merely acting on the feelings without reference to the circle of thought. It might indeed appear to be so, if we were wont to give to concepts logically put together out of properties, the credit of reality, without further search.

But it will appear quite otherwise if we interrogate experience. At least, whoever has noticed into what an abyss of pain and misfortune a human being may fall, yes even remain in it for long periods, and yet, after the time of trouble has passed, rise up again apparently almost unchanged the same person, with the same aims and opinion, even the same manner—whoever we say has noticed this, will hardly expect much from that swaying of the feelings, by which mothers especially so often believe they are educating their children.¹ Besides,

¹ Herbart enlarges on this principle in the *Aph. zur Pädagogik*, bk. 11, p. 475, where he says, "Never ought the teacher to hope anything from

when we see what degrees of paternal strictness a robust youth will endure, and remain untouched, what incentives are wasted on weak natures without making them stronger, how temporary is the whole reaction which follows the action, we may well advise the educator not to prepare for himself false relations, which are usually the only residue of *mere* discipline!

To me all these experiences are but confirmations of an extremely simple psychological conviction, namely, that all feelings¹ are but passing modifications of the existing presentations, and then when the modifying cause ceases, the circle of thought must return by itself to its old equilibrium. The only result I should expect from mere stimulation of the emotions, would be a fatal blunting of the finer feelings, the place of which would be taken by an artificial knowing sensibility which in the course of years would but foster pretence with all its troublesome offshoots.

The case is indeed entirely different, when *the circle of thought receives additions as opportunity offers*, or when *endeavours pass into action and thereby become will*. These conditions must be taken into account in order to interpret experience correctly!

At this point, we can judge what discipline may be to education. All *changes* of feeling the pupil must suffer, are only necessary transitions to determinations of the circle of thought, or of character. And thus the relation of discipline to formation of character is twofold—indirect and direct. It partly helps to make that instruction possible, which will influence the subsequent formation of the character of the future independent man, is partly a means even now to create, or not to create, through action or inaction, as the case may be, a beginning of character.² It is impossible to instruct an

mere agitation. It would be a misfortune were a wild schoolboy, chastized one hour for his pranks, not to be up to similar ones the next—a misfortune if his will were so weak and wavering. For then everything accomplished by education would yield in the same easy manner to external circumstances and their impressions. Obstinacy is to be welcomed, for it can be bent. It is only selfishness and malevolence which should not be tolerated."

¹ The distinction Herbart makes between sensations and feelings has been already noticed. Here, as on p. 84, he seems to be contending against the doctrine of Rousseau, that virtue was an affair of the heart. According to Herbart, discipline, working upon the feelings, the heart, is not enough to form a virtuous character.

be, a beginning of character.¹ It is impossible to instruct an taken in a certain way as indications of his future personality, though, as every one knows, with considerable limitations. An unruly boy acts mostly from fleeting fancies; doubtless he learns thereby what he can do, but the first element necessary to fix the will is here wanting—a firm, deeply-rooted desire. Only where this forms the basis, do boyish tricks help to determine character. The *first* relation of discipline to the formation of character is thus the more important—that, namely, which clears the way for such instruction as will penetrate the thoughts, interests, and desires. Still the second ought not to be neglected, least of all in subjects who are less mobile and act with firmer purpose. The concept of discipline formulated in the beginning is, taken merely in itself, completely empty. The mere intention to form cannot enter into, or directly act on the mind in such a way as to become a power really able to form. Those who by means of such an *empty discipline show their good intentions*, work, they know not how, on gentle natures through the spectacle they themselves present; their tender, anxious, urgent manner gives the observant boy the idea of the great importance of the thing, which an otherwise honoured person has so much at heart! Such teachers then need only be careful not to mar this spectacle in other ways, not to stifle respect by passion or pettiness, or, even a worse thing, lay themselves open to the criticism, often as true as it is sharp, of the child. Thus they will be able to accomplish much for impressionable natures, without however being for that reason safe from committing greater errors with less willing ones.

¹ "We discriminate between *direct* and *indirect* discipline. The latter is the more important, since it works on the circle of thought, predisposing that circle to adopt certain interests, and thereby co-operating in the determination of character."—*Aph. zur Pädagogik*, bk. 11, p. 477.

II.

Measures of Discipline.

Discipline occasions feelings or prevents them. Those it occasions are either feelings of inclination (Lust) or disinclination (Unlust).¹ Those it prevents are avoided either through removal of the object which can excite them, or in such a way that the object is treated indifferently—either tolerated or dispensed with.

In the case where an object is avoided, whether it be that the object is kept out of the sphere of the pupil, or the pupil out of that of the object, the pupil experiences as a rule absolutely nothing; he at least does not *feel* this measure *directly*.

Indifferent sufferance we term *Habituation*; indifferent relinquishment of that to which we are habituated takes place through *disuse*.

Inclination is caused by *incitement*. Not exactly that *every* incitement is felt as attractive, but discipline awakens every inclination for the sake of a result; its object is to call out activity in the pupil, and to this extent it *incites*.

Disinclination is produced by *constraint*, which in so far as any sort of rebellion, even if inward only, be opposed to it, is *compulsion*.

A definite act of incitement or of constraint, which is motivated by a definite cause given by the pupil, and which will be looked upon as an answer thereto, we term *reward* or *punishment*.

In considering constraint, compulsion, punishment,² some finer differences require notice, primarily on account of the measures of government, which here seem to be merged in those of discipline.

When government has once had recourse to constraints, it intends only to be felt as power. Assuming then from the preceding, that according to the determination of the aims of government, the cases where government must be exercised can

¹ That is inclination bordering on pleasure, and disinclination bordering on pain. ² *Introd. to Science*, p. 158.

also be recognized, the following rule is valid, namely, that in these cases constraint must be used in such a manner, that it employs nothing but what is necessary for the accomplishment of its aim; the educator must be cool, concise and dry, and appear to have forgotten all as soon as the matter is over. Some important conclusions regarding the degrees of punishment follow from a comparison of the house with the State. Principles are wanting here,¹ but what I assume I will try to explain as briefly as possible. There is a distinction between offences *per se*, and offences against the police of the house. Offences *per se*, where an evil intention becomes deed (*dolus*²) and where damage ensues through carelessness, where carefulness was understood as a matter of course (partly *culpa*), may be punished, without questioning whether there was knowledge of previously given regulations. The degree of culpability in this has then to be taken into consideration; *government* only takes into account the results of actions, later on *discipline* must look to *unexecuted intentions*. Where an intention ought to exist, and does not, as in cases of carelessness, the punishment is usually milder, proportionally milder the less it can be proved that the intention might have been expected. The house police must be made known and kept in remembrance by regulations. Its punishments may be severer according to the relative importance of the matter, but here especially the teacher must guard against intermingling with such punishments anything of that personal influence acting on the mind, which ought to remain in reserve for measures of discipline alone. The gradation of punishment is most difficult even for the State, it is still more so in the house, where everything is contracted into so small a compass. But all depends mainly on the *tone* of the government; through

¹ Discipline often does everything in the hands of intelligent parents. Discipline often spoils everything in public institutions. Why? With the former it represents *order*, with the latter *arbitrariness*. *Aph. zur Pädagogik*, bk. 11, p. 479.

² By *culpa* penal justice understands every act of commission or omission which is objectively unlawful or subjectively imputable; by *dolus*, every act intentionally done with the consciousness of unlawfulness. It is obvious *dolus* implies genuine malevolence of will, *culpa* only weakness of will; therefore the former is much more punishable than the latter.

this the boy must feel he has to act and will be treated, not as a pupil, but as a human being in society; through this he must be prepared for future social life. To this extent a definite government of children is at the same time a part of instruction.¹

Entirely different is the tone of discipline—not short and sharp, but continuous, persevering, slowly penetrating, and only ceasing by degrees. For discipline is to be felt as a *forming* principle. What is felt, certainly does not constitute the essence of its forming power; but it cannot conceal the purpose of forming. And even if it could, it must present that purpose, merely to be enduring. Who would not resist, or at least inwardly resent, treatment under which cheerfulness so often suffers, and out of which a constant feeling of dependence arises, were no sort of strengthening and elevating principle to be inferred as underlying it? Discipline must not affect the mind crookedly, must not be felt as acting against its aims; the pupil must on no account be in inward opposition to it, and go off at a diagonal as if driven by two opposing forces. But whence can a genuine open susceptibility be forthcoming if not from child-like faith in the teacher's beneficent purpose and power? And how can frigid, repellent, distant behaviour create this belief? On the contrary, discipline finds room only so far as an inward experience persuades its subjects to submit to it willingly. Whether it be emotions of taste, recognition of just censure, or feelings of pleasure and pain about a success or failure, the power of discipline only reaches as far as the pupil's assent meets it. And the teacher must only wish to extend his activity in proportion as he obtains this assent—in proportion as he succeeds. In early years, the fact that discipline is a milder substitute for government, to which latter the child submits because it must, comes to the teacher's aid. At a later stage it is different. A young man who governs himself feels in discipline its *importunate claim* to mould him. And if the teacher does not know how to make an end of discipline at this point,

¹ "This thought was expressed in book 1, page 86, only what is there called Discipline ought rather to have been termed Government. I could not make use of my technical terms in the Introduction."—*Note by Herbart.*

gradual efforts to throw off the influence will become apparent. These will be easily successful, for courage grows quickly, restraint disappears, the painfulness of a relationship increases, which, without heavy counterweights of confidence, of respect, and above all an inward feeling on the part of the pupil of his own need, will of itself soon bring about its retarded dissolution.

Let us now seize the core of the matter. Discipline is properly not so much a conjunction of many measures, of wholly separate acts, as a *continuous treatment*, which only now and then for the sake of emphasis resorts to rewards and punishments and similar expedients. The governed and the governor, the teacher and the taught, are persons who live with, and inevitably affect, each other agreeably or disagreeably. Do we not, when we approach an acquaintance, always enter into some definite atmosphere of feelings? What atmosphere? This ought not, as regards education, to depend on chance; but constant care is necessary in the first place to weaken the effect of this atmosphere, if there is danger that it may become hurtful,¹ and in the second to strengthen its beneficial influences to that degree which the formation of character—whether the direct, or indirect through the medium of the circle of thought—requires for its security.

It is obvious that the art of discipline is primarily but a modification of the art of intercourse with men, and therefore social tact is a valuable gift in the teacher. The essence of its *modification* here is, that on it depends the maintenance of a superiority over *children* in such a way as to make a moulding power felt, which thus animates even when it constrains, but where it directly encourages and attracts, follows *there* and there only its natural direction.

Discipline does not acquire its full momentum till after it has found an opportunity of showing to the pupil his better

¹ For instance, teacher and pupil ought not to be compelled to be constantly together in one room. A special room for himself is of all stipulations the most important to the tutor. Parents who know their own interest will offer it spontaneously to prevent the inevitable feeling of mutual oppression.—*Note by Herbert.*

self, by means of an *approbation* (not exactly praise) powerfully affecting him. For reproof falls on receptive ears only when it has ceased to stand alone as a minus quantity; it must only threaten to cancel in part the approbation already won, for those alone feel the stress of inward reproaches, who have attained to self-respect, and fear to lose something of it. Any other pupil accepts himself as he is, and he who is *blamed only*, will be indignant if the teacher will not take him as he is. Where mere blame has any effect, self-respect has already been at work. The teacher will do well to seek for it, but not blindly to depend on it. And it is not enough that this self-respect should be present to a small extent; it must reach such a degree that blame can lay hold of it. But, it may be urged, we can only give approbation where it is deserved. However true this may be, it is also true that next to the question of the possibility of forming the circle of thought, the one most important in generally determining the possibility of education is, whether special features of character already exist which are worthy to win the teacher's heart? At least the individuality must spontaneously show some sense of good feeling on which the teacher can fasten to elevate it. And where, to begin with, he can fasten but on little, he must "make haste slowly," for discipline will have power only to kindle one spark at a time from another, and he must therefore be content for a while, with little to gain little, till gradually, if the work proceeds undisturbed, the store will be enlarged, and be sufficient to meet the problems of education.

To give joy by deserved approbation is the fine art of discipline. That art can be but rarely learned; it is more easily discovered by those whose minds are attuned to love it heartily.

There is likewise a sad art—that of unerringly wounding the spirit of a child; which art, however, we must not despise. It is often indispensable, when simple speech falls on a deaf ear. But gentle feeling, enjoining forbearance and at the same time extenuation, must rule it throughout; this is all that art requires to avoid imperious severity.¹

¹ Compare the following from *Aphor. zur Pädagogik*. "The natural

Just as a singer practises to discover the compass and finest gradations of his voice, the teacher must in thought practise going up and down the scale of treatment. This he must do, not with any idea of pleasure to himself, but that he may banish with sharp self-criticism every dissonance, attain the necessary certainty in producing every note, the requisite flexibility for all turns, and the indispensable knowledge of the limits of his organ. He has good reason for timidity during the early months, whenever he is obliged to use any tone going beyond that usual to civil intercourse; he has every reason to observe himself and his pupil most critically. This observation must indeed remain the constant corrective of his rapidly growing habits, all the more so, *because the pupil changes as time goes on*. If the same reminder be necessary time after time, it must not be given twice in the same manner, or, just because it was efficacious in the first instance, it will have lost its effect in the second. All monotony, everything insipid, must be as rigorously banished from discipline, as from a good book or speech. Only when such carefulness exists in conjunction with a certain inventive power, is there hope that the teacher will attain the force he requires. For the extent of discipline must appear illimitable to the pupil, and its influence to have nothing comparable with it in value. It must so surround his whole activity as a constant coherent element, that the thought, he can escape it, may not even occur to him. It must be ever ready to make itself felt; but it also, if

goodness which we find existent in the pupil must stand in the forefront of education as of the highest importance. Without it education is impossible, for it has no point of departure and therefore no possibility of progress. We ought first to recognize, and secondly to make the existent good valuable in the eyes of the pupil himself, show him his better separated from his worse self, and so bring forth in him himself the disharmony; without doing so he can never approach to virtue. We must set him at variance with himself, for he must educate himself. . . . We must arouse approval that he may have a standard for judgment; on the degree of importance he attaches to just approbation depends the force of reproof. The teacher, therefore, must pass outside his own individuality, recognize what deserves recognition, not estimate anything beyond its value, nor blame too severely what appears to him strange and paradoxical in the pupil. He must possess the power of appreciating with his whole soul, and must understand the art of expressing approbation without praise. Praise is mostly poisonous to the young, making them proud and regardful of words rather than of love. Merit marks and similar things are entirely harmful."

really capable of something, must constantly and carefully keep watch over itself, so that it may not through over-hastiness inflict needless pain on the pupil. A boy of gentle disposition may suffer deeply, may suffer in secret, and bury in his heart suffering which will still be felt in the years of manhood.

To bear the full effect of a perfect discipline, the pupil must have perfect health. But little training is possible, when ill health has to be considered; a healthily-ordered life therefore must be alike the basis and the first preparation for education.¹

But if all is as it should be on both sides—if the purest susceptibility is there to meet duly proportioned discipline—all will pass away like music, and no lasting effect will remain, unless the stones are raised to the sound of that music into the walls of a well-defined circle of thought, wherewith to provide for the character a safe and a happy dwelling-place.

III.

Employment of Discipline in General.

(1) *Co-operation of Discipline in the formation of the circle of thought.*

The whole tone, much more than the hours of study, is influenced by this co-operation. To maintain quiet and order in the lessons, to banish every trace of disrespect to the teacher, is the work of government. But attention, lively comprehension, is something more than quiet and order. Children may be mechanically trained to sit perfectly still while they do not take in a word! Much must combine to produce attention. Instruction must be comprehensible, and yet difficult rather than easy, otherwise it causes *ennui*. It must continuously maintain the same interest—of which we have spoken previously. But the pupil must also come with the right frame of mind, it must be habitual to him. This is the business of discipline. The whole mode of life must be free from disturbing influences; no interest preponderating for the moment must absorb the mind.

¹ Compare with this the last paragraph of Chapter iv. 3.

This is certainly neither always nor entirely in the teacher's power, indeed the fruit of his work may be entirely destroyed by a single accident, which may carry away the pupil's thoughts. It is more in his power to impress on him strongly how much depends on the closest attention, in such a manner that the boy will no longer pardon himself for not appearing entirely collected at the lessons. He who has achieved this may grieve, when, notwithstanding his efforts, some overmastering influence distracts the hardly-won interest; yet he will yield, he will follow and sympathetically keep the pupil company, for he cannot commit a graver error than to sever the relation by premature prohibition. In spite of such wanderings, the pupil returns from distractions small or great, with the characteristics of his previously ordered thought. He recollects the old, the teacher can re-tie the thread, he interweaves the new; moments may be chosen to analyse it. Only the same flexibility, willingness, openness, must always be continuously created anew, for all direct action of discipline is transitory.

If the pupil has already reached the point where he can pursue his *right* way independently, then he needs much rest! Then is the time for gradually dropping all the claims of discipline, and for the teacher to confine himself to sympathetic, friendly, trustful observation. The sole aim of advice must be to induce the individual to consider the matter himself. Nothing at this point is more beneficial, nor will be more thankfully received by the pupil, than friendly endeavours to ward off all unseasonable interruptions, that the inner man may as soon as possible become clear and composed.

(2) *Formation of Character by Discipline.*

How ought egoistic ¹ action to be *limited* and *encouraged*?

It is assumed here, that government has already checked all misbehaviour, which, besides its direct outward consequences, would develop coarse traits of dishonesty and the like in the mind of the boy himself.

Above all things, however, it must not be forgotten, that

¹ *Self* action, not *selfish* action is here meant.

to the action of men belongs not merely what meets the eye, but also inward achievement, and that only the two united can lay the foundation of character. The great activity of healthy children, which their need of movement expresses, the constant stratagems of inconstant natures, even the coarse pleasures of those who give indications of a wild manliness—all these apparent signs of future character do not reveal to the teacher so much as a single silent, well-weighed, compassed act of a settled mind, or as the single steadily maintained defiance of an otherwise docile child. And here therefore much reflection must be united with observation. Firmness, properly speaking, never exists in children; they cannot resist the *variation of the circle of thought* which is borne in on them from so many sides—among others it is to be hoped from the side of the teacher. But *where* an action of a child shows decided inclination, armed by deliberation, *discipline* can effect hardly anything, unless we reckon it something firstly, that after opportunities have been cut off, capability can no longer be produced by exercise, in which case we need only take care to cut the opportunities entirely off; and secondly, that the teacher must acknowledge he can only restrain the imagination by lively and attractive occupations of another kind, which again comes under the head of influence upon the circle of thought. Let *this* be taken to heart, when any kind of ingrained perversity is to be exterminated, and discipline must mainly be used to that end. But in such cases desist totally from severe punishments. Such are suitable when an isolated new inclination breaks out thoughtlessly as a fault for the first or second time, which, without fear, would be repeated, and engrave a wrong trait on the character. Discipline in such cases must interfere immediately and decidedly. Thus the *first* self-interested lie can hardly be too severely punished, hardly warned against too often by repeated admonitions gradually becoming gentler, hardly be made too hateful by pain penetrating deeply to the innermost soul. Such treatment would make, on the other hand, the deliberate liar even more deceitful and insidious. The false relation in which he places himself ought gradually to close around him with increasing pressure; this alone however, is no good—

the whole mind must be raised, the possibility of winning for himself respect, which is incompatible with lying, must be made perceptible and valuable to him. But can any one accomplish this, who does not possess the art of affecting the circle of thought from all sides? or do you think a few isolated speeches and admonitions will effect it?

External activity, without strong steady inclination and deliberation, wherein more physical than mental disposition is conspicuous, lays no foundation of character; on the contrary, it hinders the growth of firmness of character. It may be suffered as an expression of joyousness and an aid to health and agility, indeed it gives the teacher time to *prepare everything* for the determination of character which steps in later, and it is to that extent advantageous. On the other hand it is not desirable, because a later formation of character might possibly be delayed till after the period of education. Accordingly, if the formation of the circle of thought has been retarded, or if it must be essentially corrected, nothing will be more welcome than the continued vacillation of youthful desires; if, on the other hand, the existing circle of thought gives hopes of a right formation of character, then it is the time, be the age what it may, to unite an earnest activity with it, that the individuality may soon fix itself. For him who has been too early stimulated in any great degree to activity, education is a thing of the past, or it can at any rate only be re-commenced with many drawbacks and partial results. But above all, external activity must never be so much over-stimulated that mental respiration—alternation of acts of concentration and reflection—is disturbed thereby. There are natures with whom, from their earliest years, the teacher's principle must be to keep within due limits all external incitements to their activity. They would otherwise never arrive at depth, good conduct, worth; they would never have room in the world; they would spoil things merely for the sake of having something to do, they would be feared, and, when possible, repulsed. With those, who in early life give themselves up exclusively and passionately to an unintellectual occupation, it certainly may be taken for granted, they are, and will remain empty heads, and will become all the more unbear-

able because not even *the one* interest which at present gives them life, will last in like strength and protect them from *ennui*.

After these remarks, we must consider the distinctions pointed out a short time ago in the objective as well as in the subjective part of character.

In the first place, the disposition (*Anlage*) must in regard to the *memory of willing* be completed by discipline. It will be remembered, that a simple uniform mode of life, the absence of all disturbing change, contributes to this. But how far the teacher's treatment may specially help to achieve this, will be most easily understood, if we realize how different is the impression we receive from living with persons of firm or of changeable mind.¹ With the latter, relations are always variable; we require double the force to maintain our own consistency with them, that we need with those who imperceptibly imbue us with their own steadfastness, and smooth our path by always maintaining the same relation. In education, however, it is a matter of paramount difficulty always to show the same face to children under the same circumstances, for there are innumerable things by which we are moved, but which they can as little understand as experience. And where a number of children are together, the very work of education affects them so much and so variously, that special care is required to give back to each child the tone of mind he aroused, and not to confuse the various tones of treatment, and falsify by mingling them with each other. Here the teacher's natural disposition comes into play, and with it his experience gained from intercourse with men. Where the latter is wanting, and the former influences unfavourably, the failure of discipline may then often arise solely from the fact, that the teacher does not know how to master himself sufficiently to appear *equable*, so that those entrusted to him grow puzzled, and give up the hope of being able to please him. The latter condition is the extreme opposite of the first essential of a character-forming discipline. For thereby so much of memory of willing as was self-existent, will be diminished precisely to the extent that discipline is successful, and character will be driven to build itself up in some hidden depth. A discipline that supports (by this predicate I indicate

¹ *Introd. to Science of Educ.*, p. 172.

the legitimate co-operation with the memory of the willing) will be most successful with those who by nature are equably-minded.

Those, however, who pride themselves on this advantage, must guard against the absence of a second qualification. Discipline ought also to *act determinately*, that choice may be made. And to this end a mobile mind is necessary, which knows how to answer always to the movements of the youthful soul. More even depends on the concentration of the teacher's mind than on his disposition (*Anlage*); that mind must be so completely given up to the work of education, that he himself, influenced in a great measure by the pupil, will again influence him by a natural reflex influence. He must enter into all the boy's innocent wishes, into what is in some degree based on his opinions and views; he must not wish prematurely to correct sharply anything that may serve him as a point of contact, for we must certainly be completely in touch with those we desire to influence. However, this can be better carried out in action than by the pen. To write about the second point of determining discipline is easier; it must multiply impressively enough the natural determining feelings around the boy, it must encompass him with the *consequences* of every mode of action and thought. That which goes to make up choice must not dazzle the pupil by any deceptive glitter; passing pleasantnesses or troubles must not act as snares to attract or terrify; *the true worth of things must be felt early enough*. Among educational arrangements to secure this, the punishments proper to education are conspicuous, which are not bound to a proportioned retribution as are the punishments of government, but must be so meted out, that they always appear to the individual as well-meant warnings, and do not excite lasting opposition to the teacher. The pupil's way of feeling will here decide everything.

Regarding the quality of the punishments, the difference between those of education and of government is at once apparent of itself. While the latter merely renders the deserved *quantum* of good or ill, no matter in what way, the former, on the other hand, avoids the positive and the arbitrary as much as possible,

and has to lay hold where it can, solely of the natural consequences of human action. For it (the punishment of education) should early determine the pupil's mind in such a way as he, with riper experience, and perhaps with wits sharpened through suffering, would himself afterwards determine. Moreover, the choice which it causes may be a passing one, or later on become uncertain. Educational rewards are to be arranged on these principles; but they will have little effect unless a complete system of treatment lies at the basis, to which they can give force. But enough of a subject which has already occupied teachers so much.¹

The subjective of the character rests, as already shown, on the individual expression of self in *principles*. Discipline co-operates with it as a regulating procedure. Added to this, the pupil's choice is supposed to have been already made, and should not be further unsettled; all perceptible interference and encroachment must cease. The pupil acts by himself, the teacher will only measure him by the scale which the pupil himself puts into his hand. His treatment makes the pupil feel that it does not understand, does not know how to requite, inconsequent action, that intercourse will be suspended in consequence, and that the only thing to do is to wait till the young man is pleased to return to his wonted course. Many who desire to be men betimes, require to have their attention called to the unripeness and prematureness of the principles they have picked up. This can rarely be done directly, for those whose firmness is open to suspicion are only too easily offended. As occasion offers, the youthful logic-chopper must be caught in his own trap, or allowed to meet with a rebuff in his intercourse with the outer world. It is easy at the right moment to lead the confused youth back to modesty, and to

¹ "Let the teacher attempt nothing by reward and punishment which will not raise and enhance his personal worth in the eyes of the pupil. If he does not possess this personal affection and esteem, his means will be of little use, he will effect nothing. All single acts of discipline depend on the relation of the whole of education which the teacher has already given the pupil, for all admonitions and warnings call to memory only what is already known. Single disciplinary acts as single are worthless, and determine nothing."—*Aphor. zur Pädagogik*.

let him see the next steps of culture. The more successfully such presumptuous principles are relegated to the rank of mere preliminary exercises in self-determination, the more clearly will the individual's true opinions come out as maxims,¹ and the true objective of the character will be strengthened through the corresponding subjective. But at this point there is a rock ahead, on which an otherwise right education may easily be wrecked. Those principles which really come up from the mind's depth, will not bear the same treatment as the maxims of mere argument. If the teacher but *once* treats slightly what is really a serious matter to the pupil, the consequences may cost him long labour. He may throw light upon it, may blame it, but must never despise it, as if it were mere words. Yet this may happen as the result of a natural error. Verbose young people, who are at that period when they struggle for expression, often use such expression as the language of their truest feelings, and thus unwittingly invite a criticism on themselves which often inflicts the sorest wrong.

The *conflict* in which the principles are trying to assert themselves should be *aided* by discipline, provided they deserve it. In this, two points are of primary importance—accurate knowledge of the pupil's condition of mind, and authority. For it is the inward authority of the pupil's own principles, which must be strengthened and supplemented by an authority exactly analogous from without. According to these considerations the teacher's conduct will be guided. Careful observation of the pupil engaged in the struggle must come first; quiet, firm, carefully persevering earnestness must seek to perfect it.

The consideration of moral culture introduces into all this many modifications. Far from memory of the will being always desirable, the art of discipline consists much rather in putting to shame and confusion bad endeavours, and in hushing them into forgetfulness, by means of everything which employs the mind in other and opposite directions. The choice ought not to be determined so entirely in the light of the deeply impressed consequences of the act, that the worth of the *good*

¹ See Note 1, p. 202.

will,¹ considered apart from consequences, becomes obscured thereby. The objective of the character must first go forth to meet the moral criticism, before we can further its elevation into principles, or help its assertion through conflict.

In early years, when instruction and environment invite the boy to the first moral apprehensions, the moments when the mind appears to be occupied with them must be observed and left undisturbed. The frame of mind must be kept *calm* and *clear*; this is the first aid discipline should give here. It has been often said, and cannot in a certain point of view be too often repeated, that the childlike mind of children ought to be preserved. But what is it that ruins this childlike mind, this unconscious look straight into the world, which seeks nothing, and for that very reason sees what is to be seen? Everything ruins it which tends to destroy the natural forgetfulness of self. The healthy person is not conscious of his body; in just this sense the untroubled child ought not to feel his existence, that he may not make that existence the measure of the importance of that which is outside him. Then, it is to be hoped, the clear perception of moral right and wrong will be amongst the observations he makes; in the same way and as he looks at others in this respect, he will look at himself; as the particular falls under the general, so will he find himself thrown under his own censorship. This is the natural beginning of moral culture, weak and uncertain in itself, but to be strengthened by instruction. But it will be interfered with by every strong and lasting stimulus that gives prominence to the *feeling of self*, and thus makes the individual self the point of reference for the world outside it.² Either joy or pain may be such a stimulus. The latter occurs in disease and sickness, even in merely very excitable temperaments, and teachers have long known that moral development suffers under it. The same result will follow upon harsh treatment, exaggerated teasing, or neglect of that care which is due to the needs of children. In contrast

¹ See translators' Introduction, p. 24.

² The *theoretical* comprehension of the individual self—the knowledge of self—need not therefore be feared; it will but show that the individual is as small as he really is, in the midst of things.—*Note by Herbert.*

with this we rightly advise the gratification of the natural joyfulness of children. With equal reason again, education discourages everything which stimulates prominence of the individual self through feelings of pleasure; everything, that is, which satisfies the desires without a use, which encourages the premature development of wishes that belong to later years, everything which fosters conceit and selfishness. On the contrary, children, boys and youths must be accustomed to bear the reproof suitable to, and called forth by each age, so long as it is just and comprehensible. It is a cardinal point of discipline to be careful that the general tone of environment, like public opinion, permits the expression of reproof to be rightly heard, without making it repugnant by mortifying additions. That this voice is understood and corroborated by the pupil's own silent acknowledgment¹ is a less important, but by no means superfluous, aid to the endeavours of the teacher. If the teacher is obliged single-handed to represent the general voice, or even to contradict it, he will find it difficult to give weight to his reproof. It is then of paramount importance that he should possess absolute authority, by the side of which the pupil has no respect for any other judgment. In earlier years moral elementary instruction is practically blended with this judgment, which we here relegate to mothers and the better class of writings for children, begging only that it may not be converted into the stamping in of maxims—a process which, if everything goes on as well as possible, unduly hastens and even disturbs the subjective formation of character, besides being harmful to childlike ingenuousness.

It is wise, indeed absolutely necessary, to protect and foster the child's tender feeling *at this period*, by the removal of everything which may accustom the imagination to what is morally hateful. The care which this involves does not neces-

¹ Sincere acknowledgment, when there is obvious occasion for it, ought not to be obstinately shirked; it must not, however, be made through the fault of the teacher an easy play, a habit, an artifice, whereby to win coaxing. He who confesses *willingly* is not ashamed of himself, and from him who confesses by action that he attends to remonstrance, only an extremely rough discipline would wish to extort further words.—*Note by Herbart.*

sitate specially restrictive measures, so long as the body requires continuous care and watchfulness. But the mother must not prevent the child from running free in the fields as soon as it can, and teachers are unwise in adding to care for the physical well-being, moral anxiety also. For with advancing years, this so easily tends to dominate all the surroundings, and loses sight of the fact, that coddling in moral matters, just as in all others, is the worst means of protecting individuals against the harmfulness of climate. Warding off outward cold does not mean increasing inward warmth; but, on the contrary, moral warmth arises for the most part out of true work and conflict, in which already existent power is gradually firmly established through the stings of external ill. It is only the negligent teacher who finds that his boy takes up and imitates everything which he sees. Moderate care on the part of the teacher makes the pupil follow for *himself* the course of *his own* culture, and observe and judge the behaviour of coarse natures as a strange phenomenon, not to be compared with his own endeavours. If he comes into contact with them, they will so often offend his more delicate feeling, and on the other hand make his mental superiority so pleasant to him, that the teacher, if he has previously done his duty, will now have trouble to re-establish the necessary intercourse between the boy trained by him, and the others whose fate it has been to be neglected. But it is just in such *designedly* selected companionship by which the pupil's self-sufficiency is to be counteracted, that his *consciousness* will take its stand the more firmly on the moral, the more violently the *immoral* repels him.

Such a course discipline, taking into account the environment, must take. In so doing, considerable strength of morality, already well founded, is certainly presupposed. That I need not repeat how much here depends upon the circle of thought, I call attention only to the most important point in the teacher's treatment. *Well-earned approbation*, quietly but abundantly given out of a full heart, is the spring upon which the force of an abundant, convincing, carefully apportioned *blame*, emphasized by the most varied applications, must work, until the time arrives when the pupil possesses both praise and

blame within himself, and can guide and impel himself by their means. For a time does come, sooner or later, when the teacher's words will be superfluous—that will be when he continues to express what the pupil says just as well to himself. At this point a certain confidence begins between teacher and pupil, unsuited to an earlier period, which, in the form of reflections on general events, reverts every now and then to that which every individual has to work out in regard to his own moral being.

We have now arrived at the sphere of moral resolve and self-constraint. If emphatic speech has here no legitimate place, frequent *reminders* and *warnings*, ever more and more gentle, perform the essential service of fixing attention more steadfastly and proportionately on self-observation. For morality does not consist merely in the goodness and force of the resolve; much depends on *the sum of its points of contact with all parts of the circle of thought*. A kind of OMNIPRESENCE of moral criticism is the necessary condition of moral truth.¹ This criticism can hardly be expressed gently enough by the tongue of a stranger, and conversely, when strong words are used, and we want to blame and admonish with a certain thoroughness, we must choose moments which can give occasion for a survey, a revision of a long series of offences; we rise above the isolated cases which are only instances, but which, if looked at from a higher point of view, give clearness to the general consideration. Otherwise we appear to dress up petty unimportant things in big words.

Finally, with regard to that which *supports moral conflict*, the whole of the existing relation between pupil and teacher must determine how they should respectively approach and be in touch with each other. Behaviour which assumes the existence of a confidence really broken, would be as wrong as

¹ The pure *positive* of morality, of which a man's innermost depth must be full, if resolution is to be kept safe from humiliation . . . this *primary* part of morality, which, *as moral*, is the opposite of arbitrariness, and which, as the basis of virtue, is a purely *volitionless* force, a force solely of the naked judgment, to which the desires bend amazed, even before resolution has made them feel its doubtful power—this belongs entirely to the circle of thought; it depends wholly upon what forms this circle.—*Science of Education*, p. 221.

that confidence is desirable. Is it possible for any one to express all this more minutely in general rules? I prefer to leave it to the teacher's humanity and zeal carefully to search out the place where, and the manner in which, he can in moments of danger most safely and successfully reach and raise those intrusted to his care.

CHAPTER VI.

REVIEW OF THE DETAILS OF DISCIPLINE.

AT this stage, where a circumstantial science of education would have the opportunity of expounding the whole treasure of its observations and experiments, though without producing an organic whole, I will for two reasons be even briefer than the plan of this work in itself would allow. Firstly, I should be compelled, in dealing with individual expressions of morality and of moral discipline, to give definite references to my practical philosophy, which has not yet appeared; they cannot however, even in the briefest treatment, be entirely ignored. Secondly, I must assume that all readers of this book have previously studied Niemeyer's work, which has become classical amongst us—classical on account of its language, and the consistency of its execution. It is especially valuable to me on account of the wealth of subtle observations, scattered everywhere, concerning all the details of educational activity. An accumulation of such observations perhaps of greater value than the rest, are to be found in paragraphs 115 to 130 of the first volume, which lays down *the special principles of moral education with regard to individual virtues and vices*. I take this opportunity of asking the reader, when comparing Niemeyer's principles with mine, to look for those in which we agree, rather than for those in which we disagree. Such a comparison I regard as more useful and honourable to me than if one were to go round and round with the customary question—How much is new? A fundamental disagreement would certainly exist between Niemeyer and myself, if he were entirely in earnest

in the preface, where he writes, "in matters of education everything depends on extended *experience*." If Locke and Rousseau affirmed that, I should know exactly how to square their words with the spirit of their writings, and then at once declare myself their opponent. Herr Niemeyer will pardon me for believing in his work more than his words. What most distinctively raises him above foreigners, and entitles us to think with pride of our nationality, is in my eyes the definite moral tendency of his principles, whereas in the principles of Locke and Rousseau crude impulse holds entire sway, and, barely mitigated by a highly unstable moral feeling, leads to a superficial sensuous life. I certainly need not prove in opposition to Herr Niemeyer, that true moral principles cannot be learned from experience, but on the contrary the comprehension of experiences is modified by the mind with which each individual meets them. And thus all appearance of dispute will be avoided, if I add the confession that this book owes its existence almost as much to my little collection of carefully arranged observations and experiments gathered together on very various occasions, as it does to my philosophy.

I.

Occasional and Permanent Discipline.

The same principle, which determined the separation of analytical from synthetical instruction, can be taken into consideration in regard to discipline. For with it too, much depends upon what the pupil brings; and, as instruction analyses the circle of thought which it finds existent, in order to correct it, so the pupil's conduct often requires true and responsive guidance, and fortuitous circumstances need a regulation of their consequences. Something similar takes place in the management of every business, and makes us conscious of the difference between isolated, interrupted, occasional measures, and that settled procedure which works onward under the same presumptions according to the same plan. It is also in general true, that the more in accordance with its aim this settled procedure is arranged, and the more strictly it is followed, the

more will the result be a kind of well-being, supplying forces that will serve for the utilization of favourable chances, as well as for the avoidance of everything harmful. This must not be forgotten with discipline. There is here a species of false economy, which, when occasion serves, would try to win much in a moment, and neglects in so doing to take care of, and continually to increase what is already won; there is on the contrary a right and infallible method of acquiring, which disposes and grasps all relationships in such a way that the same opinions, the same resolves, are always created anew, and are thereby strengthened and established.

We must therefore be above all things careful, that this settled discipline enters and continues in the right track, and this care must be increased at times, when measures occasionally used may have somewhat disturbed previously well-ordered relationships. Exceptional treatment as well as exceptional events, special punishments and rewards, leave impressions behind which do not last, and ought still less to accumulate. It is a special art to restore everything to its former relation by a treatment, which makes it appear that nothing has happened.

II.

Application of Discipline to special ends.

We must first recapitulate from the third chapter what *is determinable* and what *determines* in moral character. Crude desire and volition—what the individual elects to endure, to possess, to pursue—are determinable; the ideas of *rectitude*, *goodness*, *inner freedom* are determinating. Both these have their origin in the whole of the circle of thought, and thus depend for their *development* on the varied movements of the mind, the animal instincts as well as the intellectual interests. Nothing more, however, now need be said respecting their origin, since I have repeatedly expressed my views in many ways concerning the formation of the circle of thought. We will now rather consider the *results* of the existent circle of thought, how they manifest themselves in a twofold manner,

partly in what is morally determinable, partly in the determining volition, and so encounter the limitations and beneficial influences of discipline. A process of combination lies before us, similar to that which gave occasion for a tabular synopsis in the second book sketching out the course of instruction. What *occasional*, what *permanent* discipline has to do to cultivate the spirit of patience, of acquirement, of industry, the ideas of rectitude, goodness, and inner freedom, in the young man—how they co-operate in their effect on each one of these, *restraining, determining, regulating, supporting*, how both give their individual contribution to culture as a whole, especially in each of the moral ideas, by *preserving a childlike mind*, by *approbation and blame*, by *admonitions and warnings*, by the *trustful strengthening* of moral self-control—to think all this out, link by link, is a task we leave to our readers, or, still better, to teachers who are just entering their profession. The reasons before given will serve to excuse me from attempting what would be but a vague sketch of the interweaving of these concepts, but I will content myself with adding, as indicating the possibility of such an interweaving, some observations bearing upon them in a less systematic way.

The expression of a true character does not depend on the moral fibre of the will alone, but also upon that which in a manner *shines through* it from beneath—what the individual would have desired and done, had not the moral determination altered the direction of the course of action. Two persons may exactly resemble each other in the goodness of their wills, but how differently will this goodness translate itself into action and effect, if the one has all manner of weak, changeable moods, and the other a compact and ordered totality of endeavour, which he can govern in himself by means of the incoming moral resolutions. Moral resolve will support itself on the latter, and side by side with that which the individual can do, with that which he is capable of daring and of conceiving, the better choice springs up *as choice*. From this again proceeds a measure of power and promptness, of self-helpfulness amidst external obstructions, in aid of moral resolve, which the individual could never have created for himself. Finally,

every man of already decided character goes forward unswerving, after each act of self-determination that duty prompts, while on the contrary, one whose character is not so established is always making another halt, is always beginning again from the beginning, and must continually receive from moral considerations an impulse to the most commonplace duty, and hence must experience a repugnant mixture of the highest with the lowest, which renders both distasteful.

But how can the desires, how can the choice amongst them have been determined and fortified by principles—how can a firm plan for external life have been founded, unless this choice, these principles, this plan proceeded at the same time from that which the individual endeavours to acquire and pursue, and continued through that which he is prepared to bear and to undertake for it? In *one* choice all this is co-existent, and if industry is not equal to the desires for possession, if patience does not endure until the point when it is important to use the right moment, then inconsistencies in the outer, and division in the inner, life will be inevitable. In such complications of that which intrinsically has nothing in common with morality, discretion will finally as it were be taken prisoner, and then there is an end of that clear and cheerful frame of mind, in which alone the good can be seen and perfectly desired. And in this way too (moral) good is lost to nations together with their prosperity and external order, although the converse, that good is created together with prosperity and external order is not likewise true.

Nevertheless the attitudes of mind which embrace the spirit of patience, the spirit of acquisitiveness, and the spirit of industry, are specifically different from each other. The first is yielding; the second, firm and steadfast; the third is an ever new beginning. The principles of patience are negative, those of acquisition positive, both these persistently direct attention to the same thing; the principles of industry, on the contrary, demand a constant movement of the mental eye from one thing to another.

It seems difficult, therefore, to unite three such diverse attitudes of mind with pre-eminent energy in one person, and still

more difficult to bring into harmony for a plan of life, that which the man desires to endure, to possess, to pursue. It is the more difficult, in that a plan of life cannot in reason be something entirely concrete. On the contrary only general maxims can be contained in it, in accordance with which the man intends to use possible opportunities, in order to make use of special abilities and advantages. However, we will first consider the particulars, and then the combination.

There are exercises in patience from youth onwards. The smallest child is designed by nature to submit itself to these exercises, and only an entirely misguided education, by over-indulgence on the one hand and severity on the other, can render patience difficult to the child.¹ We owe to modern teachers the careful determination of the right middle course, and I may look upon this determination as definitely made.

There are also abundant opportunities for exercising the spirit of acquisitiveness from youth onwards. Educationally considered, this is a far more delicate subject than the preceding. Imagine, on the one hand, a young child who attaches some value to possession, and, on the other, a boy who does not know how to keep his pocket-money—this will be sufficient to remind us, that while the foundations of thrift must be laid early, yet that childlike kindness which is not consistent with the exclusion of others must also be cherished. Without pursuing moral considerations in this place, a glance at child-nature shows us, that when a genuine spirit of acquisitiveness, (which consists not in a capricious desire of momentary possession, but in a continuous adherence thereto, and consequently pre-supposes a decided direction of the mind towards one point,) shows itself in early years, it indicates a species of mental malady, at least a want of animation; for the child ought to be far too much occupied with perceptions and ex-

¹ We must distinguish between two kinds of patience—active and passive—between hardships to be endured in work, and wishes to be denied, to be sacrificed. Education must accustom the child to the former, the latter however may become harmful. It is often better to take a bold step to escape an evil than to suffer it. We must not expose a child to be tormented by passive patience; if the latter were always a duty, vitality would be destroyed.—*Aphor. zur Pädagogik*,

periments in the world still so new to it, to have time to cling to the mere possession of a thing in thought. Instead then of designedly producing such a disease, we should rather, when it spontaneously shows itself, employ the natural corrective, increased incitement to varied occupations. Gradually, however, there will be things which the child will be allowed to have, on the use of which it will reckon, the withdrawal of which it would feel as a permanent loss. Such things may be called its own, and the spirit of acquisitiveness allowed to exercise itself on them. But it ought not to possess as its own, more than what it can mentally grasp. Further, exchange of its own with what belongs to others may cause the value of things to be impressed upon it. This is a preparation for the time when money may be given to the child. In order that the feeling of labour in acquiring may be connected with this, children should be allowed regularly to earn, but this will miss its aim if these small productions are bought, as grandmothers frequently buy them, above the market price.¹ Everything connected with the possession of honour is analogous to this. Ambition in very early years is a malady, which fellow-feeling and diversion of thought will cure. But as the natural sense of honour gradually and slowly develops with growing powers of body and mind, it must be carefully protected and fully guarded from deadly mortifications. For men need in life, honour as well as the possession of things; he who throws either the one or the other away passes in society with justice for a prodigal. And everything which educational artifice checks and retards in the natural development of care for both, causes later either an incurable weakness, or the suddenly awakened feeling springs forth, and surrenders itself the more easily to the commonest prejudices. Observe carefully, then, whether a boy is to some extent respected by his playfellows, or whether through trivial faults he becomes the object of their teasing. In the latter case take him away from

¹ This principle was followed by the Philanthropinists, especially Salzmann, who in his school at Schnepfenthal provided his pupils with various employments, for which they received a small payment.

this truly harmful companionship, but without punishing those who tease, for they are not worth your resentment; your educational insight must show you what consequences will remain behind in the boy intrusted to you. Try to cure his weaknesses, to cultivate his talents more perceptibly, and choose for him company in which these talents will be so strongly felt, that what on the other hand is found faulty in him will be balanced against it.

Finally, there are always opportunities from childhood upward for the exercise of industry.¹ We can, we ought, to foster, to guide, to watch continuously the earliest employments to which the child spontaneously shows itself invited by surrounding objects, and gently and gradually try to lead it to constancy, to keep longer to the same object, and pursue the same purpose. We may always *play* with the child, guide it in playing to something *useful*, if we have previously understood the earnestness which lies in the child's play, and the spontaneous efforts with which it will work itself out in happy moments, and also if we know how to abstain from such condescension as would check the child's upward efforts, for in such upward efforts in the childish things which will soon be left behind, it would have received instruction. For that instruction which, analytically or synthetically, aims at clearness of elementary presentations, and therewith commences the essential work of education, we should seek in the most direct way to gain the child's activity. *Mental activity is healthy too!* healthy as that of the limbs and internal organs; everything will be set in motion together, so that the child accomplishes what it can, without exhausting any one power. That alone consumes mind and body, which is pursued for a long time without interest, yet this does not take place so rapidly that we need fear having to conquer the first difficulties of what will soon arouse interest.² *We must accustom the child to work of every kind.* That which is pre-eminently successful, will always impart its own direction to industry. A special choice amongst occupations will always call out special features in the character and plan of life.

But this direction of industry must also accommodate itself to the wish for possession, and both must arm themselves with

¹ *Introd. to Science*, p. 171.

² *Ibid.*, p. 40.

the same patience, the same kind of endurance in waiting and in suffering, which is pre-eminently required by circumstances, for such wishes and such an industry. In doing this the earlier education of the child must not be burdened with special kinds of training or hardening for a definite position in life. General culture by no means gives the boy himself the means of knowing what he will choose to become, and of circumscribing his interest accordingly. The man of many-sided culture possesses a many-sided equipment; his choice *may* be made late, for he will easily attain the necessary skilfulness in any case, and by a later choice he will gain infinitely in the certainty of not going wrong, from a mistaken conception of his own character, or from changeable circumstances.

We must expect, however, from a clear head and a cultivated mind, that a young man's delayed choice will be adequate to unite his inclinations in regard to patience, acquisitiveness and activity. For this is the work of an active *reflection* more than of any antecedent practice. Only we must then allow this reflection quietly to rule, and carefully guard against disturbing the self-determination then beginning by various exacting minor considerations, or by the claims of an interminable discipline, which may degenerate unconsciously into real cruelty towards a sensitive mind. We ought rather to accustom ourselves to look out with the young man in *his* way on the world and on the future.

Here then the assertion that mental culture is the central point of all education acquires a new validity. It is only men who are allowed to grow up with dull or entirely distorted minds, or those who are irresponsibly drawn hither and thither by the fine threads of youthful susceptibility, who are ignorant how to get on with the world and themselves; they chafe and beat themselves against the contradictions of their own efforts, and finally succumb the more surely to the bare necessity of care for subsistence and other social amenities. Such sights may seduce the teacher to cram by means of divers anxious artifices, the youthful mind with a number of acquirements for ordinary life, yes, and even by talking of these things, to attract the attention of adults and fill the booksellers' shops.

Where health and the proportions of intellectual interest have been cared for, as much judgment and flexibility as a man requires to get through life will, in the end, be spontaneously forthcoming. But to travel through life with a steady mind and firm courage, to be able to practise moral self-control more easily, and I might add with more *inward grace*—to these ends, the aid of discipline before described is of service.

Above all we must not forget, that we have now only spoken of the laying of the foundation upon which moral worth is to be built up.

It would indeed be no great task for discipline to cultivate the spirit of endurance, of acquisitiveness, and of activity in such a manner, that out of all that ought to shine through the moral resolves nothing more than a very respectable character, alien to morality, would be determined and strengthened. The *true* task of discipline, on the contrary, is to observe and to adjust the relation between this kind of cultivation and the moral, during the whole course of education. For in truth everything here is relative. The decided preponderance ought to be on the moral side, but there is a preponderance among small as among great weights. With frivolous young people both weights remain for a long time small, and a slight preponderance finally determines the life. With steady temperaments, whose attention is drawn in early life to the splendour of the good things of this world, very strong ideas of this kind are compatible at times with a moral and religious energy of nevertheless considerable depth. But how can we begin to give rules for the observation of a *relation* so important? acknowledge my inability, and believe it will be long before the practical teacher will be able to share the gain he himself wins with any theory. I pass therefore to the second part of this relation, which, taken singly, invites me to some remarks, though in the absence of practical philosophy they can be but very brief.

I have named *rectitude*,¹ *goodness*, and *inward freedom* as the *original manifold*, to which the concept of morality in general relates through their claim to obedience. It has been already mentioned that under the expression *rectitude*, two specifically

¹ *Introd. to Science of Educ.*, p. 169.

diverse practical ideas, entirely independent of each other, are comprehended. These two ideas are *Right* and *Equity*. In order to characterize them, we may take as the motto of right, "to every man his own"¹—as the motto of equity, "to every man what he deserves."² And to convince ourselves that our abortive rights of nature have mixed and confused both these claims in the strangest manner, we may remember in passing the so-called scales of justice, and ask ourselves what the judge would do with the scales when some one demanded his property back again? Or we may reflect a little more seriously on the contradiction, "summum jus, summa injuria,"³ to understand that here by the expression *jus*, just as in my expression *rectitude*, two entirely different concepts must doubtless be understood, of which neither can be contained or determined by the other. But the same reason which up till now has been the cause of a gross confusion in practical philosophy, may be a reason for the science of education to combine both diverse ideas. They are generally created contemporaneously and by the same circumstances; they enter into the same decisions, and therefore it is not easy to suppose that an ingenuous mind which makes its moral insight more keen for the one, will not at the same time do so for the other. Mothers who maintain order among their children decide innumerable times according to both ideas, certainly not always without mistakes, and when wrong are generally so, because they themselves wish to *rule therein* too much.

This leads me to the chief observation which I have to make here in relation to the science of education. The great work of education, to make the sense of right active early in youth, would proceed of itself without difficulty, if combined with good discipline and government; the moral perceptions which belong thereto would be the first and most natural among them all, if children were allowed to accommodate themselves to

¹ *Introd. to Science*, p. 71. ² *Ibid.*, p. 72.

³ "The highest (strictest) right, is the highest (greatest) inequity." Obviously this familiar term "*Ungerechtigkeit*," probably copied from Terence (dicunt, *jus summum sæpe summa est malitia*) signifies not the direct contradictory of right, but only unequitable, so that both concepts of right and of equity taken in the negative sense can be combined therein in thought as Herbart combined them above in the concept of rectitude.—*Anmerkung von Karl Richter.*

and associate with each other in their own way, and could be judiciously left to themselves. For where human beings, big or little, rub against each other, the relationships with which those moral perceptions are connected develop abundantly and spontaneously. Each one soon has something individual which the others acknowledge; the children associate with each other and exchange things and services at prices more or less fixed. The interference of adults, and the anticipation of this possible interference alone, makes justice among children uncertain, and deprives it of their respect; well-meaning government has this effect in common with every other which is despotic. It is obviously impossible to rule children like citizens; but we may lay it down as a principle, *never to disturb what exists among children without good reasons*, nor change their intercourse into forced politeness. When disputes arise, we must first ascertain what has been settled and agreed upon amongst the children themselves, and must take the part of the one who in any sort of way has been deprived of his own. Then we must try to help each one to what he deserves, so far as this is possible without violent injury to justice. And finally we must point beyond all this to what is best for the common good, as that to which it is right that both property and merit shall be spontaneously sacrificed, and which will be for all the chief measure for future agreements.¹ If discipline has got beyond the first beginnings, it must never allow the pupil to habituate himself to making *his* right the determining ground of his actions; the right of others alone must be for him a strict law. No one ought to invent for himself *initial* right, nor arbitrarily presume to interpolate for himself one more reasonable than that which exists.²

The expression, *goodness*, should call to mind *benevolence*.³ It

¹ Herbart here shows the practical ideas of Right, Equity, and an administrative system, active in children.—See *Introd. to Science*, p. 169.

² The reason why the first place is assigned to rectitude for the formation of the objective part of the character is, that the relations of right and equity signified by the term are more important than those of benevolence and culture, and because, since they occur so numerously in youth, they can and ought easily to be understood.

³ For the further definition of *benevolence* or *good-will* see translators' Introduction, p. 29.

is very important to distinguish here two points both of equal importance, because they are originally different from, and independent of each other, and therefore seldom exist in equal strength, and yet are both indispensable if benevolence is to become a settled feature of character. That is to say, it is necessary that a rich measure of good-will shall exist *as natural feeling* in the objective of the character, and equally necessary that in the subjective, the idea of *good-will* shall be fostered to maturity as an object of moral taste. Philosophers have never assigned the latter its true place and rank; only in religious teaching are principles enunciated in which nothing is wanting, save quietness, and sobriety of reflection. It seems to be a frequent misfortune of humanity, that good-will only endures in feeling, and disappears in the degree in which the character grows cold through discretion. And in fact it is not easy to hold fast to the idea of *good-will* in its purity, as I will explain in another place in more detail.¹ That the character should not be wanting in good-will as feeling, or goodness of heart, will be provided for through an actively aroused sympathy, the difference between which and benevolence cannot here be shown.² That discipline may be here at one with instruction, let the former see that children feel much *with* each other, that *they are companions in joy and sorrow*.³ The opposite effect will take place if we allow many chances of divided interest among them. But it is one thing to accompany some joy or pain with sympathy and good-will, another thing to comprehend *good-will* itself! When we begin to speak of good-will, the time is come for taste to become conscious of approbation, which is the natural result of quiet

¹ *Note by Herbart.*—Especially the two ideas, *good-will* and *equity*, which have hitherto been most misunderstood, require most of all, speculative art for their proper exhibition.

² According to the *Allg. prakt. Philosophie*, the distinction mentioned here between sympathy and benevolence consists in sympathy, as merely an involuntary imitation of an alien feeling, whether of joy or pain, being only a simple condition of our inner being, while benevolence rests on the absolutely pleasing unanimity of our own will with a foreign will, that is a relationship of two wills.

³ *Introd. to Science*, p. 70.

contemplation. Paintings embodying benevolent sentiments, stories of deeds in which they are manifested, may, by means of the most characteristic traits, reach the highest degree of distinctness; they must not seek to carry the heart away by emotion only, or they destroy the tone of mind in which alone they can truly please. If the children's susceptibility spontaneously mingles emotion with the consideration of such things, we may enjoy in silent pleasure the welling up of lovable feelings, and must forbear from exciting it still more, but break gently off and return to seriousness. The emotions will subside, they will become rarer with years, yes, they will be laughed at by later prudence, relegated to the region of youthful folly, and forcibly suppressed by the principles of a circumspect egoism, unless taste in its maturity and steadfastness makes head against this, and calls forth another wisdom. The ease with which benevolent characters begin to be corrupted through their own logic, if they remain for a time unwatched, is one of the most disagreeable of a teacher's experiences, though certainly one that ought not to be entirely unexpected. In this respect the disposition to early manliness, otherwise so excellent, is mostly to be feared.

So far as disposition goes, they who incline to *goodness* and they who incline to *inner freedom*, appear to be almost opposite kinds of men.¹ The good-natured, who can warmly rejoice when things go well with others, are wont themselves to love comfort, and to give way considerably to manifold changes of feeling; the strong whom fate does not bend, and who will not hear of bending, are wont only to call those who do bend, weak, and coldly to blame them. The antithesis here lies by no means in the judgments of taste, whereby the ideas of benevolence and of inward freedom are created; these are entirely independent of each other, and just for that reason are neither for nor against each other. But it lies in the objective of the character which

¹ Note by Herbart.—I must, however, here beg some readers not to identify *inner freedom* with *transcendental freedom*. We are all conscious of the former whenever we force ourselves to duty against our inclinations; the science of teaching may not know anything of the latter because nothing can be built upon it, and my pedagogy ignores it, because my philosophy rejects it.

makes the following out of the ideas easy or difficult. We may call to mind *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία* in Plato.¹ The susceptible desiring mind, which perceives in itself many likes and dislikes, possesses in them the principle of a lively sympathy and consequently also a rich spring of natural benevolence; to this is wont to be added the yielding of the subjective to the objective of character, which subjective readily finds principles answering to the inclinations.² The weaker on the contrary the susceptibility, and the greater all kinds of activity and consciousness of energy, the more capability will there be for genuine *resolute volition* (conformably to what I have said before in respect to action as the principle of character), and this prepares the ground for volition based upon insight. With insight, benevolence as a natural feeling is often not at all compatible; on the contrary, it is characteristic of inward freedom to follow no natural feeling unconditionally. If then the idea of benevolence is wanting, inward freedom will take pride in its coldness, and thereby, with perfect justice, will shock the warm-hearted and benevolent. So much the more necessary is the cultivation of the latter idea.³ But as for the right development of the idea of inner freedom, unfortunately it is primarily a philosophical, and only secondarily an educational problem, therefore I should run the risk of treating the latter vaguely, if I here tried to pursue it further. Only we must not talk too much to the young man of *unity with himself*, which he himself should settle according to his own inclinations.

My readers might well anticipate, that from the elements of the practical ideas about which I have been silent rather than explanatory, many finer definitions for educational instruction, especially for the synthetic, would be forthcoming,—that amongst others, through them alone the educational nature of the reading of Sophocles and Plato after Homer, and of Cicero and

¹ Plato assumed between thought and desire the *θυμός*, the energy which could act either on the side of reason (*λογιστικόν*), or of morality (*ἐπιθυμητικόν*), and impart to one or the other the impetus to real activity, which, without it, they did not possess; thus it was somewhat similar to what was afterwards called "freedom of will." ² This refers to the good natured.

³ *Introd. to Science*, p. 73. Herbart here implies the necessity for proportion between the five practical ideas.

Epictetus, after all these, would be placed in its true light. A hint on this point may at any rate present the *Odysseus* of Sophocles in contrast to that of Homer, if there be a desire to study the *Philoctetes* almost immediately after the *Odyssey*. The question also may be asked, what influence the historical basis of our positive religion, so important to education, will probably have, if acquaintance with the Platonic Socrates, as he perhaps discloses himself in the *Crito* and *Apologia*, came first, and if later the Stoic moral philosophy introduces the study of Kant and Fichte's modes of presentation. I surely need not remind you that it would be entirely unpedagogic, if instead of successive concentrations on each one of these systems, we tried to make a muddle of all together. To describe circumstantially things of this kind is not the business of the science of education; it can only suggest the consideration of what would be necessary and useful as answer to its essential demands.

For the same reason, I must also leave out here the development of what each single one amidst the practical ideas would accomplish through instruction adapted primarily to many-sidedness of interest. Above all, however, no one will fail to notice, that where compassionate sympathy, where all-powerful social interest, and finally where a tone of mind favourable to taste is aroused and maintained, a number of conceptions must be already spontaneously developed, of which practical philosophy will only need hereafter to make a concise exposition in order to mark out and define still more sharply the moral principles.

By the side of necessary instruction, the teacher's inventive power must always be employed in the arrangement and utilisation of any opportunities wherein the moral feelings show themselves alert and active, and in which they can be perfected and exercised. Need I name the best of these opportunities—family festivals—of which none ought to escape the teacher's attention and co-operation. Doubtless we should be greatly mistaken if we thought the beneficial impressions of such times, which exercise enduring influence for many years, could exercise any considerable force in later life—if we hoped

to be able to compose as it were out of similar emotions a person's whole mode of thought. But from the tone of mind in which the youth is placed and maintained, the inner working out of the gifts of instruction is determined, and upon it are contingent the views of experience and knowledge, and the force and blending of the early conceptions of eternal truth and goodness.

Only let not merely scattered opportunities, but, if possible, continuous activity also, keep alive the feelings of right, of benevolence, and of self-control. For *benevolence*, such will certainly be forthcoming; also for the feelings of *right* and *equity* opportunities of exercise amongst brothers, sisters, and playfellows will arise spontaneously, if not connected yet all the more freely, if possession, earning, and the arrangements growing out of them are not entirely wanting in this little circle, or are not made use of too indiscreetly by discipline. Self-control, which makes human beings inwardly free, finds abundant opportunity, not only in morality proper, but in everything which in any way may be considered as belonging to taste. It is not at all necessary here to catch at educational devices, no arbitrary aimless sacrifices and burdens are needed; such have nothing in common with inner freedom, for *it* consists in the following of insight. But we must quicker early and with ever-increasing care the sense of the differences between what is for, and what is opposed to, taste; thus a number of little duties will arise, ranging upwards from efforts after cleanliness and order, to the attention which social relationships require, the observation of which imparts to the mind a steady beneficent tension. But precisely in these things, discipline must guard against an emphasis of which insight cannot approve. It must treat nothing here with exaggerated importance, for little things would thereby become completely trivial to the ingenuous mind, but rather strive to compass everything by gentle restraints. In cases of necessity, government must take vigorous measures. But if discipline be exchanged for government, if we leave that force to operate continually and persistently on all trivial occasions, which, used occasionally, makes good again what the children have

spoiled, if that force be given to pressure which belongs only to the sudden blow, then we must not be surprised if the power of the boy succumbs, if finally the wild untutored youth maintains his superiority to the weakling over-trained.

The young child is not yet capable of valuing the benefit of education. A boy of twelve years, rightly guided from early childhood, prizes it above everything from his deep sense of the need of guidance. The youth of sixteen begins to take on himself the teacher's work; he has partly appropriated his point of view, he accepts it, and marks out for himself his course accordingly; he manages himself and compares this self-treatment with that which continuously fell to his lot from the teacher. It must be so—for he who knows himself best and looks through himself most directly, will, at times, see with greater clearness, than he who always remains another person. It must be so—for he feels himself unnecessarily constrained, and his obedience transforms itself more and more into forbearance to the benefactor of earlier years. Under this forbearance, however, he wishes to suffer as little as possible. Then follow efforts to gently throw off the weight of discipline. These efforts will multiply in very rapid progression, if on the one side the teacher notices nothing, and if on the other the pupil does not still often make mistakes, and judgment does not fall into his own hands in his own eyes. But in any case they multiply. A wrong feeling may now easily possess the teacher, impelling him to make an end suddenly. Yet his duty will restrain him. He will interfere more rarely, more guardedly, and always more under the presumption that he is exercising influence on a fine excitable susceptibility; he will seek to touch the subjective more than the objective of the character; he will try to guide not the reins, but the hand which holds the reins. Moreover, it is now of supreme importance that the principles become perfectly formed and purified, which will henceforth rule the life. Instruction, therefore, will still continue, after discipline has almost disappeared. But further, instruction no longer touches a merely receptive mind; the pupil will himself judge. To the end

that he may examine, he begins by doubting. That he may be free from his embarrassing confinement within his habitual circle of thought, he enters the sphere of other opposing opinions. Little differences of views, which gradually arise and have hitherto remained unnoticed, acquire voice and growth under the favouring influence of strange impressions, to which the charm of novelty gives force. The principles become deflected just in the years when the physical side of the man and the social relations come to the front with irresistible claims. What will now protect the toilsome work of education? What *ought* to protect it? What, if not its inner rightness, the truth of convictions, the clearness and breadth of the intellectual gaze, if not the feeling of mastery over men and opinions, and the responsive inward gratitude for that care which has rendered such an ascendancy possible? Let the teacher have courage, when he has failed, to see the consequences of his failures, and also have courage to learn from them. And so let the young man, at any rate now that he is grown, hear the language of the world. Let time bear him forth to its illusions and its revelations, to its troubles and its joys! or let him try to influence its changes, to test and to show his courage and his power—the courage and power inborn, cultivated, and self-won!

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
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